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I. INTRODUCTION 
A, Definition of Subject 
This thesis is concerned with efficient choices of crop rotations and 
fertilizer levels on crop-share rented farms. Most of the inefficiency 
that exists in these choices originates in one of the following throe 
sources: (l) rental institutions, (2) imperfect knowledge of prices and 
production relationships, and (3) alternative goals besides cash income on 
the part of the farmer. 
The latter two sources of inefficiency are common to all farms and 
tvre assumed to be non-existent for purposes of this study. In other words, 
the behavior of the owner-operated fam is assumed to be synonomous with 
an efficient allocation of resources on that farm. 
Rental institutions affect the efficiency of operation of leased 
farms in many ways; however, this study is only concerned with the ways 
in which crop-share leases influence the choice of crops and variable 
inputs. The eB^jirical exaiqjle used restricts the implications of this 
study to choices of crop rotation and fertilizer level, 
B, Objectives of Study 
The objectives of this stui^ arei 
(1) To review the basic ideas of production economics which apply to 
choices of crop rotations and efficient leasing. 
(2) To explain some basic ideas pertaining to linear programming, 
(3) To test certain hypotheses that pertain to the efficiency of different 
2 
orop-ahare leases. A lease is assumed to be efficient when the opti­
mum programs of the tenant and landlord provide the same allocation 
of resources as a similar owner-operated firm. 
3 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Three subjects are combined in this study: crop rotations, crop-share 
leasing, and linear programming. Each of them is based on the principles 
of production economics, Basic principles of production economics are 
outlined below, and some of their applications to crop rotations and crop-
share leasing explained. Linear programming is eaqplained in the following 
chapter, 
A, Production Economics 
Three basic production relationships account for the choices which a 
firm must make in maximizing profits (l8), (3.) Changing one factor and 
the output while all other factors are constant, (2) Substitution of one 
factor for another while the production remains the same. (3) Substitu­
tion of one product for another while all inputs remain the same. The 
relationships are conveniently summarized as factor-product, factor-factor, 
and product-product relationships. 
Factor-product relationshit) 
The nature of the single factor-product or input-output relationship 
I 
is illustrated in Figure 1, Units of one input are measured along the 
horizontal axis and the corresponding output is measured on the vertical 
axis and indicatSd by the totel product curve. The increases in output 
associated vrith each increase in the inputs are indicated by the dotted 
steps in Figure 1, The ratio of the change in output to the change in 
inputs from any one level of input to another is known as the marginal 
u 
product. The most precise measiire of marginal product is the first deriva­
tive of the production function for the desired level of input. The 
average product and the marginal product are indicated in the lower part 
of Figure 1, The aversige product is simply the output divided by the 
input for any one level of input. Other inputs are held constant while 
one Ib increased, and the relative scarcity of the fixed inputs eventually 
causes diminishing marginal returns and the leveling off of the total 
product curve. 
The moet profitable level of input use is determined if the ratio of 
the price of the input to the price of the product is known. This ratio 
is expressed by ab/ac in Figure 1, or the slope of the line be, which is 
tangent to the total product curve at c. Since this tangent also expresses 
the slope of the total product curve at c, it is identical to the marginal 
product. Profit is represented by the distance ob, and it is maximized at 
this point where the price ratio of input to output equals the marginal 
product. 
Regardless of the price ratio, it is inefficient to produce beyond 
the point where a total product curve turns down, and the marginal product 
of one input is negative. This is a purely physical inefficiency because 
more product can be obtained by reducing this one input. 
It is very possible that some outputs increase in constant proportion 
with the increase in one, or a group of, inputs. For example, the total 
com yield may vary in a constant proportion with the number of acres 
harvested. Other inputs used are assumed to be in superabundant supply. 
This constant proportions factor-product curve is merely a straight line 
through the origin, and its average product equals the marginal product. 
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These constant proportions hetween inputs and output are assumed in linear 
programmingt as indicated below. 
2* Factor-factor substitution 
The substitution of one input for another, while output and all other 
inputs are held constant, is graphically depicted by an "iso-product curve" 
in Figure 2. There is an iso-product curve for every level of output and 
none of these can intersect since each represents the different efficient 
ways of producing that one level of output. The axes in Figure 2 represent 
physical inputs of and X2. The slope of an iso-product curve at any 
point is called the "marginal rate of substitution" of *2 *1» 
The iimnediate objective in this analysis is to demonstrate a way to 
minimize the cost of producing one level of output such as that indicated 
by the iso-product curve, P, In Figure 2 the iso-cost curve represents 
different amounts of and Xg that can be purchased with a certain amount 
of money. Its slope is the price ratio of X2 to X]^, There are an infinite 
number of paredlel iso-cost curves above and below the one shown represent­
ing higher and lower expenditures on inputs. The least-cost combination 
of inputs which can be used to produce P is indicated by the tangency point 
of the iso-cost line and the iso-product curve at 0. This prescribes that 
oa of x^ and ob of X2 will be used. Hence an optimum combination of inputs 
is said to occvir whenever the marginal rate of substitution equals the 
price ratio for any pair of inputs. 
In conventional economic applications the iso-product curve is assumed 
to be convex to the origin as is the one in Figure 2, This condition 
insures that the above marginal condition yields a minimum cost and not a 
6 
maxiimim cost. If inputs are perfect substitutes for one another and the 
iso-product curve is a straight line, it normally pays to use only one of 
the inputs. At the other extreme if the iso-product curve is a right angle 
with each arm parallel to one of the axes, the inputs do not substitute for 
one another at all, and must be used in fixed proportions. This type of 
iso-product curve is assumed in defining linescr pi^gramming activities, 
3. Product-product relationships 
In the third production relationship, inputs are held constant and 
products are substituted one for another. The graphic device used here is 
an iso-resource curve or transformation curve as illustrated in Figure 3» 
This iso-resource cxirve shows the combinations of two products that can be 
produced with a fixed quantity of inputs available. In Figure 3 the iso-
resource curve illustrates a typiceO. production relationship where the 
marginal rate of substitution of ?2 ^1 increases as P2 is substituted 
for P]^, This marginal rate of substitution is again the slope of the 
transformation curve at ai^ one point. 
The objective in this analysis is to maximize profit l?y choosing the 
right combination of the two products which can be produced with a speci­
fied quantity of inputs. Here the price ratio of the two products is 
graphically represented by an iso-revenue curve. The highest such iso-
revenue curve is found at the point of its tangency with the iso-resource 
curve. Profit is again maximum where the marginal rate of substitution 
equals the price ratio. In Figvire 3 this maximum pTOfit output wovild be 
where oa units of P^^ and ob units of are produced. 
7 
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One can define two areas of irrational production here corresponding 
to a marginal product that is zero or negative. Whenever more of one 
product is obtained with no sacrifice of the other product, the production 
of the one is described as "supplementary," or in addition to the constant 
output of the other. Whenever addition of one product adds to the total 
output of the other, production of the one is "complementary" to the other. 
It is obvious that production where either complementarity or supplemen-
tarity is possible is irrational from the standpoint of maadLraum physical 
production. 
Complementarity is illustrated in Figure 4, by the part of the iso-
resource curve marked "c," It occurs whenever the iso-resoTirce curve has 
a positive slope. The dotted iso-revenue line is for a price of equal 
to zero and shows that it pays to produce so long as the physical output 
of ?2 increases with P^, This relationship is particularly inqportant with 
respect to the economics of crop rotations and crop-share leasing. Even 
though it is physically inefficient, there are \inderstandable reasons why 
production is sometimes carried on within this complementary range. 
The supplementary portion of the iso-resource curve in Figure A is 
marked "s," Whenever an iso-resource curve is either horizontal or 
vertical, supplementarity exists. It is usually possible whenever a flow 
of resources, such as labor or water, is present but, because of other 
resource limitations, cannot be absorbed in production of a particular 
product. Sometimes this "excess" can be used on some other product so as 
to increase profits. 
Awareness of the physical inefficiency of these two ranges of produc­
tion directs the profit-maximizing farmer to produce within the competitive 
9 
range where It is the economic criteria of the price ratio that helps him 
find his maximum profit combination. 
The above is a brief introduction to production theory by graphic 
techniques. Production principles take on meaning when they are applied 
to actiial problems, and they must be applied with flexibility and tmder-
standing rather than as laws with very narrow and specific meanings (lO), 
B, The Economics of Crop Rotations 
The economic theory of crop rotations is developed directly from 
production theory pertaining to the choice of products. However, the main 
empirical techniques used to illustrate and confirm this theory are 
budgeted crop rotation programs. Budgeting techniques and linear program­
ming are ideally sviited to problems in the selection of crop rotations 
since there are normally a limited nmber of distinct alternatives from 
which to choose. 
1. Complementarity 
The iso-resource curve typically used in the economic theory of the 
choice of crop rotations is one that classifies all products as either 
grain or forage crops. The rationale behind such a classification is 
exactly the same as that of the rotation itself. The grain crops typically 
deplete the soil of nitrogen, other elements and huraus, while the forage 
crops restore some of these. 
Figure U above can be used to illustrate the choice of the amount of 
grain and forage for a rotation. Grain would replace on the vertical 
axis and forage output would be indicated along the horizontal axis. 
10 
Forage is complementary to grain production from no forage production to 
ox. Even if the forage has no value, it pays to produce this amount of it, 
simply because it increases the grain output. 
2. Dil.pg9ntlffpo>^8 cury^ 
In actual practice, however, there are not an infinite ntimber of 
rotations to choose among. Figure 5 illustrates the hypothetical produc­
tion of six rotations involving com, oats, and meadow. The Jointed nature 
of the production possibility curve leads to the selection of one rotation, 
such as CCCOMM in Figure 5, for a wide range of price changes. 
If a whole farm must be devoted to one rotation, then the iso-resource 
curve in Figure 5 is represented by one point for each rotation, indicating 
that the combination of grain and forage production between points is not 
possible. On the other hand, if the land can be divided so that, for 
example, half a farm is devoted to CCCCOM and the other half to CCCOMM, the 
product of such a combination is indicated by the midpoint of the line 
joining these two points in Figure 5. 
3. Effect of fertilizer 
It is possible that high levels of fertilization eliminate the coii5)le-
mentary range of the iso-product curve, and, if the fertilizer is cheap 
enough, eliminate forage in the optimum rotation. The hypothetical effect 
upon iso-resource curves of fertilization of the grain crops is illustrated 
in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 shows four different iso-resource curves representing four 
fertilizer levels for grain. The effect of fertilizing the grain is to 
11 
increase the yields, eliminate the complementarity, increase total coats, 
and possibly increase income. 
A. "Iflo-land" curve 
It is evident that different quantities of resources may be needed 
at each point on one of the crop-ix)tation iso-resource cujrves illustrated 
in Figures 5 and 6, Yet an "iso-resource" curve means that the same 
resources are used at each point. Since the land input is the same for 
each point, technically this is only an "iso-land" curve. If the labor 
supply is superabundant, a faraer might ignore the fact that one rotation 
requires more work on his part than another. However, many capital 
expenses, such as gasoline, seed, and above all, fertilizer, do vary with 
the output of different rotations. 
If the market prices of grain and forage are used in formulating the 
price ratios, or the iso-revenue lines, it is gross income that is maxi­
mized. Whenever the capital costs of each rotation are the same, net 
income and gross income are maximized at the same time. But when these 
costs vary from one rotation to the next, the rotation having the maximum 
gross income need not also have the maximum net income. A logical solution 
to this problem is an iso-net income line instead of an iso-revenue line 
in graphic analysis. This line reflects the net price rather than the 
market price ratio, and the net price is found by subtracting the capital 
costs per unit from the market price per unit of product. Typically, the 
net costs per unit of meadow are less than for grain crops. Hence, the 
change from gross to net prices most likely will increase the slope of the 
price-ratio line. That is, if the capital costs are greatest for grain. 
12 
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consideration of net prices shifts the optimum choice of rotations toward 
forage. 
Four fertilizer levels and six rotations are illustrated in Figure 6, 
Perhaps the simplest way to choose the most profitable alternative from 
these is to budget the receipts and expenses for each. The fact that a 
different iso-net income line is needed for each pair of points makes a 
graphic solution cumbersome. 
5. Time factor 
Another important factor is the time required to work out the rotation. 
A rotation may slowly build up the soil or tear it down depending upon the 
rotation, the soil practices and crops raised in the years before its 
adoption, A farm which has been planted to continuous com for many years 
will not enjoy the possible complementary effects of a CCCCOM rotation 
until about six years after the rotation is adopted, and it may take 12 
years or more to reach the maximum potential of such a rotation. The 
nature of this gradual increase in land productivity is illTOstrated by 
Figure 7 in which four iso-resource curves show the opportunities open to 
a farmer at various numbers of years after the rotations are adopted. 
If rotations involving large amoimts of grain are introduced on a 
farm where the soil is already in excellent condition, progressive deteri­
oration of the soil takes place. This is illustrated in Figure 8 by 
successive decreases in com yields, ci, cg, 03 and c^, along the vertical 
axis. The soil deteriorates less under the rotations involving some 
meadow, and, of course, not at all under a continuous meadow rotation. 
u 
This consideration of the time needed to obtain fiiU results from a 
rotation places the choice of a rotation in much the same light as any 
investment in conservation. Usually a sacrifice is involved in early years 
to enjoy greater productivity and income at a later date^ Some farmers 
who acquire run-down farms have sufficient resources to proceed at once to 
build up the soil by plowing under forage crops on the whole farm, and then 
adopting a rotation. More often, however, they gradually build up the soil 
to a reasonable level making small conservation investments and gradual 
adjustments. Figure 8 illustrates a disinvestment in soil capital and the 
opposite of soil conservation. Here the farmer enjoys extra income during 
the early years while the soil is being adjusted downward to the produc­
tivity of the rotation he has chosen, 
C, Economics of Crop-Share Leasing 
Crop-share leasing arrangements are the most common type of lease in 
the Midwest and represent about 75 per cent of the leases in North Central 
Iowa, Results of a random sangjle of all tenants in this area of Iowa, 
conducted in 1952 by the North Central Land Tenure Research Committee, 
revealed that out of 342 tenants who responded 62 per cent had crop-share-
cash leases, lA per cent had pure crop-share leases, 19 per cent had 
livestock-share leases, and 5 per cent had cash leases (19, Supplementary 
Tables}, 
1, Crop-rotation decision 
Choice of crop rotation is not left solely to the tenant under crop-
share and crop-share-cash leases, as it typically is under purely cash 
15 
leases. A study by Heady and Kehrberg in 1949 of rented farms in the Tama 
soil area revealed that 4B,7 per cent of these landlords took part in 
specifying the cropping system (l6), A study of rental practices in Noirbh 
Central Iowa by Timmons in 1948 and 1949 revealed that out of 98 crop-share 
tenants surveyed, 48 estimated that they had greater than 75 per cent of 
the say in choice of crop rotation, 36 had up to 50 per cent say in this 
decision, and only 5 per cent had nothing to say in this choice (26). In 
other words, perhaps 60 to 90 per cent of tenants have something to say in 
the decision as to cropping practices. 
It is clear that the erop-share lease has not provided a definite way 
in which the question "what to produce?" is resolved. This is, and perhaps 
will continue to be, a major source of disharmoi^ between landlord and 
tenant. The Heady and Kehrberg study cited above revealed that the fol­
lowing percentages of the crop-share tenants desired to make these changes 
on their farmsj 17,6 per cent a different rotation, 16 per cent more 
pasture, 8 per cent more cattle, 23 per cent building repairs, and 21.6 
per cent new buildings, 
2, T^gi^g t9T lefipeg 
No assunqDtions as to which party chooses the crop rotation are made 
below. The principal test applied simply asks if a particular lease 
"results" in an optimum allocation of resources and rental harmony. It 
takes this optimum allocation from the maximum-profit program chosen 
by an owner-operated farm with the combined resources of the tenant and 
16 
landlord,* A lease is said to be efficient if the optimum program for each 
party is the same as the optimum for the combined firm. 
Parts of this condition can be fulfilled while the whole is not, and 
each part is considered desirable in its own right, (l) The tenant desires 
the efficient program of the owner-operator while the landlord does not, 
(2) The landlord desires this program while the tenant does not. Or (3) 
there is harmony between the two leasing parties at something other than 
the optimum program of the combined firm. These instances of harmony are 
used as Bubo3?dinate tests to the main one of complete agreement with the 
owner-operated firm. 
There is no rigidly logical connection which specifies that where 
there is rental harmony between the landlord and tenant the combined income 
will be maximum. It definitely seems, however, that the production choice 
which maximizes combined income stands a better chance of being harmonious 
over the long run than one which does not. Movements in the direction of 
harmony typically are toward higher combined income and vice versa, since 
these at least increase one party's income while the other's remains 
constant, 
3. Designing an efficient shrire lease 
The above tests ignore problems of the distribution of Income, The 
functions of a perfect lease are really duals (l) to provide an equitable 
''Owner operation is assumed to provide an index of efficient alloca­
tion here, even though it is quite possible for leasing systems to provide ^ 
a more efficient allocation than owner-operation. Witness that half the 
farms and more than half the land in Iowa are rented. Large debt burdens 
may put the owner-operator in a more restricted position than the cash 
tenant faces after a poor crop year. 
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distribution of the proceeds between the landlord and tenant, and (2) to 
provide an efficient organissation of resources on the rented farm relative 
to consumer demand as expressed in the price system (10, p. 598), 
Economics in a free-enterprise context automatically provides for a 
type of equitable distribution of income. Resovirces are allowed to move 
around until they find their highest bidder. This means that in a perfectly 
competitive economy each resource earns its marginal value product. Leasing 
arrangements are actually made in a very imperfect market, however, with 
poor knowledge and mobility. Hence, it is important that the lease itself 
provides a reasonably equitable distribution. 
The three conditions for optimum production outlined above are called 
upon here to help design a lease that insures efficient allocation of 
resources. If the following four conditions are incorporated in a lease 
they guarantee no lease-oriented inefficiencies, 
(1) Each resource owner should receive the shares of the product earned 
by each unit of resource he contributes. Especially, the share of 
the cost of each variable input must be the same as the share of the 
marginal product obtained from it, 
(2) The shares of the costs of inputs which are substltutable for one 
another should be the same. The lease should minimize distortion of 
the factor-factor relationships, 
(3) The shares of the products produced by the same inputs should be the 
same. If cash rent is incorporated in a share lease, it should be 
chosen to minimize the distortion of the product-product relationship, 
(4) Each of the first three conditions above should hold for the present 
period and over time. Uncertainty of tenure perhaps does more to 
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distort crop rotation oholoes than do all the tinsatisfactory lease 
conditions combined. 
These relationships are e:qplained in greater detail below, 
k. The rental decision 
The rental decision determines whether the landlord and tenant will 
receive the marginal value product of the resources each contributes. The 
shares, the quantity and the quality of each resource are the determining 
factors. Before a tenant chooses a particvilar farm, the land resource is 
a variable input for him. Similarly, the labor and capital of a tenant 
are variable inputs to the landlord until he actually chooses a tenant. 
It is eaqjected that each will try to get the best and the most in the way 
of the other's inputs. Once a particvilar rental arrangement has been made, 
however, the land becomes a fixed quantity for the tenant and the tenant's 
resoxirces become fixed for the landlord. 
Fig\ire 9 illustrates the selection process for tenant and landlord 
under a lease which gives the tenant 2/3 of the crop and the landlord 1/3. 
First, assume that MP represents the total marginal product as more and 
more land is combined with the tenant's fixed supply of resources. The 
marginal product eventually becomes zero at the point x where the tenant 
can no longer profitably farm additional land. But only 2/3 of MP goes 
to the tenant as each acre is added, and the remaining 1/3, MC^;, is the 
share the tenant must pay the landlord for the use of the land. The tenant 
also considers this share as his marginal cost, and he wishes to cdd acres 
only as long as the total meo-ginal product is greater than his marginal 
cost. In other words, he wishes to add land until MP equals M&t, which 
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in Figure 9 also happens to be the point where the marginal product becomes 
zero. 
But the landlord is also looking for the tenant with the most in the 
way of labor and capital. If MP in Figiire 9 now represents the marginal 
product of added tenant resources as the land offered by the landlord is 
held constant and MC^ his marginal cost, then the landlord also prefers 
to add tenant resources vmtil their marginal product is zero. 
In most cases a landlord is not willing to' rent to a tenant i(rho has 
so few resources that the marginal product of the last acre of land is 
driven to zero.* To find a tenant willing to supply as much labor and 
capital as the landlord may wish is equally rare. Some conqpromise is 
airrived at \jrhich reflects the supply of and the demand for the resotu'ces 
in question. 
Since the land is fixed in supply, the price or rent is expected to 
reflect only the demand or marginal value product for it. Several worth­
while attempts have been made to determine how closely the marginal value 
product corresponds to the crop-share and cash rents in Iowa, Heady and 
Shaw determined from a stratified random sample of North Iowa farms in 
1950 that there was a significant difference between the marginal value 
product of cropland used for crop production at the mean and the share 
rental rates then current (17), The marginal value product estimated at 
the arithmetic mean was $45.91 per acre for 1950, which was a favorable 
crop year. In another study, Heady and Kehrberg estimated that the 
The study of Meady and Kehrberg revealed that the average size of 
farm rented on a crop-share basis was 195 acres, but the average size 
these tenants would prefer to farm was 255 acres (l6). 
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marginal value productivity of cropland in East Central Iowa was $31.A2, 
while the crop-share rental return to the landlord was $18,90 and the 
average cash rent paid was $10,29 (l6, see also 12, p, 6o6).* Significant 
though these differences may be, most of them can be explained as normal 
discounts for xmcertainty. In modem farming there is much at stake 
besides the land investment and this discotint may be looked upon as the 
reward to the tenant for assuming most of the risk. 
5. Sharing variable expenses 
The first condition above that "each resource owner should receive 
the shares of the product eanaed by each unit of resource he contributes" 
has already been discussed with respect to the resources that affect the 
distribution of income. 
The condition that the share of the cost of each variable input must 
be the same as the share of the marginal product obtained from it is more 
critical as far as efficient production is concerned. The most commonly 
cited example is that of fertilizer, where if either the landlord or tenant 
pays all the cost and receives only half the added product, less than the 
optimum amount of fertilizer will be used. Figure 10 illustrates the 
effect upon fertilizer use of not sharing costs. HP indicates the total 
marginal product of fertilizer when all other inputs are held constant 
and 1/2 MP is the share of the marginal product that goes to both the 
landlord and the tenant when the crop is shared equally. The market price 
*When the possibility of raising livestock is introduced the marginal 
value product of all land, and in particular the pasture land, may be still 
higher (H). 
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of the fertilizer is oa and one half of this is ob. An owner-operator or 
a cash tenant is wise to add fertilizer until its marginal cost equals the 
marginal produot, or the amount of fertilizer indicated by od, A share 
tenant or landlord who pays the frill cost of the fertilizer and receives 
a marginal product indicated by 1/2 MP only chooses to apply an amount of 
fertilizer equal to oc. On the other hand, if fertilizer costs are shared 
in the same proportions as the produot, as indicated by the price ob, then 
the tenant's optimum application of fertilizer is again od. If one party 
pays all the fertilizer costs, the marginal costs of fertilizer to the 
other party are zero, and the latter desires the former to apply an amount 
of fertilizer equal to oe. 
These principles apply to other inputs and other fields ae well. They 
only refer to single inputs, or groups of inputs, and not to input substi­
tution. 
The Heady and Kehrberg sample in the Tama soil area revealed that 60 
per cent of the landlords pay some part of the fertilizer costs, and also 
that 49 per cent of them share the cost of com seed, 16 per cent the cost 
of seed oats, 97 per cent the cost of pasture seed, 3 per cent the cost of 
com picking, 62 per cent the cost of com shelling, and 49 per cent the 
cost of weed spray (16), For the most part these percentage differences 
are unexplained. 
6, gharjtnR A" deferent r^t;^og 
The second condition above states that "the shares of costs of inputs 
which are substitutable, one for another, should be the same," This is 
illustrated in Figure 11 where the iso-product curves and Pg each 
represent a constant share of the product going to the tenant. It is 
assumed that the price of x is $6 and that of y is $8, and that the tenant 
bears the full cost of each. With a constant amount of money to spend on 
these inputs, say $48, as indicated by the iso-cost line, Ij, the tenant 
can maximize his output by using oa of input y and oe of input x. He is 
inclined to combine inputs in approximately these same proportions as long 
as his share of the cost of each remains the same. 
Assume now that the landlord shares the cost of y with the tenant but 
not the cost of x. The tenant naturally wants to use more of y and perhaps 
less of X. This is illustrated by the iso-cost curve I3 in Figure 11 from 
which it can be determined that the tenant's optimum combination of inputs 
to produce Pg is 00 of y and od of x. The change in proportions here is 
evident, for a firm using market prices is inclined to produce P2 by com­
bining ob of y and og of x. 
If fertilizer costs are shared and all other operating costs are borne 
entirely by the tenant, the tenant has a desire to apply more fertilizer^, 
than if all costs are shared equally. Similarly, if all costs are shared 
but labor is entirely fumished and hired by the tenant, the tenant is 
inclined to substitute capital for labor to a greater extent than the cash 
tenant or owner-operator. 
This latter case presents a serious problem as to whether a satis­
factory share lease can be worked out. Is it possible to work out an 
efficient share lease when one basic premise of these leases is that the 
tenant supplies all the variable labor inputs and only receives a share of 
the marginal product from them? Schickele makes a negative reply (24). 
However, there are suggested solutions which involve a close working 
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relationship between a landlord and tenant who share all operating expenses, 
including hired labor, in the same ratio that they share the products. The 
purpose of their close working relationship is to decide upon the amount of 
tenant labor versus hired labor and capital, and to decide upon the ratio 
in which inputs and outputs are shared (11), 
7. Sharing products in different ratios 
Where products using essentially the same inputs are shared in dif­
ferent ratios, there are incentives for both the landlord and tenant to 
choose products other than the optimum from the standpoint of the owner-
operator. In Figure 12 this distortion is clarified with the use of three 
iso-resovirce curves. Pi, ?2t ^3 represents the combinations of the 
two products A and B which are produced with a fixed set of Ismdlord and 
tenant resources. With the price ratio indicated by the dotted iso-revenue 
line, an owner-operator or a cash tenant with these same resources chooses 
to produce oc of B and og of A. P2 represents a one-half share of these 
two products and is merely scaled down. If the tenant is making a pro­
duction decision on the basis of P2, he chooses to produce oa of B and oe 
of A, which are exactly half of the optimum quantities as determined from 
Ty On the other hand, if this tenant receives 1/2 the output of B but 
only 1/3 the output of A, his decision-making production curve is now P^. 
He chooses to produce these products in the proportions ob of B and od of 
A, This shift in favor of the product from which he receives the greater 
percentage return is only to be expected. 
This iso-resouroe cvurve analysis assumes that the inputs are approxi­
mately the same for both products. A recommendation that the shares of 
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each product he identical ahould be modified when one particular crop takes 
a great deal more or less tenant labor and capital than the others,* 
The shares that are actually found in Midvfestem crop-share leases 
are largely unexplained and written off as "customary," There have been 
seversQ. studies of the crop-share lease terras for Northern Iowa but the 
shares found in the Heady and Kehrberg study appear to be typical. (16). 
The percentages of the crop-share leases v/hich provided the tenants with 
the following shares were: 99 per cent of the leases gave the tenants 1/2 
of the com, 90 per cent gave 1/2 of the soybeans, 76 per cent gave 3/5 of 
the oats, and 97 per cent of the tenants sampled paid cash rent for pasture 
(see also 26, p, 112). 
The advantages of cash rent for pasture land are fairly obvious. Not 
all the value of the meadow crops can be profitably taken off as hay, and 
it is only sensible that the tenant's livestock be allowed to get the 
remaining value as pasture. The problem of measuring the landlord's share 
of such income is excessively difficult and cash rent is a flexible and 
*For example, in the South cotton production takes much more labor 
than a competitive crop like com. It takes approximately 6l hours of 
labor to produce a net income of §100 from cotton in the Southern Piedmont 
of North Carolina and only 23 hovirs to produce the same net amount from 
corn (28), An iso-resource curve such as in Figure 12 does not apply here. 
The ratio of labor to other inputs (and in particular land) increases as 
a tenant shifts his land from corn to cotton, and supposedly his labor 
income increases too. If a crop-share tenant is to choose a program with 
an efficient allocation of labor between these crops, then the lease has 
to let him earn the marginal value product times the labor input in each 
crop. This would mean that in the above example the tenant's share of 
cotton receipts should be 6l divided by 23, or 2.7 times as large as his 
share of the income from com. Under an optimum allocation the tenant's 
marginal value productivity of labor would be equalized for each crop. 
If it were $1 per hour, then his share of $100 for cotton is $6l and his 
share for corn, $23, 
27 
obvious solution. The main question is whether the cash rent paid repre­
sents an "equal" share, 
8. Length of lease and uncertainty 
The fourth condition above specified that the first three conditions 
must hold both for the present period and over time if there is to be an 
efficient allocation of resources. With respect to factor-product rela­
tionships, the lease structure should not discourage an economic application 
of an input such as Time simply because it may take many years to realize 
the full benefit of the lime."* The possible effects of uncertainty on the 
product-product relationships and choice of crop rotation are perhaps more 
serious (15). 
The length of the lease and whether or not it is written have been 
taken as key indications of the degree of uncertainty in a lease. The 
Heady and Kehrberg study (l6) in East Central Iowa revealed that the 
average number of years the crop-share tenants had rented on a share basis 
was 5,2 years. The average length of present lease term was 1,3 years. 
The study by Hurlburt revealed that 65 per cent of all leases in Central 
Iowa were 1-year term. Of the pure crop-share leases, 32 per cent were 
written, and 5-4 per cent of these tenants had rented the same farm for five 
or more years (19, Supplementary Tables).** 
*For a study of the ways in which leasing and teniire affect land 
improvements see Tousaaint's thesis (27), 
**There are many examples in Iowa of crop«-share leasing arrangements 
where the tenant feels almost as secure as an owner-operator, yet he heis 
nothing in writing, wants nothing in writing, and enjoys his own flexi­
bility, These situations visually ooctir where the landlord, or landlady, 
is quite equitable or disinterested, and where he or she is fortunate 
enough to have found a very capable tenant. 
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Johnson offers some explanations of the wide use of the crop-share 
lease in the United States (21). He suggests that the short-term of these 
leases is the secret of their phenomenal success. Three ways are sug­
gested by which the landlord in a crop-share lease can protect himself, 
or keep the tenant from minindzing his tenant Inputs per acre. The land­
lord can: (1) specify in detail what work the tenant is to do, (2) share 
expenses to the same extent as output, and (3) grant only short-term 
leases. The first two are not coranon in crop-share leasing and the latter 
certainly is. There is a serious question as to whether more of (l) and 
(2) and less of (3) might not be a more satisfactory long-run basis for 
rental efficiency. Short-term leases provide the landlord a powerful and 
simple control when one considers the high social and financial cost of a 
tenant's having to move, and the ease with which the average landlord can 
check to see if this tenant is making reasonable crop incomes. 
All the answers have not been supplied to the problems of crop-share 
leasing. In most of the places i^ere disadvantages are pointed out in the 
existing lease structure, there is a long list of hidden advantages. And 
some of the suggested "improvements" have disadvantages yet to be dis­
covered . 
D. Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are to be tested in this study. They are 
drawn mainly from the discussion of crop-share leasing above. 
(l) A cash rent of ^^8 per acre for cropland in pasture is too low to pro­
vide maximum agreement among a crop-share tenant and landlord, and an 
owner-operator as to land devoted to pasture. 
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Agreement is highly iinlikely among the optimum programs of the tenant, 
landlord and ovmer-operator when a tenant pays all the fertilizer 
costs and receives only a share of the added return. 
Leases which share all crops and all operating expenses in the same 
proportion are more likely to provide agreement among the optimum 
programs of the tenant, landlord and owner-operator than leases which 
have unequal proportions. 
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III. LINEAR PROGRAIMNG 
A. Introduction and Asaumptiona 
1. Introduction 
In economics lineso- programming is normally applied as a technique 
for selecting the optimum combination of budgets when certain resources 
are limited in supply. There are several ways in which to select thin 
best combination of activities, and among them aret simple geometric 
analysis, the Charnes simplex method (6), the Dorfraan method (7), and any 
of several machine processes based upon simplex procedures. Mathematical 
verification of the theorems of linear programming are not reproduced here 
since these are available in Charnes (6) and elsewhere. However, a simple 
example using graphic and Charnes ainqalex solutions is given below, pro­
viding a demonstration that linear programming provides an optimum income. 
In linear programming the term "linear'* has a dual meaning correspond­
ing to two assunqptions common in the technique, (l) The production 
functions are usually assumed to be linear and homogeneous, and (2) the 
results of sinoiltaneously carrying out two or more activities la a linear 
In a more general sense linear programming is any practical problem 
stated in vector algebra as follows: 
Maximize or minimize c'x subject to these restrictions: 
(1) Px = b 
(2) X > 0 
Notation: x = colvmin vector of variables 
c' = row vector of constants 
P = m X n matrix with n >• m and at least m lineeu*ly inde­
pendent coltunn vectors (matrix includes slack and/or 
artificial vectors) 
b = column vector of constants (requirements). 
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combination of the resmlts of the separate activities. "Progrannning" is 
the process of systematically planning or moving from one defined state 
to another,* 
In linear programming literature the term "product" is usually 
replaced by either "activity" or "process." An activity or process is 
one way of producing a particular product; therefore, there cotald be 
several activities for one product. An activity or process specifies the 
kind of input, the kind of output and the ratio of each input to the 
output, "Disposal" activities are also possible and are used to accovint 
for the unused portion of certain inputs that are available. An activity 
can be carried on at different levels, and a change of level simply 
involves proportional changes of all inputs and the output. The group of 
activities which are produced or planned by a firm is called a "program," 
This program normally includes a number of disposal activities along with 
the productive activities. 
During and after World War II programming models were developed by 
George Dantzig and others for the U. S, Air Force under the direction of 
Marshall Wood. The publication of the proceedings of a Cowles Commission 
conference devoted to "activity analysis" (22) made these findings gen­
erally avedlable. Additional explanations by Chames, Cooper and Henderson 
(6), and Dorfman (7) placed linear programming on its own as another tool 
of the empirically inclined economist. 
*The thing that distinguishes the linear programming technique from 
conventional budgeting is that it leads to the optimum production in an 
orderly fashion. 
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For many years farm advisors have realized the need for a method of 
selecting the best combination of enterprises out of the many that were 
posslblsi so as to obtain a reasonably full use of avedlable resources. 
Since 1952 agricultural economists have demonstrated that linear program­
ming has great promise In answering this need. 
One theoretical extension that agricultural economists have explored 
is that of applying statistical probability to linear programming. Heady, 
Tlntner and Babbar treated the effect of yield and price variability on 
linear programming recommendations (13)• Recently, Freund incorporated 
risk theory into a linear programming problem in North Carolina farming 
necessitating an extension into quadratic programming (8). 
2. 
Normally the following five assunqptions are used in linear programming. 
It is important to understand their effects and, where it is possible, the 
methods of relaxing them,* 
a. Limited reaourcea It is necessary to the linear programming 
problem that at least one resource be limiting or the optimum activity is 
used at an infinite level. What is most important in practical business 
advice is that realistic limits be chosen. Also, it is Inqportant to 
Include provisions for adding more of some resources that can be purchased 
when this is possible. For example, a fanner may be able to borrow $10,000 
at 8 per cent, but he is not inclined to do this until his own working 
capital is exhausted, and unless it pays. Separate activities can be 
Incorporated to provide for the purchase of such Inputs, 
*For a discussion of this topic see Horholms' thesis (23). 
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b. Finite nvmber of t>rod\iotlve proceasea There is a distortion of 
reality in that linear programming does not provide for infinitely small 
substitutions along an iso-produot curve such as in Figure 2, There is 
a limit to the number of activities that can be included, and hence to 
the closeness with which they can be spaced along such a curve. Some 
balance always is needed between the desire to keep the number of activi­
ties small and the desire to approximate reality, 
c. Divisibility If any process can be used at any positive level, 
any input can be used at any level also. This assumption is reasonably 
closely met ^^^ith respect to farm products. However, there axe a number of 
inputs that have to be bought in particular quantities, A farmer may be 
able to rent 100 acres or none, and if he buys a tractor, he has to buy a 
whole one. One way of handling a divisibility is to compute one's resu3.ts 
as if Inputs were divisible, and then adjust the optimum plan so that it 
corresponds to the nearest indivisibility. If perfect divisibility leads 
to the production of an absurdly small amount of some partic\ilar field 
crop, one can very easily drop such an activity when the Income sacrifice 
is less than the trouble involved in producing it, 
d. Constant protxartiona between inputs and outtjuts This is the most 
serious of the linear programming assiunptions and the most difficult to 
remove. Sometimes a ratio of inputs to outputs which is logical at one 
level of output is quite inefficient at another. Nonlinear techniques 
permit this assiaiqption to be relaxed but the computation procedures are 
quite conqjlicated. An alternative is to Introduce particular activities 
for certain resource levels and to take out or adjust aotivities that do 
not apply at the levels used. 
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®« Addltlvlty The output of two activities produced simultaneously 
is always the sum of the output of the separate activities. This is not 
true when one product contributes to another like forage complements grain 
in typical rotations, or livestock aid crops through the manure they pro­
vide. An activity can always be added for the combined enterprise or 
rotation. If it is efficient enough, it excludes sole production of the 
separate products that make it up. Some by-products, such as manure, can 
be awarded cash values. 
This is not intended to be a complete discussion of these assumptions, 
Itowever, even from this sketch it is apparent that more realism can be 
introduced into linear programming mainly by increasing the number of 
activities and by nonlinear developments, 
B, An Example 
An hypothetical linear programming problem is presented here, and the 
geometric and algebraic solutions are worked out. It consists of three 
activities and two limiting resources. The essential facts are outlined 
in Table 1. This firm is assumed to have $10 capital available and 6 hours 
labor, which are listed as "restrictions" in Table 1, To the right of 
these are the input-output coefficients, which express the amo\int of each 
input needed per unit of each product. For exan^jle, the capital coeffi­
cient for P2 is $3 per unit The gross income per unit of each activity 
is $5 and the net Income is found by subtracting the capital costs from 
this. 
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Table 1, Resources, coefficients and prices for an hypothetical linear 
programming example 
Restrictions Activities 
Resource Quantity Pi 1 P2 1 P3 
Capital, dollars 10 2 3 1 
Labor, hours 6 2 1 4 
Gross income per tinit, dollars 5 5 5 
Net income per unit, dollars 3 2 U 
The object is to maximize net income while no more than the available 
quantities of capital and labor are used, and none of the outputs are 
negative, 
1. Graphic solution 
Graphic analysis is now used to offer a solution. Vectors describe 
each activity and the parallelogram rule for addition of vectors is s^lied 
to form combinations of activities. 
The vectors for each of the three activities are plotted and labeled 
in Figure 13. The soces represent labor and capital use, or disposal, and 
are themselves vectors, uses 2 units of labor and 2 units of capital 
per unit produced, and hence the point 2, 2 indicates one tmit of and 
the point 6, 6 indicates three \mits of P^, etc. The Pg and P^ vectors 
are found exactly the same ifay fi^m their coefficients in Table 1, 
The inputs available are indicated by dotted lines out from 10 on the 
capital axis and 6 on the labor axis* At the outset it is assumed possible 
to dispose of all, or any part, of the two resources. This disposal can 
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be thought of as the first production plan, and it is indicated as such 
in Figure 13. The maxLinum output of any one activity is shown where its 
vector intersects one of the dotted lines. 
It is possible to produce 11/2 units of P3 by combining 6 hours of 
labor and $1.50 capital. This is called "plan 2" and represents an income 
of $6 at the net price of $4 per unit. Actually plan 2 consists of this 
production of P3 and a disposal, or idle holding, of $8,50 capital. 
It would also be possible to eeum $6 by producing 2 units of at 
$3 each, or 3 iinits of P2 at $2 apiece. These points of equal net income 
have been joined by a solid line which is equivalent to the iso-product 
curves of Figin-e 2, but which is called an "iso-income" crorve here. The 
essential feature of this curve, and of most iso-product cui^es, is that 
it has a negative slope. An iso-product curve could be drawn for any 
income in Figure 13, and as long as the prices stay the same, each would 
be parallel to the one for a $6 income. It can be seen that the highest 
such cuirve that is attainable with these resotirces passes through the 
point where the dotted resource lines intersect. 
This maximum income point is called "plan 4" in Figure 13 and repre­
sents a particular combination of P]^ and Pg. The ideas that apply to 
parallelogram addition of forces can now be used to help describe this 
particular combination. Lines are drawn through the optimum point parallel 
to Pj^ and P2» intersecting Pg and P^ at x and y respectively. The vectors 
ox and oy r^resent the particular production of Pg and P^ at the optimum 
point. The ox vector represents 2 tanits of P2 worth $6, and oy represents 
2 units of P^ netting making the maximum combined income $10, 
38 
Such a graphic solution obviously becomes difficult beyond two inputs, 
and hence it is not useful for the types of problems common in linear 
programming. Nevertheless, it is an example of a linear programming type 
problem and solution. 
Changes in the quantities of inputs available and the effect of 
attaching prices to inputs can be studied with the aid of single resource 
maps. These are constructed from double resource maps such as that in 
Figure 13 by observing the activities chosen and the net incomes when each 
of the dotted resouaroe lines is extended. 
The effect upon net income of increasing capital while the available 
labor is held constant at 6 hours is poarbrayed in Figure 14. From zero to 
$1,50 capital is the optimum activity and the marginal value product 
for an added $1 capital is ^,* Beyond $1,50 capital it becomes profitable 
to substitute for P^ until only Pj^ is produced at $6 capital. These 
same changes can be noted from Figure 18 by assuming different capital 
limitations and using simple graphic solutions. Beyond $6 capited it 
*These values are called "marginal value products" here even though 
they differ from the conventional margineil value products of economic 
theory in two respects, (l) All other factors are not held constant while 
one is increased. This is not too serious since the basic assumption is 
made that the value of most other resources is zero until they become 
limiting, (2) The added rettims are "net" rather than "gross," This is 
a definite advantage since it takes into account the change in capital 
expenses that accompany any change of one input. One in^jortant property 
that these quantities have in common with marginal value productivities 
is that the sum of each of them times the quantity of that resource avail­
able equals the total net income. This means that they satisfy the 
important condition that the inputs times their marginal value products 
exhaust the total product when returns to scale are constant. 
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becomes profitable to substitute Pg for until at $18 only P2 is produced, 
and the marginal value product of added capital becomes zero. 
It is assumed above that this farmer has a fixed amount of capital, 
that he could not borrow more, and that he has no alternative uses for his 
$10 except in the production of these thi'ee activities. Assuming instead 
that he can borrow any amoiint of capital at 10 per cent interest, it is 
easy to see the effect upon his productive program from Figure H-. Every 
dollar of added capital from $6 to $18 nets this farmer 25 per cent return, 
but beyond this point there is no added return. Hence, he would borrow 
enough capital to farm at this point, 
A similEir pattern of changes in optimum activities, with decreasing 
marginal value products, is shown for labor changes in Figure 15. Capital 
is assumed to be held constant at $10, and labor is increased until 4-0 
hours are used to earn from P3. If labor inputs are worth $1 per hour 
to this farmer, it would not pay him to use as much as Jfi hours labor, 
however. The marginal value product of labor changes from $1,25 to $,83 
at the 10 hour level where only Pj is produced. This is also his optimum 
level of labor input. 
Another reason for graphic study of resource relationships such as 
those provided in Figures 13| 14- and 15 is that they can provide an index 
of the stability of a particular solution. It is easy to predict the 
effect of changes in labor and capital inputs upon the optinum program of 
the example above which had $10 capital and 6 hours labor. Small Increases 
in capital will mean increases in the P2 and decreases in the that enter 
the optimum plan, and increases in labor will have an opposite effect. 
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However, in more involved problems sometimes small changes in inputs cause 
drastic changes in the activities that are optimum. 
The effect of changing product prices can be shown with the aid of 
production possibility curves similar to those in Figures 3 and Possi­
bility curves for each pair of the three activities in this example are 
presented in Figures 16, 17 and 18, 
The production possibility curve for Pj and in Figure 16 is formed 
by the two iso-resource curves for labor and capital. These iso-resource 
lines merely show the amounts of each product that can be produced with 
the inputs indicated. The maximum possible production is indicated by the 
solid line segments of these lines closest to the origin. On the upper 
end of this production possibility curve, labor limits the pitjduction of 
P^ and on the lower end capital is limiting. The marginal rate of substi­
tution of the upper segment, where labor is restrictive, is 1/2, and the 
rate of aubstitutlon of the lower section is 3/2, The optimum output may 
be found where the marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio of 
P2 for P^, If the price ratio is between I/2 and 3/2, the optimum point 
is the "comer" value where two units of each activity are produced. If 
the price ratio is less than 1/2, only is produced, and if it is greater 
than 3/2, only P2 is produced regardless of the qiiantity of each input 
available. A price ratio, or iso-revenue, line has been included in Figure 
16 for the prices used in this example. It has a slope of 2/3 and indi­
cates that an optimum income of $10 can be obtained at the comer value. 
A graphic analysis like that in Figure 16 provides another index of 
the stability of a solution. One can easily see the range within which 
prices can vary before the optlmvun plan changes. It would be still better, 
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however, if we co\ild determine the optimum activities for any set of prices 
for the three activities. 
Production possibility curves for each of the other combinations of 
products are presented in Figtires 17 and 18, The different input levels 
are assumed and the marginal rates of substitution are indicated for each 
iso-resource line. 
The different price ratios for which certain activities are optimum 
are summarized in Table 2. These are taken directly from the rates of 
substitution indicated in Figures 16, 17 and 18, It may be noted from the 
first column of Table 2 that if the price ratio of P2 to C2/®1» 
greater than 3/2 only ?2 will be produced. Also, from the last column of 
this table, if cg/cj is greater than 3, P2 will be produced to the exclusion 
of Pj, When P2 has such favorable price ratios, it will be produced no 
matter what the resource limitations may be. 
Table 2, Price ratios for which different activities are optimum 
C2/01 Activity °3/°l 1 Activity C2/C3 Activity 
<1/2 <1/2 I'l <1/4. 3^ 
1/2-3/2 Pq^  and ?2 1/2-2 P]^ and Pj 1/4-3 Pj and P2 
>3/2 
^2 >2 3^ >3 P2 
From these optimum activities for different price ratios, a type of 
price map can be formed. This is done in Figure 19 in which the optimum 
program for any price combination easily can be found. For example, if 
ci = 2, 02 = 4 and C3 = 1, the relevant price ratios are 02/ci = 2 and 
Oj/ci = 1/4. Locating this point in Figure 19, we observe that only Pg 
would be produced with these price ratios. 
The price ratio for the example from Table 1 falls in the central 
square area of Figure 19 where any of the three activities cein be optimum 
depending upon the resource limitations. This fact that any one, or any 
adjacent pair, of the three activities can be optimum at the assumed prices 
is also indicated by the decreasing negative slope of the iso-product curve 
in Figure 13, 
2. 
The linear programming problem can be restated as followst to maxi­
mize z = + 02*2 Ojx^ where the c's are the net prices from Table 1 
and the x*s are the levels of each activity produced, subject to the 
restrictions that no more than the available quantities of capital and 
labor are used and that no x's are negative. That isi 
(1) 10 2X1 + 3*2 + 1x3 
(2) 6 ^  2X1 + 1x2 + 4x3 
and X ^  0. 
The first step is to change the inequations (l) and (2) above to 
equations by allowing for the disposal of capital, P^, and labor, 
(3) 10 = Ix^ + Qxj + 2xi + 3X2 + 1x3 
(4.) 6 = Ox^  + 1x5 + 2xi + 1x2 + 4x3. 
Or the same two equations can be written in vector form ast 
(5) PQ = + X5P5 + X^PI + X2P2 + X3P3, 
whereI Pq = 10 6 
and Pi* ^2 and P3 are the vectors of coefficients from Table 1. 
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Equations (3) and (4) are the heart of the first plan, or simplex 
tableau, of Table 3, The equality, plus signs and x's are removed, and 
the vector numbers are indicated at the head of each column. 
Before describing the siii?)lex procedure, it is expedient to introduce 
the idea of a "basis." A basis of a vector space is a set of non-zero 
vectors for which a linear combination can be fovind which is equal to any 
selected vector in that space* The basis will always contain the same 
number of vectors as the dimension of the space. and P5 are such a 
basis for two-dimensional space, A linear combination of them can be found 
which equals any two dimensional vector, say Pq = 
Xg such that x^P^ + X5P5 = Pq» or, in terms of simple algebra, solve the 
following equations! 
x^ l + X5O = qj^  
x^ O -f X5I = qg. 
The solution, x^ = q^^ and xj = q2» is always this simple when the identity 
matrix, [i!] , makes up the basis. 
In a simplex tableau all of the coefficients sire expressed in terms of 
the basis. Also, the basis vectors are always transformed into the Identity 
matrix, and hence their values are indicated on the left side of the 
equations, or in the Pq column. In Table 3 the column to the left of PQ 
designates the activities that are in the basis. Capital and labor 
disposal, P^ and P^, are the activities in the first basis, and it may be 
recalled that they also make up the first plan in the graphic analysis of 
Figure 13. 
^1 . Simply find X/ and 
12 
Table 3, Siis^jlex tableaux for linear progrannning exanple 
10 so $3 §2 14 
Activities PQ P4 P5 Fl P2 R Linear otjerations on rows 
in basis Row no-l Ooeration 
Flan 1: 
10 
$0 
Capital 
Labor 
10 
6 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
2 
0 
-3 
3 
1 
0 
-2 
1 
0 
-4 
10 
3/2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Flan 2s 
u 
Capital 
3^ 
==3 - °3 
17/2 
3/2 
6 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
-lA 
lA 
1 
1 -1 
11/4 
lA 
1 
-1 
0 17/3 
1 3 
4 
0 
1« 
2' 
3* 
4' 
row 1 - (l)(row 2*) 
r o w  2 7 4  
row 3 - (-4)(row 2') 
row 4 - (-4)(row 2') 
Plan 3: 
SO 
$3 
Capital 
Pi 
®3 
^3 - °3 
4 
3 
9 
9 
1 
0 
0 
0 
-1 
1/2 
3/2 
3/2 
0 
1 
3 
0 
CD 
1/2 
3/2 
-1/2 
-3 
2 
6 
2 
2 
6 
1" 
2" 
3" 
4" 
row 1' - (3/2)(row 2") 
row 2' f 1/2 
row 3* - (-l)(row 2") 
row 4' - (-l)(rcw 2") 
Flan 
|2 
^3 
^2 
Pi 
^"3 
^3 - °3 
2 
2 
10 
10 
1/2 
-lA 
lA 
lA 
-1/2 
3/4. 
5A 
5/U 
0 
1 
3 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
-3/2 
llA 
21/4 
5/4 
l«i 
2'" 
2" t 
4«t 
row 1" i- 2 
row 2" - (1/2)(row 1"') 
row 3" - (-l/2)(row 1"' 
row 4" - (-l/2)(row 1"' 
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The row labeled "cj" across the top of the simplex tahleam indicates 
the net prices from Table 1, and the prices of the disposal activities 
which are zero. These net prices are also listed along the left edge of 
the tableaux for the processes which are in the basis, A "zj" row is 
included which shows the net cost of adding a unit of each activity. It 
is the s\im of the net prices on the left times the coefficients in each 
coltann. Since the net price of each row in the first tableau is zero the 
Zj's are all zero. The z^ - cj row is simply net cost minus net price for 
each column. Any time an entry in this row is negative the profit can be 
increased by bringing that activity into the production plan or basis. 
The largest negative entiy in the first zj - cj row is -4 for P^, and 
hence this activity is selected to replace one of the disposals,* The 
disposal activity replaced is found by dividing the Pg entries by the P^ 
column to obtain the amounts of P^ that can be produced. These figures 
are entered in the column headed "R" and the smallest one, 3/2, indicates 
the maximum amount of P^ that can be produced. Labor is the input to be 
used up, and P^ replaces it in the basis of plan 2, 
The pivotal figure in the transformation to the next tableau is the 
encircled 4 at the intersection of the outgoing row, labor, and the incoming 
column, P^, of plan 1, Each entry in the labor row of plan 1 is divided by 
4 to obtain the new P^ row. Each entry in the new capital row is the cor­
responding entry from the previous plan less the product of the incoming 
column element in plan 1 and the incoming row element of plan 2, For 
example, the new capital disposal in the Pg column is 10-(1 x 3/2) = 17/2, 
^Somewhat better criteria for selecting the incoming activities are 
suggested by Boles (3). 
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The new zj and zj - Oj rows can be found in the same way as the capital 
row, except that the zj - Cj entry (here -4.) is used as the multiplier from 
the previous plan for both rows. The new Zj row also can be found by 
multiplying the row by its net price. When a problem involves many 
transformations, the former method of finding the Zj row tends to introduce 
more rounding errors; however, in moving from one plan to the next, the two 
methods always provide a good con^jutational check. 
Exactly the same transformation procedures are used in moving to suc­
cessive plans. The activity with the highest negative Zj - Cj is always 
introduced until these opportunities to increase profits are exhausted. 
The linear operations in the transformation of each row are specified on 
the right side of Table 3, They simply consist of dividing one equation 
by a constant, or subtracting one equation times a constant from another 
equation. Such linear operations carry the equality of the original equa­
tions over to each new row. 
This transformation from plan 1 to plan 2 can be described in algebraic 
terms 6LISO, The original basis is expressed by 
(6) PQ = LOP^ + 6P5. 
The activity to be Introduced into the basis, P3, also can be expressed as 
a linear combination of this basis, 
(7) P3 = IP^ + AP5, 
or transposing and multiplying by a constant, 
(7») X3(P3 - P^ - 4P5) = 0. 
Equations (6) and (?') are now added together to give 
(8) PQ = (10 - X3)P4 + 4(3/2 - X3)P5 + X3P3. 
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Now Xj must be chosen so that one of the or xj terms In (8) becomes zero 
and the other remains positive. These conditions are satisfied by choosing 
X3 = 3/2, as in plan 1 of the simplex tableaux. Now 
(9) Pq = I7/2P4 + 3/2P3 
is the new basis of plan 2. The other activities would now be expressed in 
terms of P3 and P^ in order to see if it pays to bring one of them into the 
next basis. 
The simplex procedure consists of continual introduction of activities 
which will increase income until these opportunities are exhausted. Apply­
ing this same principle in algebraic transformations written out like those 
above, one obtains the same results as in Table 3. 
Each of the plans in Table 3 has its corresponding position indicated 
in Figure 13. Although quite different methods are used, both the graphic 
analysis and the simplex procedure yield identical results. The Fg column 
of the final tableau in Table 3 reveals the quantities of Pg and P^^ pro­
duced, The Zj and Zj - cj rows show the net income at the end to be $10, 
In the final tableau the disposal activities are expressed in terms of 
the new basis vectors P2 and Pq^, The zj - cj row for the labor and capital 
disposal columns shows the net loss involved if one less unit of each input 
is available. For capital this is 1/4., or $.25, and for labor it is $1,25. 
These are the marginal value products of each input, and they are the same 
values that are associated with this level of each input in Figures lA and 
15. 
The above exanqple is only an introduction to some of the basic ideas 
of linear programming. However, it outlines the essentially sin^jle model 
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that is applied in tliis study to find the optinmm program for fixed resource 
situations. 
Improvements in sinqilex procedures that have heen reported in the past 
two years are mainly in the direction of making the tool more flexible (5) 
and reducing computation time (3). The inqjroveraents naturally cause the 
simple model to be somewhat outmoded. 
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IV. THE DATA AND METHODS USED 
A. Data and Assmptlons 
The primary data used in this thesis are crop rotation yield estimates 
obtained from the Iowa State College Agronomy Department, Four fertilizer 
levels were used in these experiments, but other inputs were not specified. 
Thus many assunptlona about the other inputs are necessary. 
1. Yield estimates 
The Agronomy Department has been compiling crop rotation end ferti­
lizer data on an Agronomy Fana in North Central Iowa since 194.2. During 
this time farming and fertilizing methods have changed, as have the hybrids 
used, leading to a general increase in productivity. Professor W. D. 
Shrader compiled from these results, and his knowledge of the increases in 
productivity, the "estimated" yields for eight rotations for Nicolette-
Webster soil (25)• These yield estimates were presented with the following 
considerations and estimates of reliabilityi 
... The yields for the first two treatments are based largely on 
the 1942-51 ten year average yields on the old rotation experi­
ment on the Agronomy Farm and within the assumptions laid down 
are estimated to be accurate within 5 to 10 per cent. The 
estimates on the moderate and heavy treatment are based on much 
less complete information than are the lighter treatments. They 
are based on short tenii fertilizer trials, on yields from heavy 
manure applications on the Agjronony Farm, and on the extension 
of response curves from lighter treatments. The accuracy of the 
yield estimates for the higher treatments is estimated to be 
within about 10 to 15 per cent. 
Any user of these yield figures is urged to keep constantly 
in mind that these yield figures are estimates and will be 
subject to revision as more data becomes available. ... 
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Assiu^tlons t 
1, That soils are Nicollet loam or non-oalcareovis Webster silt 
clay loam. 
2, That soils are adequately drained; either natural or arti­
ficial, 
3, That land is not subject to erosion, 
4, That land was in about a com-com-oat-meadow rotation with 
no fertility treatment except moderate manure applications 
for 20 or more years before the different treatments and 
rotations were established. 
5, That the different treatments and rotations have been estab­
lished for a ten-year period prior to the time period used 
for estimating yields. 
6, That yield estimates represent a lO-year average yield under 
average weather conditions, 
7, That com yields are obtained with adapted hybrids and with 
a stand of approximately 14.»000 stalks per acre, 
8, That oat yields are obtained with best varieties available. 
9, That hay yields are obtained on red clover-alfalfa-timothy, 
10. That all crops are planted, tended and harvested at the 
proper times, 
11, That all com is harvested. 
The four fertilizer levels were non (n), light (l), moderate (m) and 
heavy (h). When commercial fertilizer was used, the light, moderate, and 
heavy applications were made each year. The pounds of available nitrogen, 
phosphate and potash applied per acre for each fertilizer level are out­
lined in Table 4. 
The actual yield estimates for each of nine rotations and these four 
fertilizer levels are presented in Table 5. These estimates show a 
decrease in oats yield with heavy fertilizer applications in rotations 3, 
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. This is due to nitrogen bum, the excessive nitrogen 
being residual from the previous year's com. 
Rotation nmber 3, com-oats (sweet clover) is a two year rotation 
with the sweet clover coming as a "catch crop," providing green manure for 
the following year's com. Similarly, the com-com-oats (sweet clover) 
rotation is a three-year rotation. 
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Table Available pounds of nitrogen, phosphate and potash applied per 
acre of each crop 
Treatment | Com 1 Oats Soybeans Meadow®^ 
0, None 
1. Light 
0 
30-^0-30 10-20-10 
0 
0 
2* Moderate 60—40—30 10—20—10^ 0 
or 8 tons manure once in U years 
3 • Heavy 120-60—4.0 0—40—20^ 0 
or l6 tons manure once in 4 years 
10-20-10 X life 
of meadow 
10-20-10 X life 
of meadow 
0-40-20 X life 
of meadow 
^Treatment put on oats. 
^Applications increased to 30-20-10 for moderate and 60-40-10 for 
heavy for the continuous oats rotation, 
2. Selection of rotations 
JSxamination of these estimated yields reveals that three rotations, 
continuous oats, com-oats (sweet clover) and com-oats-meadow-jneadow, are 
much less profitable than the others and so these are not used in this 
study. This leaves four fertilizer levels for each of six rotations or a 
totcil of 24 activities from wMch to choose. 
These six rotations are all used in Northern Iowa, Several factors 
which tend to limit the percentage of the acreage in row crops are the 
livestock program of a farmer, participation in government crop loan pro­
grams, and conservation measures necessary on the more hilly land. In 
actual practice the labor and capital resources available to a particiilar 
farmer are also of critical in^jortance in his choice of rotations. 
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Table 5» Crop yield estimates Nicollet and Webster soils 
None 
Fertility treatments 
Light I ModerateI H^ayy 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Com yields, bu./acre 35 50 65 80 
Continuous oats 
Oat yields, bu./acre 30 40 50 55 
Com-oats (sweet clover) 
Corn yields, bu./acre 50 65 75 90 
Oat yields, bu./acre 35 45 45 40 
Corn-soybeans 
Corn yields, bu./acre 45 60 72 90 
Soybeans yields, bu./acre 18 22 25 30 
Corn-com-oats (sweet clover)^ 
•1st com yields, bu./acre 50' 65 75 90 
2nd com yields, bu»/acre 40 55 70 85 
Oat yields, bu./acre 35 45 45 40 
Com-corn-oats-meadow 
1st year com yields, bu./acre 70 90 97 100 
2nd year com yields, bu./acre 60 75 90 95 
Oat yields, bu./acre 40 50 60 50 
Hay yields, tons/acre 2.3 3.0 3.2 3, 
Corn-oats-meadow 
Corn yields, bu./acre 70 90 97 100 
Oat yields, bu./acre 45 60 60 50 
Hay yields, tons/acre 2.3 3.0 3.2 3. 
Com-oats-meadow-meadow 
Com yields, bu./acre 75 95 97 100 
Oat yields, bu.^cre 50 60 50 40 
1st year hay yields, tons/acre 2.3 3.0 3.2 3. 
2nd year hay yields, tons/acre 2.0 2.6 2.8 2 
Corn-soybeans-corn-oats-meadow 
Ist com yields, bu./acre 70 90 97 100 
Soybeans yields, bu./acre 20- 25 30 35 
2nd com yields, bu./acre 62 78 90 95 
Oat yields, bu./acre 40 50 60 50 
yields, tons/acre 2.3 3.0 3.2 3 
®yield estimates for this com-com-oata (sweet-clover) rotation were 
obtained from Dr. W, D. Shrader even though experiments had not been con­
ducted this whole 1942-51 period on it. Hence, the above estimates of 
reliability do not apply to this rotation. The author is very grateful to 
Dr. Shrader for having provided these but, of course, takes full responsi­
bility for their uses here. 
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The conventional linear programming notation for activities, 
P^, etc., is adopted here and tised extensively in the following chapter. 
The rotations are arranged with the shortest, continuous corn, first and 
the longest, com-soybeans-corn-oats-meadow, last. Table 6 provides a key 
for each of these activity numbers. 
Table 6. Activity numbers of different rotations and fertilizer levels 
Fertilization 
Rotation None 1 T.^ 1 Moderate 1 Hfiflvy 
Com Pi ^2 P3 
Corn-soybeans 
^5 P6 
Corn-com-oats (sweet clover) 
^9 1^0 Pll Pl2 
Com-oats-meadow 1^3 1^5 1^6 
Corn-com-oats-meadow Pl7 1^8 1^9 2^0 
Com-soybeans-com-oats-meadow 2^1 2^2 2^3 2^4 
3. 
It is necessary to assume specific sets of techniques for each crop, 
including such things as whether 2 or 4- row equipment is used, whether 2 or 
3 cuttings of hay are taken off, the ways in which fertilizer is spread and 
the methods by whloh the crops are harvested and disposed of. 
There are many ways in whloh labor and machinery substitute for one 
another on the farm. However, only one set of techniques whloh is reason­
ably efficient for the average crop-share farm is chosen here. 
The methods by whloh the various cost items are computed is explained 
In Appendix F, but a few of the critical assumptions are reviewed here. 
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Two-row com planting and ctiltivating equipment are used. Applications of 
fertilizer are assumed to require extra time but no extra machine operating 
costs, since they are made with plantings or cultivations. 
With respect to grain harvest, it is assumed that this crop-share 
tenant has a two-row compicker aiuJ a six-foot combine. He makes two cut­
tings of he^ and they are custom baled. He also has his com custom 
shelled and has a commercial trucker haul his grain to market. 
A. Mssa 
Average prices for the years 194.9-53 are used here,* These include 
prices for the four crops involved, for the seed and fertilizer, and for 
estimated machinery expenses. Custom rates which appear to have been 
common during these years are adopted. These prices and the sources from 
which they are taken are listed in Appendix E, 
5. Table of budgets 
Costs and returns for each of the 2U rotations based upon these 
assumed techniques and prices are listed in Table 7, These apply to the 
whole farm or to the owner-operator, (They are divided between the land­
lord and the tenant and presented for the different leases in Appendix A.) 
The first line of Table 7 shows the gross income per acre of each 
activity. Continuous com with a high rate of fertilization, P^, yields 
the highest gross income of the 24 rotations ($110,4-0/acre). It is 
^*Only one set of prices was to be used in this study, and it was 
desired that they correspond to current (1954) price expectations of 
farmers. The price expectation model assumed was the average of the past 
five years, (For other models see 10, chapter 16.) 
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Table 7, Co: It • :k: r 'l.urnv.. ;Ci- acre lor owner-op'. rator from nnch of nctivitios 
lota!ions and Dieir activity nu 
C-n C-1 G—m C-h GS-n CG-]. CS-m CS-h 
Items Pi P2 P3 U ^5 P6 F7 P8 
1. Gross income/acre ftf/.OO 89.70 lie.40 5/1.27 69.78 8] .93 100.8 
2. Gapital cost/acre 15./.':' 2f^.53 31.71 -43.79 15.80 21.39 23.94 30.1 
3. Net income/acre 
( l i n e  1  -  l i n e  2 )  32,81 ^2./*7 57.99 66.61 38.47 48.39 57.99 70.6 
Labor requirement 
(hours © f1.OO/hour) 7.00 7.2C 7.20 7.20 6.50 6.60 6.60 6.6 
5. Net after labor sub­
tracted (line 3-line 4.) 25.81 35.27 50.79 5^. a 31.97 4J .79 51.39 64. C 
6. Net income/$l capital 
cost(line 3 f line 2) ?.12 1.60 1.83 1.52 2.43 2.26 2.42 2.: 
Rotations and their activitv m 
Items 
COM-n 
Pi 3 
GOK-1 GOK-m 
^15 
GOK.-h 
P16 
GGOM-n 
Pl7 
GGOM-l 
P'lS 
GGOK-m 
P]9 
GGOM-
P2( 
1, Gross income/acre 57.26 74.42 78.83 77.67 62.70 7". 79 90.17 91. ( 
2. Gapital cost/acre 17.93 24.^7 26.63 3r.7i 17.67 25,/^. 28.30 34.: 
3. Net income/acre 
(line 1 - line 2) 39.33 49.75 52.20 • 4<' .96 45.03 54.35 61.87 56.5 
A. Labor reqidrements 
(hours @ Sl.OO/hour) 4.90 5.35 5.43 5.43 5.43 5.81 5.87 5.! 
5. Net after labor sub­
tracted (line 3-line 4) 34.43 u.uo 46.77 41.53 39.60 48.54 56.00 50.' 
6. Net income/$l capital 
cost(line 3 t line 2) 2.19 2.02 1.96 1.53 2.55 2.14 2.19 1.' 

n 
c for owner-op? rator from nnch of 2A activities 
C-1 C-m C-h CS-n GC-3 C.S-m CS-h 
-10 
CCO-n CCO-1 CCO-m CCO~h 
P2 P3 ^5 P6 F7 P8 P9 Pio 111 h2 
69,00 89.70 110.-40 69.78 81.93 100.80 50.?7 .^0 78.10 90.63 
26.53 31.71 -43.79 15.80 21.39 ?3M 30.16 15.78 2/^.62 27.97 3''-.36 
42.47 57.99 66.61 38.47 48.39 57.99 70.64 34,49 41 50.13 54.27 
7.20 7.20 7.20 6.50* ' 6.60 6.6o 6.60 6.33 f.57 6.57 (^.57 
35.?.7 50.79 5^.41 31.97 4^1.79 51.39 64.04 28.16 35.41 43.56 47.70 
1.60 1.83 1.52 2,43 2.?6 2,42 2.34 2.18 1.70 1,79 3.49 
Rotations and their aciivitY numbers 
;0K-1 COI-I-m COM-h CCOM-n CC0M~1 CCOM-in CGOM-h CSCOM-n CRCOM-l CSCOM-mlCnCOM-h 
1^4 ^15 P16 Pl7 P18 ^19 ^20 P2I P pp ^23 j ^'24 
•4.42 78.83 . 77.67 62.70 79.79 90.17 91.03 61.58 77.56 87,62 90.88 
'4.67 26.63 30.71 17.67 25.28.30 34.22 17.27 23.53 25.82 3^^.59 
9.75 52.20 4^.96 45.03 54.35 61.87 56.81 V.,31 ' 54.03 61.30 60,29 
5.35 5.43 5.43 5.43 5.81 5.87 5.87 5.54 5.85 5.90 5.90 
4.40 46.77 a.53 39.60 48.54 56,00 50.94 38.77' 48.18 55.90 54.39 
2.02 1.96 1.53 2.55 2.14 2.19 1.66 2.56 2.30 2,39 1.^^ 
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Interesting to note that continuous com with no fertilizer, produces 
the lowest gross returns. 
All the capital costs enumerated above, including fertilizer as the 
main variable cost, are given in line 2. The gross incomes less capital 
costs yield the net incomes of line 3. Corn-soybean rotation with heavy 
fertilization, Pg, has a higher net income than P^, This is because the 
soybeans are not fertilized and hence Pg has an appreciably lower capital 
cost than does P^. 
The cost of hired labor is subtracted with the capital expenses above, 
but it is only reasonable that in his choice of rotations a farmer should 
consider the various amovrnts of his own labor needed. If he values his 
time at ^ per hotir, he csua subtract the operator labor costs per acre of 
each rotation in line 4- to obtain another set of "net" income figures in 
line 5. Again Pg has the highest "net" income ($64.04./acre) of any of 
these 24 alternatives. 
Fixed costs, such as taxes and fences, which are the same regardless 
of what is grown, are ignored here because the problem is only one of choice 
between rotations. 
Using these cmde and simplified budgeting methods, the corn-soybeans 
rotation, Pg, is chosen as most profitable and the problem is finished. 
Actually, the problem has been viewed only from the standpoint of land 
as a scarce factor. The particular farmer concerned may not have the labor 
in some critical month, such as I-lay, or he may not have enough capital to 
handle 154- acres of Pg. Should he Just raise as much of Pg as he can and 
forget about the idle land? Or, assuming it is his capital that is short, 
should he produce as much as he can of a rotation which uses less capital 
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relative to the net income received? line 6 of Table 7 gives the net income 
per dollar capital expense. It is noted that $1 spent on Pg yields 
net, while the same dollar spent on P21 nets $2.56, If capital is the 
limiting input, it pays this farmer to produce Pgi. Similarly, if the 
farmer's labor resourceK for May are exhausted in production of com and 
soybeans before his land is used up, it would pay him to shift some or all 
of his land to another rotation which reqtdres less May labor per dollar 
net income. Linear programming is useful where such a combining of activ­
ities is needed to obtain full utilization of a number of resources. 
B, Lease and Resource Situations 
1* Lease situations 
Eight lease situations are chosen with the objective of testing the 
hypotheses of this study. These leases are numbered and sunmariaed in 
Table 8, 
Lease 1 is considered the "typical" crop-share lease of North Central 
Iowa, and combines the most common properties of all leases. It divides 
the corn and soybean yields eqiaally between the landlord and tenant and 
gives the tenant three fifths of the oats and the landlord two fifths. 
Hay and pasture land is usually handled on a cash-rent basis with $8 per 
acre the most common amount paid, ^fost operating expenses are borne by 
the tenant, but fertilizer costs are shared by both parties. 
Leases 2 and 3 are the same as lease 1 except the cash rent is raised 
to ®16 and $25» respectively. In leases U and 5 the tenant pays all of 
the fertilizer and seed costs and rents pasture for $16 and ^125, respec­
tively, Lease 6 shares equally between the landlord and tenant all crops 
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Table 8, Definition of lease situations 
Conditions 
Item Tenant share Landlord share 
Com 1/2 1/2 
Soybeans 1/2 1/2 
Oats 3/5 2/5 
Fertilizer and seed 1/2 1/2 
Operating expenses (including 
hired labor) 1 0 
Rea3. estate expenses 0 1 
Labor 1 0 
Cash rent for hay land $8 
2 Same as 1 except $16 per acre cash rent for hay land. 
3 Same as 1 except $25 per acre cash rent for hay land. 
4. Same as 2 except tenant pays all fertilizer and seed costs. 
5 Same as 3 except tenant pays all fertillBer and seed costs. 
All crops 
Hay 
Fertilizer and seed 
Operating expenses (including 
hired labor) 
Real estate expenses 
Labor 
1/2 1/2 
1/2 1/2 
1/2 1/2 
1/2 1/2 
0 1 
1 0 
7 Same as 6 except tenant gets 
and expenses are shared. 
8 Same as 6 except tenant pays 
land instead of one half the 
2/5 and landlord 3/5 where receipts 
$25 cash rent for hay and pasture 
value of hay or pasture. 
Including hay and all operating esqjenses including fertilizer and seed. It 
approximates a partnership except that the landlord bears all real estate 
expenses and the tenant supplies his labor. Lease 7 is the same as lease 6 
except the shares are two fifths for the tenant and three fifths for the 
landlord. Lease 8 only varies from lease 6 in that a cash rent of |25 per 
acre for hay land is paid by the tenant in exchange for all of the income 
from this land. 
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2. Resource sltuationa 
In the choice of resoTirce sittiations the relative amoiaits of land, 
labor, and capital, one to another, are the inqiortant factors. These, 
rather than the absolute amounts, determine the activities chosen. It is 
desirable to explore a vdde variety of situations and at the same time 
some realistic situations. 
The land limitation is assumed to be 154- acres throughout* and the 
capital and labor limitations are stimmarized in Table 9. 
The assumption as to how much labor a tenant is willing to put in 
each month is quite arbitrary. Two hundred sixty hours per month is taken 
as a starting point (26 days with 10 hours per day). From this are sub­
tracted an estimate of the time needed to care for livestock and the 
average percentage of each month which is not suitable for work in the 
field because of weather (see Appendix C). The final figures for hours 
available for field work are presented in Table 10. 
These hours may seem shoirt, especially to farmers used to I4.-I6 hour 
workdays dviring the rush of planting or hainrest. They represent acttial 
operating time in the field, however, since travel to and from the field, 
and time out for repairs and adjustments are not included in the coeffi­
cients. They are considered minimum amounts that a tenant might set as 
the maximum number of hours he is willing to work. 
*The modal size crop-share farm in Northern Iowa in 1950 was 160 acres 
as determined by a random sample of farms conducted by Russel Shaw in 1950 
(17), Although the average size farm ranted on a crop-share basis in 
Northern Iowa according to the 1950 U, S, Census of Agriculture (33) was 
approximately 200 acres, the average cropland harvested by these tenants 
was approximately I63 acres. 
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Table 9. Resource limitations of tenant, landlord and owier-operator 
Party ls3.iiVfll/lon noil avftl?,able 
TenantI 
Landlord: 
Ovmer: 
1 $1500 A (see Table 10) 
la 1500 unlimited 
2 3000 A 
2a 3000 unlimited 
3 U500 A 
3a 4500 A plus 3.0 hrs. May labor 
K unlimited unlimited 
Ab. $100 less than used unlimited 
in situation U 
1 ^ 500 unlimited 
2 1200 unlimited 
3 2000 unlimited 
U unlimited unlimited 
5 imlimited A 
1 2000 A 
2 2700 A 
3 3500 A 
U 4200 A 
5 5000® A 
6 2000 unl^jnited 
7 2700 unlimited 
8 3500 unlimited 
9 4200 unlimited 
10 5000^ unlimited 
^Capital is non-limiting in these cases. 
Table 10. Net hours available for acttial field work by tenant, situation A 
Month fburs available 
August 
September 
October 
November 
166.9 
167.3 
168.2 
118.e 
Month tf<?wrg 
March 
April 
June 
Jxily 
19.3 
128.3 
135.6 
U9.A 
182.6 
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The second labor aitmtion is one in which the tenant has svifficient 
labor for any pix)duction program possible on his farm. In other words, 
labor is assumed to be unlimited. 
It is reasonable to assume that a typical crop-share tenant has the 
added labor of a son available during the summer months. As it turned out, 
however, this farmer is never short of labor during June, July or August, 
though he often runs short during May, It is assumed in resource situation 
3a that the tenant has ten extra hours labor in May, The resulting 
increases in possible net income are between ^50 and $200. 
The landlord does not contribute any labor, and it is assumed that he 
considered the tenant's labor to be unlimited, or sufficient for any pro­
duction program. In the final landlord situation, however, it is assumed 
that the landlord recognizes the labor limitation of the tenant. 
Four different quantities of capital are assumed for the tenant and 
four for the landlord. This only includes the capital needed for current 
operating expenses. The quantities of available capital are chosen upon 
the basis of what seems reasonable for a farmer who has very limited 
capital, and several who are less limited. These arej 5pl500, $3000, $4500 
and Tmlimited capital for the tenant. Situation 4a, with $100 less than 
the amount of capital used vrhen it is unlimited, provides an idea as to 
whether it pays to borrow this last ®100, 
In leases 1, 2 and 3, the landlord shares the fertilizer and seed 
costs with the tenant. In order to make his capital limitations comparable 
with the tenant's $500, $L200, $2000, and unlimited capital are assumed. 
However, these capital limitations are much more restrictive than the 
tenant's in leases 6, 7 and 8 where all operating expenses are shared. 
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The ten owner situations are selected combinations of the tenant's and 
landloixi's situations. They are used to con5)are the crop rotation choice 
of the combined firm vd.th the tenant's and landlord's choices. 
With these eight different leases and thirteen resource situations of 
the landlord and tenant plus ten owner situations, there are now 114 
separate situations. For each of these it is necessary to find the most 
profitable use of the available resources. The assumption is that each 
party wants to produce the crop rotation and use the amount of fertilizer 
which will maximize his individual profits. 
A oiiqjle means of referring to the tenant and landloi^ situations is 
necessary. The system chosen consists of three digits separated by periods. 
The first digit refers to the lease. The second digit denotes whether it 
is for the tenant, 1, or the landlord, 2, The third digit specifies the 
particular resource situation of landlord or tenant. For exan^jle: 5.1.3 
refers to the fifth lease, to the tenant, and to the third resource situ­
ation of the tenant as listed above, 
C, Methods 
1. P9],3,ay ff4tB 
This study is concerned with the cash income from a rotation as a 
whole, rather than with the yields of specific crops within that rotation. 
The most logical unit in which to express the product of a rotation as a 
whole is the dollar,* 
*Sometimes feed mits are used to aggregate retvims from crop rota­
tions. They are useful in linear pTOgramming analysis when the objective 
is to maximize livestock production from the feed grown on one farm. Here 
the objective is simply to maximize crop income. 
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There la one distinct advantage derived from using dollar \mits rather 
than some physical units in computations the size of those typical of 
linear prograniming problems. Comparisons of productive alternatives and 
visual checks of one's work become imich simpler. Visual checks and com­
parisons are sin^sler still if the work is standardized in terms of net 
income rather than gross incomej however, gross income units are used in 
the main conqputations of tliis study, 
2. pf cp^ ffj.cj.en1^ p 
An input-output ratio, or coefficient, is sia^ily the input in question 
divided by the output associated with it. The outputs used here are the 
gross incomes for each rotation. These gross incomes and the capital 
inputs for the landlord and tenant imder each lease are assembled in 
Appendix A, Those of the owner-operator are given in Table 7 above. The 
labor inputs, which are the same regardless of the lease assumed, are 
presented in Table 3A» 
The coBqjutation of the coefficients for P23 for the tenant under lease 
3 is demonstrated in Table 11, _The gross income in the first column, 
^52,11, applies to five acres, one from each stage in the corn-soybeans-
corn-oats-meadow rotation. Similarly, the inputs in the second column 
apply to five acres of P23. The capital coefficient, $,50775, is found by 
dividing the capital costs, $128,01, by the gross income, $252,11, and the 
rest of these ratios are found in the same way. These same coefficients 
are used in the linear programming exanqple below, and appear in the P23 
co3.umn of Table 12, 
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Table 11, An example of the computation of input coefficients, lease 3 for 
tenant 
Gross income Inputs per Coefficients» 
per 5 acres 5 acres Inputs 7 gross 
Inputs ^23 ^23 income (dollars) 
Capital, dollars 252,11 M.oi ,50775 
Land, acres 252,11 5 ,01983 
March labor, hours 252,11 ,655 .00260 
April labor, hours 252,11 3,235 ,01283 
May labor, hours 252,11 ,018-^0 
July labor, hours 252,11 5.838 ,02316 
October labor, hours 252,11 4,316 ,01712 
November labor, hoxirs 252,11 2.856 ,01133 
3. A IfyPiltOal ^plvt3,pp 
An example of one of the typical linear programming solutions used in 
this study is presented in Table 12,* The vinit in tenns of which each 
activity is measvired Is $1 of the gross income and the net prices, Cj, 
appearing across the top of this table are obtained by subtracting the 
capital coefficient from #1, In the case of P23, for example, the capital 
coefficient is f.50775 capital/$l P23 (gross), and the net Income, cj, 
equals $,4.9225/$! P23 (gross). 
The conventional rules for simplex confutation (6) are followed in 
this exaii5jle even though some modifications were used in the actual compu­
tations of this study,** These rules recommend introducing the activity 
'^'igiires referred to in the text are underlined in Table 12 to help 
the reader find them, 
**These shortcuts weret (l) choosing the incoming activities which 
one reasons idll be in the finil most profitable program, (2) only filling 
in the necessary rows and colionnB, and (3) confuting each zj row from the 
preceding one. 
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Table 12. An example of a linear programming solution with 2K activities 
cj 0 
^0 25 
0 0 0 0 
^26 ^27 ^28 ^29 
0 
'30 Pon P31 i 
- c 1 
2506.31309 
2506.31309 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 18.A8313 0 
0  0 +  0  
.-4,04.4-0 Capital P^^^ 
0 Land P26 
0 March P27 
0 April P28 
.55893 May Pg 
0 July P30 
0 
0 
October F31 
November P32 
2311.017A0 
35.153-^7 
9.29329 
4.7.82221 
3680.93288 
60.24795 
32.59365 
AA.81412 
^3 
'•1 - ^ -1 
2991.95925 
2991.95925 
.47410 0 
+ 0 
0 0 11.55342 0 
0  0 +  0  
.49225 Capital P23 
0 Land P26 
0 March P27 
0 April P28 
.55893 May Pg 
0 July P30 
0 
0 
October P31 
November P32 
4270.33039 
31.90802 
8.18300 
46.IUO8 
1885.77139 
56.27654 
33.74664 
43.70383 
g.1 - ° 1. 
?156.08434 
3156.08434 
.63^65 0 
+ 0 
0 0 9.21150 0 
0  0 +  0  
0 Capital P25 3000.0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .60290 
0 Land P26 15A.0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 .04141 
0 March P27 19.3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 April ^28 128.3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 .0342c 
0 May 
^29 135.6 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 .06377 
0 July P30 182.6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 .03102 
0 October P31 168.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 .0429C 
0 November P32 118.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 .05913 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.1 - c.i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -.3971C 
0 Capital P25 1022,18611 1 0 0 0 -u. 58564 0 0 0 -.32723 
0 Land P26 65.03A92 
0 March P27 19.30000 
0 April P28 63,19048 
.55893 May P8 4484-. 12698 0 0 0 0 33.06878 0 0 0 2.1088C 
0 July P30 117.44563 
0 October P3I 22.28651 
0 November P32 55.25992 
0 0 1.17B6'; 
0 0 + 
2.26086 0 0 0 -32.97606 0 0 0 -.7398J 
-.78756 0 0 0 4ii.52961 0 0 0 2.3659^ 
0 0 1.0232( 
0 0 + 
4.17765 0 0 0 -60.93363 0 0 0 -1.3670! 
-2.54376 0 0 0 70.14A89 0 0 0 2.9406( 
0 0 .9706( 
0 0 + 

les 
0 n 1.,  .39710 .40435 .47358 .454:;'^ .47 52-2 .50401 .54132 .45465 
30 P3I 1' -- ' -5 Pi ^2 P3 ^4 i ,• J P6 P7 ^8 ^9 
1 0 0 .60290 .59565 .52642 ,<^4565 .52478 .49599 .45868 .44107 .54535 
I  0 0 .04141 .02898 .02230 .01812 ,03685 .02866 .02U1 .03984 .03843 
) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .00455 
) 0 0 .03420 .02529 .01953 .01587 .02606 .02098 .01787 .01452 .03263 
) 0 0 .06377 .04609 .03545 .02880 .05524 .04368 .03720 .03024 .03946 
0 0 .03102 ,02316 .01782 .01446 .02607 .02100 .01788 .01453 .04321 
) 1 0 .04290 .03003 .02310 .01877 .06044 .04700 .04003 .03254 .02654 
) 0 1 .05913 .04139 .03184 .02587 .02631 .02046 .01743 .01417 .03659 
) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
) 0 0 -.39710 -.40435 -.47358 -.45435 -.47522 -.50401 -.54132 -.55393 -.45465 
) 0 0 -.32723 -.07660 .00936 .12558 -.28093 -.14111 -.08391 0 -.03020 
) 0 0 2.10880 1.52414 1.17229 .95238 1,82672 1.23016 1 1.30489 
} 0 0 1.17867 .85189 .65523 .53231 1,02101 .80734 .68757 55893 .72934 
D 0 0 + + + + + -f 0 4 
D 0 0 -.73982 -.17318 .02116 .28392 -.63514 -.31903 -.18971 0 -.06828 
D 0 0 2.36592 1.58433 1.16494 .85370 2,04746 1.5^^532 1.29609 1 1.32862 
D 0 0 1.02320 .81550 .65968 .59198 .88754 . .74030 .64770 .55893 .71499 
3 0 0 + + + + + + 0 + 
0 0 0 -1.36705 -.32000 .03910 .52463 -1.17362 -.58951 -.35055 0 -.12617 
0 0 0 2.94060 1.71885 1.14850 .63316 2.54083 I.8O3I4 1.44345 1 1.38166 
0 0 0 .97066 r^320 .66118 .6l2Li 784243 ".71764 .63423 .55893 .71014 
0 0 0 +  +  +  +  +  +  +  0  +  

m .A5A^5 .U890 .A79A7 .45UO 
.33332 .39582 .4.04A0 .35378 .40133 •U 
8 ^9 ^10 ^11 ^'12 Pl3 ^15 ^16 ^17 
tim .5/^535 .55110 .52053 . 5/1860 .66688 .604J.8 .59560 .646?2 .59887 .5 
98^ .03843 . 0290/f .024.88 .02158 
.02732 .02099 .01983 ,02016 .0?686 .0 
.00/,55 .00634 .00543 .00471 .00323 .004,58 .004,33 .00440 .00?38 .0 
-^52 .03263 .02'/',: .02195 .01904 .01567 .01239 .01170 .01190 .01710 .0 
)02A .039^6 .03ro8 .02.637 .02288 .0U02 .01112 .01051 ,01068 .02068 .0 
A53 .CU321 .03361 .02880 .02499 .03502 .02986 .02980 .02938 .03085 .0 
iPM .Q7MU .02005 .0173 8 .0U91' .0094A .00725 .00685 .or 696 .01391 .0 
A17 .03659 .0276A .02369 .02055 .01300 .00999 .0094^ ,00960 .01918 .0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
'•>293 -.^5/+65 -.^890 -.47947 -.451^0 -.33312 -.39582 -.404-10 -,35378 -.40133 — .4 
-.03020 .10215 .3 3591 .234,88 ./16239 .^^<199 I.U231 .49045 .29724 .3 
.01293 
.00A33 
.00665 
1.30/^89 1.01786 .87202 .75661 .46362 .36772 .34755 .35317 ,68386 .5 
.02A75 
-.004i;6 
.00A52 
5893 .7293A .56891 .487^0 .A2289 .25913 .20553 .19426 .19740 ,38223 .3 
+  +  +  
-.02851 -.07399 -.19029 -.21034 -.15638 -,01910 -.1 
-.06828 .23095 .30727 « CO
 
cc
 
1.045A0 .99928 1.00000 1.10884 .67202 .7 
1.32862 .93759 .76523 .58777 .10029 .020A2 0 -.03221 .45030 • < 
5893 .7U99 .617U .55197 .52A98 „47881 .A1552 .4.0440 .43041 .52345 . 1  
+  +  •  , +  4* +  + 0 -( +  +  
12637 .^26?5 .56778 .89769 1.93170 1.8^64.8 1.84-781 2.04893 1,24177 1.: 
1.38166 .75819 .52655 .210^0 -.71176 -.75580 -.77678 -.89354 -.07172 
r  
5893 .710U .6338A .57379 . 559-19 • .55306 .A86A9 .47542 .50916 .57137 
^  t  
-t- +  +  + +  +  •t +  + -f-

.40133 .43128 .45972 .40645 .42154 .45713 .49225 .45623 R 
^17 ^18 ^19 ^20 ^21 
p 
22 
p 
23 Pot P8 
.59887 .56872 .54028 .59355 .57846 .54289 .50775 .54377 6801.64146 
. 02.686 .02104 .01874 .01866 .02817 .0222r' .01983 .01927 7762.09677 
.00238 .00344 .00307 .00306 .00200 .0029? .0C260 .0'"^2'-2 
.01710 .01392 .01240 .01235 .01766 .01441 .01283 .01246 8836.08815 
.02068 .01673 .01490 .01483 .02557 .02067 .01840 .01787 4484.12698 
.03085 .02665 .02424 .02413 .02964 .02554 .02316 .02250 12567.10255 
.01391 .01090 .00971 .00967 .02432 .01923 .01712 .01663 5169.02274 
.01918 .015(>2 .01338 .01332 .01609 .01273 ,01333 .01100 8383.90967 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-.40133 -.43128 -.45972 -.40645 -.42154 -.45711 -.49225 -.45623 ^0 f P35 
.29724 .32470 .32296 .37724 .20550 .24341 .23937 .28312 2313 .03.740 
.00776 5030.465 T-S 
.00260 4457.27482 
.00400 9502.32781 
.68386 .55324 .49272 .49041 .84557 .68353 .60847 .59094 12902. iwai 
.03432 4745.2779s 
-.00268 
.00271 32225.64601 
.38223 .30922 .27540 .27410 .47261 .38205 .34009 .33029 
-.01910 -.12206 -.13235 + -.07506 -.15216 -.12594 T'O f 103 
.67202 .73410 .73017 .85289 .46461 .54579 r^iisi .64009 4270.33039 
.00076 46254.56579 
.00026 35743.42307 
.00040 119555.^^2500 
.45030 .29810 .23895 .19399 .68409 .49384 .42038 .36848 8756.20362 
.00093 64782.74193 
-.00027 -
.00026 172362.00000 
,52345 .46349 .42884 .45334 .57025 .4°674 ".45382 .46481 
+ + -.03088 + + -.03843 + 
1.24177 1.35648 1.34922 1.57598 .85851 1.00852 i.roooo 1.18277 
-.07172 -.^7214 -.32824 -c.46852 .32319 .06988 0 -.12873 
.571:7 .51562 .48069 .51391 .60324 .53550 .49225 .51027 
+ -f + + + + 0 + 
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with the highest net gain per tinit. Pg is chosen as the first activity to 
come into production hecause it has the highest net price, 1.55893. 
is chosen to be introduced in moving from plan 2 to plan 3 because it has 
the highest negative Zj - Cj value (1,21014 in the last row of plan 2). 
^23 is brought into the final production plan for the same reason, replacing 
P15. 
Once Pg is chosen to come in plan 1, the next step is to divide the Pg 
column by the Pg column so as to determine which resource restricts the 
production of Pg the most and what this maximum possible production is. 
May labor is most restrictive, limiting the production of Pg to $4484..13. 
Thus in plan 2, the May labor row goes out (May labor is exhausted) and Pg 
comes in. This new Pg row is found by dividing all the entries in the old 
May labor row by ,03024, 
The new zj row in plan 2 is merely this new Pg row times the net price 
of Pg, 55893* The Zj - Cj row of plan 2 is found subtraction and need 
not be filled in where the result is positive. 
In order to find the next restrictive input, the Pg and P^j columns of 
plan 2 are first computed. The R column reveals that capital is the most 
restrictive input upon production of P;l5 ($2311.02), However, the capital 
row in plan 1 reveals that P-j^j is not a very efficient user of capital. 
At this point the person doing these computations might ask himself 
what activities are reasonable candidates besides Pj^g. He notices that 
P-j^ also has a high added return per unit added, but that it is even less 
efficient than P^g in its use of capital. P19 also has quite a high 
negative entry in the zj - cj row and is reasonably efficient in its use 
of capital. P23 has an entry in the Zj - Cj row of -.15216 but is a good 
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deal more efficient than in its use of capital. Both and ^2^ 
potential candidates for the final most profitable program. Either is a 
better choice than ?2.5 relatively simple to find out which of 
these two, P]^g or Pg^, is the better choice. 
However, following the conventional rules, P15 is introduced here. 
Up to this point, only the Pq, the Zj and the - Cj rows of plan 2 are 
filled in. Now the Pg^ row of plan 2 is computed. Using the Pg^ entry in 
this row as an example .23937 is computed as follows: 
,50775 - (,M107 X ,608^7) = ,23937. 
This is the corresponding entry in plan 1 minus the product of the incoming 
column entry for plan 1 and the incoming row entry of plan 2, 
Next the incoming row of plan 3, P15, is computed by dividing each 
element in the capital row of plan 2 by the boxed-in figure, ,44.231. At 
this point the Zj - Cj row of plan 3 can be con^nited directly from the 
Zj - Cj row of plan 2 following the same inile that is used for any other 
row. For example, the zj - Cj entry in plan 3 for ^19 is found from the 
plan 2 entry as follows: 
-.18432 - (-,210U X ,73017) = -.03088. 
The longer way to compute the new zj - Cj row is to compute the new 
Pg row. Multiply the P^j and Pg rows by their respective net prices and 
add to find the new net sacrifice zj (,4.2884). Then Zj - cj is found by 
subtraction, and the two methods should check. 
It is not STirprising to observe that the only remaining negative 
entries in the zj - cj row of plan 3 are for P^g and Pg^, At this point 
it is hard to tell without filling in the Pj^g and P22 columns of plan 3 
which would be the better choice. However, it is P^j, or really capital, 
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which limits the addition of P23 to $4270,33, and capital is even more 
restrictive upon P23 is chosen to come in on the basis of this logic 
as well as on the basis of having the highest negative Zj ~ Cj• 
The new P23 row in plan U is foxind by dividing the entries in the Pj^ 
row of plan 3 by the boxed-in figure, .54118, The Pg and rows can be 
computed exactly as before or they can be left out. The research worker 
is mainly interested in the fact that no negative entries appear in the 
Zj - Cj row of plan and ho can compute this row directly from the 
previous row. 
The Pq column in plan 4- of Table 12 reveals how much of Pg and P23 is 
being produced and how much of each resotirce is being disposed of. The zj 
row of the Pq column shows the maximim net income to be $3156,08, 
In Table 13 the production of Pg and P23 is summarized and a check is 
made to see if each resource is completely used up. The capital needed in 
the production of Pg is |831«76, and it is found by imiltiplying the gross 
Table 13, Summary of a line&r programming solution 
Item 
'A. 123. Disposals Totals 
Gross incomes, $ 1885,77139 4.270.33039 — 6156,10178 
Net incomes, $ 105A.0U20 2102.07013 - 3156,08434 
Capital, $ 831.75719 a68,26026 0 3000,01745 
Land, acres 37.41370 84.68065 31,90802 154.00237 
March, hours 0 11,10286 8,18300 19,28586 
April, hours 27.381^0 54.78834 46,11408 128,28382 
l4y, hoxirs 57.02573 78.57408 0 135,59981 
July, hours 27,40026 98,90085 56,27654 182,57765 
October, hoiirs 61.36300 73.10806 33.74664 168,21770 
November, hours 26.72138 48,38284 43.70383 118,80805 
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income from Pg, $1885•77139, by the capital coefficient for Pg, ,44107. 
Capital needed for Pg^ is $2168,26. There is no capital in the disposal 
coliimn and the total capital checks with the original 3i3000 capital avail­
able. This computational check is the most useful function of these 
summary tables,* 
For the analytical purposes of this study, the important things from 
each simplex solution are: (l) the acreage devoted to each rotation, 
(2) the net incomes from each activity, and (3) the resources exhausted 
in production. These are presented in Tables 14.-17 for sdl the situations. 
*Llmited space does not permit reproduction of the summary tables but 
any one of them can be reconstructed if one knows; (l) the original 
resources available, (2) the input/output coefficients for the activities 
being produced and (3) the gross Incomes of the activities produced. The 
resources available for each tenant and landlord situation were outlined 
earlier in this chapter. Data needed to compute any input/output coeffi­
cients are given in Appendix A, The gross Incomes are presented in 
Appendix B, 
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V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A. Introduction 
Summary tables 
The optimum solutions for each of the situations used in this study 
are summarized in Tables 14 through 17, These tables are arranged to 
facilitate con^jarison of lease situations and resowce situations in 
several important respects. 
Table 14- summarizes the optimum programs of the tenant under the eight 
leases described in the row stubs and the four resource situations 
described in the column headings. Table 15 does the same for five landlord 
situations. The optimum programs of an ovmer-operated firm which has the 
combined resources of the landlord and tenant are sTimmarized in Table 16, 
Table 17 describes four additional tenant situations. 
The activities included in the optimum solutions and the acres devoted 
to each are the first two items listed in each block of these tables. 
These are the most important single factors in the appraisal of leases 
below. The limiting resources are also indicated in each block, and they 
provide insight into the reason each party chooses the rotations he does. 
Lastly, the net incomes derived from each activity are presented. Fixed 
costs have not been subtracted in arriving at these net figures. Subtract­
ing taxes and insurance would make the landlord's net incomes appreciably 
lower than those listed. 
2. Lease preference 
A brief review of the lease conditions and the results in Tables lA 
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Table lA. Summarj' of optimum solutions for tenant (15A acres cropland) 
fie 
1,1 §1500 capital and labor A I.:' nooo 
Lease situations Acres Limiting Net 
Activities of each resources income Ac1 iv it;OS 
(1.1.1) 
Lease 1; 1/2 com and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $8 cash Pp^ CSCOM(m) 67.6 Capital 1906/-1 
rent for pasture, 1/2 fert. and 
seed cost paid by tenant 
(!.l. ) 
P, 3 :SC!K(m) 
(2.1.1) 
Lease 2: l/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $16 Pg CS(h) 67.A Capital 1900.8? 
cash rent for pasture. 1/2 fert. 
and seed cost paid bv tenant 
T?.i3y 
P{3 G, (h) 
P-.3 .•.COI-'(m) 
(3.1.1) (same as 2.1.1) 
Lease 3: 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $25 cash Pg CS(h) 67.4 Capital 1900.8? 
rent for pasture, 1/2 fert. and 
seed cost paid bv tenant 
(3.1. ) 
Pp c (• ) 
Pp3 GG ;Oi:{ir.) 
(A.1.1) 
Lease U'. 1/2 com and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $16 P22 CSOI'i(m) 51.7 Capital 1106.61 
cash rent for pasture, all fert. 
and seed costs paid bv tenant 
{.',.1.:'; 
p., 3 c :.coi'(i!;) 
(5.1.1) 
Lease 5: 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $25 Pc CS(n) 81.3 Coyital 921.81 
cash rent for pasture, all fert. P^ GS(ra) 9.0 May labor 153.04 
and seed costs paid by tenant 1074.85 
('.!.?-) 
1-7 C. (m) 
I ',3 C, COM(m) 
(6.1.1) 
Lease 6: I/2 all crops includ- P27 CCOM(n) 35.8 Land 80^.2r 
ing hay to tenant, only 1/2 p^-] CSOM(n) 80.0 May labor 1773.C''. 
operating expenses, fert. and Pg^ CSOM(m) 38.2 Capital 1179.2^^ 
seed costs paid by tenant • 3758.4.6 
(^.1. ) 
Pg - ) 
T CCC Mltn) 
(7.1.1) 
Lease 7: 2/5 all crops includ­
ing hay to tenant, 2/5 operat- P^^ (GCOM(n) 6,3 May labor 112.96 
ing capital expenses, fert. P23 (CSCOM(m) 140.9 Cayital 34^^.97 
and seed costs paid by tenant 3597.66 
. (^ .iT?) 
P8 --(M 
Pic,  ' GrM(:,;) 
(8.1.1) 
Lease 8: 1/2 of corn, oats and 
soybeans and all hay to tenant, Pg CS(h) 77.9 May labor 2751.49 
$25 cash rent for pasture, I/2 p2'j GSOOM(m) 18.2 Capital 573.92 
operating expenses, fert. and 3325.4-1 
seed costs paid by tenant 
Pf? r •(•:.) 
P19 .:C' K(rn) 

(154 acres cropland) 
Resource sitviations 
Ltal and labor A .1,,? i3000 capital and labor A 1.3 S4500 carital and labor 
23 1 Limiting 1 Net 
ach 1 resources! income 
Acres Limiting 1 Net 
Ad ivit.OS of each rcsourceBi income 
Acres Limiting j 
Activities of each resoui ' ces l  
.6 Capital 1906.61 
(1.1.) 
I-. 3 -.S' iMlm) 135.1 Capital 3813.23 
(1.1.3) 
Pg CS(h) 27.4 Miiy labor 
FjL9 CCOM(m) 118.0 Mar. labor 
.4 Capital • 3900.8? 
( P . l . P . )  
FpC.(h) 28.4 May labor 799.63 
P03 ; .'.COl-'(tn) 99.5 Capital 2649.20 
34^.8.82 
(2.1.3) 
Pg CS(h) 27.5 Mflv labor 
CCOM(m) 117.8 I-Iar. labor 
e as 2.1,1) 
.4 Capital 1900.82 
(3.1. 0 
Pp C (' ) 37.4 May labor 1054-10 
Pot CS :Oj;(m) 84.7 Capital 2101.99 
3156.09 
(3.1.3) 
pg CS(h) ?7.4 '"iay labor 
P19 CCOM(m) 118.0 M^r. labor 
.7 Capital 1106.61 
(.;.l.:') 
Pp3 C ;COI'(ir.) 103.4 Capital 2213.22 
U . 1 . 3 )  
Pjg CCOM(m) 2.7 May labor 
F23 esCOM(m) 143.8 l-!ar. labor 
-.3 Capital 921.81 
).0 May labor 153.04 
1074.85 
(^.1.^) 
} •-/ C; (m) 56.4 May labor 959.95 
I ' 3 L, GO!'(!u) 53.6 Capital 1050.30 
2010,25 
(5.1.3) 
P7 CS(m) .1 Miay labor 
P23 CSCOM(m) 145.9 Capital 
5.8 Land BOT .2f 
3.0 May labor 1773.04 
5.2 Capital 1179.2? 
3758.46 
(< .1. ) 
Pg CL;') 27.5 May labor 971.13 
fp, CCfM(m) 117.9 Mar.labor 3646.83 
4617.96 
(6.1.3) (same a.^ 6.1.2) 
'>,3 May labor 112.96 
D.9 Cayital 3484.97 
3597.66 
(^.1.2) 
p8G; (h) 27.5 I>lay labor 776.79 
P^f, ' Cf"::(i.;) 117.8 Mar. labor 2917.34 
3694.13 
(7.1.3) (same as 7.1.2) 
7.9 May labor 2751.49 
3.2 Capital 573.92 
3325.41 
(c.l.?) 
Fo C ?7.7 May labor 973.06 
Pig ;Cf H(m) 117.7 Jfer. labor 3745.31 
4718.37 
(8.1.3) (same as 8.1.2) 

A 1.3 S4.5OO carital anrl labor A 1.4 Unlimited carital and labor 
1 Net 
! income 
Acres Limiting | 
Activities of each resovjrceal income 
Acres Limiting Net 
Activities of each resources income 
3813.23 
(1.1.3) 
Pg CS(h) 27.4 labor 77P.78 
P-|n CCOM(m) 118.0 Mar. labor 33^5.20 
4167.98 
(1.1.4) 
Pig CCOH(m) 154 Land 4A32.47 
capital expenditure 3785.24 
• 799.63 
264.9.20 
3AA8.82 
(2.1.3) 
Pg CS(h) 27.5 Hay labor 774.98 
Fig CCOM(m) 117.8 l-Uir. labor 3155.27 
3930.25 
(2.1.4) 
Pg GS(h) 154 Land 4338,47 
capital expendit-ure 3423.63 
• 1054.. 10 
2101.99 
3156.09 
(3.1.3) 
Pg CS(h) 27.4- I'Jay labor 772.30 
Pno CCOM(m) 118.0 f-lar. labor 2893.77 
3666.57 
(3.1.4) (same as 2.1.4) 
Pg CS(h) 154 Land 4338.47 
capital expenditure 3423.63 
2213..''S 
(4.1.3) 
Pig CCOM(m) 2.7 May labor 57.20 
Ppo CSCOM(m) 143.8 l-lar. labor 3073.85 
^ 3136.05 
(4.1.4) 
F23 CSCOM(m) 154 Land 3296.98 
capital expenditure 4/69.03 
' 959.95 
1050.30 
2010.25 
(5.1.3) 
Pr, CS(m) .1 f'iay labor 2.54 
P23 CSCOM(m) 145.9 Capital 2860.77 
2863.32 
(5.1.4) 
Pg CS(h) 154 land 3117.18 
carital expenditure 464^.92 
• 971.13 
' 3646.83 
4617.96 
(6.1.3) (same as 6.1.2) 
A617.96 
(6.1.4) 
|Pg CS(h) 154 Land 5439.60 
1 
capital expenditure 2322.50 
' 776.79 
' 2917.34 
369/1.13 
(7.1.3) (same as 7.1.2) 
3694.13 
(7.1.4) 
Pg CS(h) 154 Land 4351.68 
capital expenditure 1858,00 
:• 973.06 
' 3745.31 
4718.37 
(8.1.3) (same as 8.1.2) 
4718.37 
(8.1.4) 
Pg CS(h) 154 Land 5A39.60 
capital expenditure 2322.50 
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To-tale 15. Si.'iniiiary of optimum solutions for landloixJ (15/1 acres crojlann) 
Lease situations 
P..1 -^^500 criT)ital rmd nnlii'dtfcd labor 
Activities 
Acres 
of each 
Limiting: liei. i 
rGi)0\.:rc;e£31 income Ac 
Lease 1; l/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, cash 
rent for jasture, 1/2 fert. and 
(l.?..l) 
CS(m) 
•17 GCOM(n) 
69.6 Ca])itr>l 
84.4 I^ anf'' 
2':.?/+. 97 
2180.^6 
uv  i /Ui i t ino  
Lease 2; 3/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $16 cash 
(2.2.1) 
F7 CG(m) 69.6 Gap;i tal 
i 
1 
.:524.38 i 
rent for pasture, 1/2 fert, and 
seed co:it paid by tenant 
CCOM(n) 84.4 L;ind 
4874,^ 1 
Lease 3: I/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $25 cash 
(3.2.1) 
F-|7 CCOI.;(n) 
F93 GSCOM(m) 
80.4 Lane 2419,3' 
rent for pasture, I/2 fert. and 73.6 Capital 2',"y:  
seed coBt paid b-'.- tenant t: 1  r," f, 
( •  
Leane A: 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and i/C oats to tenant, §16 cash 
rent for pasture, all fert. and 
ijofd costs paid b^' tetiant 
Fy C(h) 154. [vino 
•4-
Lease 5: 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oatn to tenant, 
rent foi' pasture, all fert. and 
seed costs paid by tenant 
(S./.I) 
'•"25 cash F'^ C{h) ISA k.nd 
Lease (->: 1/2 all crops including 
h'ay tc ten'n.t, only 1/2 capital 
operating exj:)rnges, fort, and 
seed costs paid by tenant 
P^i CSCOl'(n) 57,9 
Fpr, cash rent" 96.1 
C. ,p.i t al 
L-;nd 
Ijease 7: 2/5 all crops including 
hay to tenant, 2/5 operating 
capital expenses, fert. and 
seed costs raid by tenant 
(7.2.1) 
Pp;] CSCOK(n) Ac>.2 
rp5 cash rent^J05.8 
Cay ital 
Land 
I2r 
1->P2 .S::  
320/.. 7 3 
TTJ.i)  
p]7  CCOM(n) 56.6 Capltai 
P25 cash rent 97.4 Land 
128.'. 
2il 5.1)9 
Lease 1/2 of com, oats and 
soybeans and all, hay to tenant, 
t25 cash rent for pastux'O, 1/2 
operating expenses, fert. and 
seed cost^; paid by temmt 
;I337.R:^ 
y:4s.p( 
3286.r9 
"This activity provides an opyortunity cost of 'pO per acre for the Ian'" 

Rciioi.rce s i Ions 
T'""V" 
•'':T2C 0 car^ital and unlii:dt,ed labor ::.3 nitnl '.nd i.:.]i;i.iti : ( l  iuLor 1 2.4 Ur;]irrdted c 
kc\ V i tic 
1 Acres j 
1 of eachi 
Limiting 
rcaourccs 
Kot 
income Ac'tivil.ii'c 
kcres 
of oach 
l.inn t;i np 
retjourceG 
Net j 
inconst; j Act.ivitics 
{ Acr 
lof e 
(.1.- „ ) ('.r./J 
I r V' 
Pr (; (, 
( • )  
) 
7.S 
U6,2 
Cnyital 
Land 
283,93 
620,'-., 3f-
6Z''2.29 
P8 CS(V.) 3 54 Land Pp GS(h) 154 
( :  .  
- ; (",2.3) (2.-.4) 
[  r i  [  i  ) 
.:(• ) 
7.8 
lU ,7. 
Cuyital 
I and 
2H3.93 
C;2CF,. 36 
A/r.:? ?Q 
F8 CS(>:) 15A Larid C549.31 Pa G,S(h) 15-^ 
) (3,\3) 4) 
1 V> V 
' ' { 
/ . ^ 
• \ - } 
v,( 
Uj .7 
) 7.3 
L-ipj lal 
L'iiid ;:7j .5C> 
650;;.] 3 
Pg ns('-) 
i 
15/. Land ^54C.;-n la 2::(9) 15-^ 
(./• . ; (4. .T) 
( •) iarid rv^ c;'' ,90 >" /, C(l') 
f 
15 A Land 84,f^ 8.90 U c(h) 15/ 
V  '  •  i . .3) (' .".4) 
) i S d  uind ,90 P4 C ( h )  .1 5A I.and 8498.90 14 c(M 15/! 
" l ' . '  (s;'.3) (' .2. / , y ~  
[ w  -
.V. r., ,t ' ' 
.":r\T ital 
; iijid 
3r7f. . 90 
30c.37 
3yr-.% 
1-7 C . ' i i . ; )  
1 8  c n ( - )  
1^3.6 
59.4 
I .:md 
Caj'ital 
30( 3. 3B 
]781.]7 
AySA.55 
Pr C.9(h) 3 5^ 
} (7.- .3) (' .2.0 
i - ^  
*  
lO .11S 8  Crq-.it.al 
i .and 
307': •, 99 
7A4. ?1 
3B/, 3,20 
?7 Cr.(ir;) 
P21 CSCOli(n) 
]0J .0 
^^3," 
Capi tal 
Land 
3535.P3 
]4'"'?.6r-
4".', , 'i9 
1  ;  C f i ( h )  15/ 
/ , ) ( t , 2 , 3 )  •  V -  •  •  /  
r • r ;  
r^;£: 
'VX 
: U 3 h  
) 1 3 ^ . 8  
rei t. IP.2 
Cuf j-ta] 
I ,'uid 
3:'1C.79 
3''-^ 3.^ :3 
yyiL .62 
: Pj? CS(h) 
. Fi7 CCOH(n) 
192,4 
51.6 
Capi tal 
I/ind 
36-.5.7f 
1 2 2 9 .  C O  
A&3(-.5C 
P e  - : p ( n )  15/ 
indlorr irif- c ..Tier-oferritor. 

] jjlor ?.4 lanliir.ited cirital ai;<: labor 2.5 unlimited caritnl and labor A 
!;ot i  
nconio 1 
j AcrPr llir.'.iting 1 Net 
Aciivitins 1 ol' i.-uchl resourceijj income 
1 Acres jLiinitinp j ]>et 
Activities lof each I resources 1 income 
(T .''.I.) 
Pp C.S(h) 15/^ Land 65/,0.81 
(1.?.5) 
Pg GS(h) ?7.5 May labor II6S.56 
P19 GG0K(n-.) 117.8 Mar.labor 38^9.74 
P25 cash rent^ 8.7 I^and 173.49 
5P41.29 
5/ir.8l Pg G;;(h) 15U L-ind 654-0.81 
5 )  
Pg GS(h) 27.5 Miiy labor 1166.00 
Pjg CCOM(m) 117.8 Mar.labor 4138.19 
Fp5 cash rent^ 8.6 Land 372.59 
5476.78 
5/.C.ai 
(:.''.4) 
Pa G;••(>,) 154- Land 6540,81 
(3.2.5) 
Pg CS(h) 27.5 May labor 1169.35 
P]9 CCOM(m) 117.8 Jj^ r.labor 43'^ 8.44 
P05 cash rent'^ 8.7 Land 173.43 
5741.?2 
4^8.90 
(4.- ./,) 
P^ C(h) 154 -and 8498.90 
(4.2.5) 
F4 G (h) 22.0 Nov.labor 1212.92 
Pg GS<h) 4.'' labor 228.27 
F20 CGOM(h) 117.9 Mar.labor 4886,08 
P?5 cash rontf^ 9.6 Land 191.84 
6519.11 
A98,90 
('•.".4) 
P^ C(h) 154 Land 8498.90 
i  
J  
J  
(5.2.5) 
C(h) 22.0 Kov.labor 1216.71 
Pg CS(h) 4.5 May labor 227,77 
P20 GG01-:(h) 117.8 Mar.labor 5146.''7 
P25 cash rent^ 9.7 Land 193.10 
6784.25 
Of 3.38 
781.17 
78A.'55 
1  (' .T'./,) 
} 
Pp cr,(}-,) ]54 Land 5439.60 
(6.2.5) 
Pg CS(h) 27.5 Mav labor "71.13 
Pj9 CG0M(ir.) 117.9 Miar.labor 364''-.a3 
Ppr cash rent®' 8.6 Land 172.25 
4790.21 
53 5.83 
. 6 6  
I;.< G:;(h) 154 Land 65' \?4 
(7.2.5) 
Pg CS(h) • 27.6 May labor 1168.82 
F19 CGOM(n)) a 117.7 Mar.labor 4370.85 
P25 cash rent 8.7 Land 174.05 
5713.72 
615.70 
P2r.80 
836.5C 
1 Py r;s(!)) 154 Land 5439.60 
1  •  
1  
. .  —  
(8.2.5) 
Pg GS(h) 27.4 May labor 968,^^7 
P19 CGOM(in) 118.0 I-lar.labor 354'"'.92 
Pp5 cash renl? 8.6 Land 171.53 
4^87.42 

Table 16, Summary of optimum solutions for owner (154- acres cropland) 
labor limitation 
Capital Labor situation A Labor unlimited 
limitation 
Activity 1 
Acres j 
3f each! 
Idmiting 
resoxirces 
I Net 
1 incomes 
I Acres jlimiting 
Activity lof eachlresoTorces 
Net 
incomes 
®2000 1 
P21 CSCOM(n) 
P25 cash rent® 
115.8 
38.2 
Capital 
Land 
5131.65 
764.00 
5895.64 
6 
?2i CSCOM(n) 115.8 
P25 cash rent® 38.2 
Capital 
land 
5131.76 
764.00 
5895.64 
12700 2 
Pg CS(h) 
P23 CSCOM(m) 
P25 cash rent® 
87.6 
2.2 
64.2 
Capital 
May labor 
Land 
6189.06 
137.64 
1283.80 
7610.50 
7 
Pg CS(h) 89.5 
P25 cash rent® 64.5 
Capital 
Land 
6323.76 
1289.68 
7613.44 
$3500 3 
Pg cs(h) 
P23 CSCOM(m) 
P25 cash rent® 
22.3 
109.5 
22.2 
Capital 
Ifey labor 
Land 
1578.20 
6770.04 
442.91 
8791.15 
8 
Pg CS(h) 116.0 
P25 cash rent® 38.0 
Capital 
Land 
8197.47 
759.22 
8956.69 
$4200 4 
Pg CS(h) 
Pig CCOM(m) 
P25 cash rent® 
27.6 
117.6 
8.8 
May labor 
March labor 
Land 
1949.87 
7276.74 
176.63 
9403-26 
9 
Pg CS(h) 139.3 
P25 cash rent® 14.7 
Capital 9836.96 
Land 295.07 
10,132.03 
15000 5 
Pg CS(h) 
F19 CCOM(m) 
P25 cash rent^ 
27.6 
117.6 
8.8 
May labor 
March labor 
Land 
1949.87 
7276.74 
176.63 
9402«26 
10 
Pg cs(h) 154 Land 10,879.20 
°This activity provides an c^portunity cost of ^0 per acre for the landlord owner-operator. 
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Table 17. Simmary of optimum solutions for tenant for four additiona! resource situations (15-
Lease situations 
l.ln $!;1500 c.nyital and unlimited labor 1.2a S300C capita 
Acres Limiting Net 
Activities of each resources income 
Acr 
Activities of e 
(1.1.1a) 
Lease 1; 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, ^8 cash P23 CSCOM(m) 67,6 Capital 1906.61 
rent for pasture, 1/2 fert. and 
seed coat paid by tenant 
(1.1.2a) 
Fn3 GSCOM(m) I35 
(2.1.1a) 
Lease 2; I/2 com and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $16 ' Fg CS(h) 67.4 Capital 1900.82 
cash rent for pasture, 1/2 fert. 
and serd cost paid by tenant 
(2.1.2a) 
! 
Pg CS(h) 134 
(3.1.la) 
Lease 3: 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, cash Pg CS(h) 67.4 Capital 1900.8? 
rent for pasture, 1/2 fert. and 
seed cost mid bv tenant 
(3.1.2a) 
Pg CS(h) 134 
(4.1.1a) 
Lease 4: l/2 com and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $16 pp^ CSCOM(m) 51.7 Capital 1106.ri 
cash rent for pasture, all fert, 
and seed costs paid by tenant 
(4.1.2a) 
CSCOI\(!ii) 103 
(5.1.1a) 
Lease 5: 1/2 corn and soybeans 
and 3/5 oats to tenant, $25 " F5 CS(n) 94.9 Capital 1078.95 
cash rent for pasture, all fert. 
and seed costs paid bj' tenant 
(5.1.2a) 
Fc CS(n) 8/^ 
P7 CS(ia) 6c 
(6.1.1a) 
Lease-6: I/2 all crops includ- Pj CS(m) 51.1 Capital 1481.54 
ing hay to tenant, only 1/2 '^21 102.9 Land 2279.86 
operating expenses, fert.' and 3761,AO 
seed costs paid by tenant 
(6.1.2a) 
Pg CS(h) 15/ 
(7.1.1a) 
Lease 7: 2/5 all crops includ- Pg CS(h) 10.4 "Land 293.3^; 
ing hay to tenant, 2/5 operat- Py CS(ra) 143.6 Capital 3331.05 
ing capital expenses, fert. 3624.37 
and seed costs paid by tenant 
(7.1.2a) 
Fg CS(h) 15/ 
(8.1.1a) 
Lease 8; 1/2 of corn, oats and 
soybeans and all hay to tenant, P5 CS(n) 84.3 Capital 1622.50 
$25 cash rent for pasture, I/2 P7 CS(m) 69.7 Land 2019.87 
operating expenses, fert. and 3642.37 
seed costs paid by tenant 
(S.1.2a) 
Pg CS(h) 15/ 

iitionaJ resource situations (15'i acres cropland) 
g . g i t^ fl t .1 pgr; 
lited labor 1.2a S3000 capital and unlimited labor 1.3a 3.3 rJus 3 0 hours Mnv labor 3 
ig Net 
;es income 
Acres Limiting Net 
Activities of each resources income 
Acrcc Limiting 1 Nnt 
Activitips of each resourccrl income 
L 1906.61 
(1.1.2a) 
P03 CSCOM(m) 135.2 Capital 3813.32 
(3.1.3a) 
Pg CS(h) 34.1 t-lay 3ribor 951.81 
Pjn CGOi:(m) 117.8 Kar.labor 33'^0,89 
4350.70 
added income with more May labor 182.72 ' 
L 1900,82 
(2.1.2a) i (2.1.3o) i 
! Pg CS(h) 34.1 May labor ^59,^] ! 
Pe, GS(h) 134.9 Capital 3801.64 ' P19 CCOK(m) 317.8 Kar.labor 315'".'7 ^ 
4115.08 1 
added income with miore Kuiy labor 18/i.r'3 ' 1 
I 1900.8P 
(3.1.2a) (3.1.3a) 
Fg GS(h) 34.3 May labor "59.81 
Pg CS(h) 134.9 Capital 3801.64 : P^q CGOK(m) 317.8 Mar.labor PcC'^-.lO 
• : ' , 3890.10 
j "added income with more Kiav labor 183.34 
1 1106.fl 
(4.3.2a) (4.1.3a) 
Pg GC(h) 5.9 Hay labor 119.73 
Pno CSCOM(m) 103.4 Capital 2213.20 : Ppo C5C0:-:(m) 147.2 Mar.3abor 33^1.3'^ 
3271.12 
i innnnip 'j-ith mnrfi '.Irty lnhnT> iT',"7 
1 1078.95 
(^^.1.2a) P (5.1.3a) j 
Pc CS(n) 8^4.3 Capital 956,12'; p„ cs(m) 12.6 Miay labor 2U.54 i 
?7 CS(m) 69.7 Ltmd 1186.30 ; p„o CSCOK(ra) 136,2 Carital 2673.23 i 
21.'.\a j 2885.75 j 
1 added income with more Miay labor 1 
1 1A81.5.4-
2279.86 
3761.40 
(6.1.2a) j (6.1.3a) j 
]'g CS(h) 154 Land 5439.58 | Pg CS(h) 34.0 May labor 12Cl.''4 | 
•; P29 CCOM(m) 3 37.9 Mar.labor 3648.39 j 
I 4850.33 1 
1 added income with more l-iay labor 1'58.20 i 
1 
) 293.3^^ 
1 3331.05 
3624.37 
(7.1.2a) 1 (7.1.3a) ' ! 
: Pg CS-(h) 34.0 May labor 962.30 i 
Pg CS(h) 154 Land 4351.66 : CCOM(in) 13,7.8 l%r.labor 2917.15 i 
3879.45 j 
i added Income with more May labor 185,3? ' 
.1 1622.50 
2019.87 
3642.37 
(8.1.2a) 
Pg CS(h) 154 Land 5439.59 
1 (8.3.3a) 
Pg CS(h) 34.1 May 3abor 1204.80 
P^Q CCOM(m) 117.7 Und 37^,5.31 
4950.11 
added.income with mr.e.,,May_.lahox-,ZlL.24.... 
T— 

1. 3n 3.3 rJus 10 hours Mnv laV:or J .Au subtract ion curltjil frorr, .] ./. '••yronck.'d 
Activltips 
(1.1.3a) 
P8 CS(h) 
Acres 
of each 
Limiting i Not 
rcsovircc'sl incoir.R Activiticin 
Acres | Limiting 
of oac''i rcaoi.;!'C>.;! 
Net 
incomc 
32 
34.1 Way labor 951.81 
P^n CCOi:(m) 117.8 Mar.labor 3390,89 
/435O.7O 
added income: with more Mav labor 13,".72 
(2.1.3a) 
Pg cr.(h) 
F29 CCOH(m) 
(J .1 ./+a) 
i 1-39 GCOM(m) 111.90 Carital 
I I'p3 CSCOM(m) /.2.10 Jand 
! j 
; decreanc in incpine from 1.1.A. 
3220.70 
11 HP.27 
AA08.97 
64 
3A.1 May labor 
117.8 Mar.labor. 
added income with more Fay labor 
950,81 
315'3.27 
A115.08 
18A.n 
T^l.Aa) 
1 
I ?8 GS(h) IA^.5 Capital 4211.57 
I 
! 
decreaoe in incomfi from 2.1.A. l2o.72 
6A 
(3.1.3a) 
FS ^>S(h) 
Pig CGOK(m) 
3A.1 May labor 
117.8 I^r. labor 
"59.81 
28^ ''"'.10 
3890,10 
added income with more Miav labor 1S3.3A 
(l.l.Aa) uame aa ( 2 , 1, 4 a )  
\ - p ,  C » S ( h )  . o a j ' i t a l  
decrease in income fror. 3.1.A. 
A211.^7 
20 
(A.l.3a) 
Pg CL:(h) 
P23 CSCOK(m) 
,^.9 May labor 
' (A.l.Aa) 
1A7.2 Mar.labor 
added income with more Mav labor 
119.73 
31'^ l. 3"' 
3271.12 
135.-7 
Lot CJCOK(m) 150.6 Carital 3223.21 
! decrease in income from A.l.A. LI.11 
(•'. 1. Aa) 
• 1-7 CS(m) 
i Ps cs(h) 12-: 
30 :• 
a ; 
(5.1.3a) 
P7 CS(rc) 
Pp3 CSCOK(m) 
added income 
(6.1.3a) 
Ps CS(h) 
Fj9 CGOM(m) 
12.6 May labor 
136,2 Cajital 
with more May labor 
21A.5A 
2671.21 
2885.75 
22.A3 
16.1 I.and 
137.9 Caiital 
273.A6 
27Q2.lA 
3t/;5.60 
1 decrease in ir.comc from 5.1.A. ^^1.58 
(6.1.Aa) 
58 3A.0 May labor 
117.9 Mar.labor 
added income with more I^iay labor 
1201."A 
36AS.39 
A85O.33 
198.20 
P7 CS(m) 
Pg CS(h) 
32.1 
12.1.9 
1-and 
Capital 
decrease in income from 6.1.A 
(7,].Aa) 
i P7 CS(m) 
1 Pg CS(h) 
031.28 
A305.1Q 
52.36. A7 
203.13 
66 
(7.1.3a) 
Ps CS(h) 
P19 CCOM(m) 
3-A 
117 
,0 May labor 
, 8 I'lar. labor 
added Income with more tfey labor 
962.30 
2917.15 
3879.A5 
IB5.32 
AO.l 
113.9 
land 
Capjital 
decrease in Income from 7,1.A. 
929.79 
3218.72 
AIA8.5I 
.59 
(8.1.3a) 
Ps CS(h) 
P^g CCOH(m) 
3A.1 May labor 
117.7 Land 
120A.80 
37 A5.31 
A95C.il 
(8.1.Aa) same as (6.1.Aa) 
' P7 CS(m) 32.1 l^ nd 
Ps CS(h) 121.0 Capital 
added income with, more ..Mav. labQr_.231^7AL.-
931.28 
43^^5.19 
5236.A7 
jiecxpjLS.e_la-iXi£.Qji.i.e.,.fr!2iiL.8..1./i.,—203^ -
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and 15 make it evident that the tenant prefers certain leases and the land­
lord others,* 
The tenant prefers leases 6, 7 and 8 in which all costs are shared 
with the landlord. In lease 6 the tenant and landlord each pay 1/2 of all 
expenses. In lease 7 the crops and the expense items are divided 2/5 to 
the tenant and 3/5 to the landlord, and so the net incomes are naturally 
greater under lease 6, Lease 8 is like lease 6 except the tenant takes all 
the income from hay or pasture and pays $25 per acre cash rent for the 
meadow land. Under the most limited capital situations, his income is 
larger from 6 than 8 and very little pasture is rented. However, with 
$3000 capital and above the tenant enjoys a higher income from lease 8, 
Of the first five leases the tenant prefers the one which shares 
fertilizer and seed costs with the landlord and has the lowest cash rent. 
This is lease 1 in which the cash rent is $8, In leases 2 and 3 the cash 
rent is increased to $16 and $25 per acre, respectively. While causing a 
reduction in tenant income, the increased rent also causes a shift away 
from rotations high in pastvire acreage. In leases k and 5 the tenant bears 
all the cost of fertilizer and seed and pays |16 and §25 cash rent for 
pasture. Lease 5 brings the tenant less income than any of the others. 
<^or the most part the lease conditions are treated as "given quanti­
ties" in the discussion below. Each lease is studied as if it is already 
an accepted part of the social and economic scene. Nevertheless, it is 
well to have this general lease preference in mind. The possibility of 
changing the lease is present in the minds of both parties in a typical 
case of rental disharmony, and it is necessary to separate factors which 
affect resource allocation from those which affect income distribution. 
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From the standpoint of the landlord, lease 5 is quite favorable. 
Under leases A and 5 he pays no variable expenses. In general the land­
lord's lease preference follows a pattern opposite to the tenant's. Lease 
3 is preferred to leases 2 and 1, and any of the first five leases is 
preferred to leases 6, 7 and 8. Lease 7, giving the landlord 3/5 of the 
receipts and expenses, yields him a higher income than leases 6 and 8. 
3. Marginal value products 
The net return from an added unit of each resource, or the marginal 
value product, is provided in the final rovi of each simplex solution. For 
example, in Table 12, the P25 coltimn indicates disposal of one unit of 
capital, and the zj row of this column shows the net gain possible with 
one dollar more capital. In the third plan, this quantity is $.47 and in 
the final, maximum profit plan it is $.63. The added net return possible 
with an added hour of May labor is $9.21. 
These marginal value products for four landlord and tenant resource 
situations are presented in Table 18. They provide an index of the rela­
tive scarcity of inputs, and of the effects of lease and resource changes 
•upon this relative scarcity. If it is possible to increase some scarce 
resources, they indicate which it is most profitable to increase provided 
a marginal coat is associated with each. 
For example in tenant situation 1, lease 5» the marginal value product 
of an added ll of capital is ^0 and that of Ein added hotu* of May labor is 
$.19. It clearly pays this tenant to add capital first if it can be bor­
rowed at any ordinary rate of interest. Under lease 8 this same tenant 
may find it best to add May labor first, for here each additional hour 
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Table 18. The marginal value products of limiting resources for selected 
sitxaationa and each lease 
Situation! 
Resource 
Leases 
1 2 1 3 5 6 1 7 1 8 
(dollars) 
Tenant 1: 
Capital 1.27 1.27 1.27 .74 .70 2.04 1.68 1.16 
May labor 0 0 0 0 .19 .58 8.08 11.72 
Land 0 0 0 0 0 4.16 0 0 
Landlord li 
Capital 2.84 2.27 2.09 0 0 .25 .64 .a 
Land 21.22 24.14 26.68 55.19 55.19 20.00 20.00 20.00 
Tenant 4at 
Capital®' .23 1.27 1.27 .74 .52 2.11 2.11 2.11 
Land 23.01 0 0 0 4.69 3.45 3.45 3.45 
Landlord 3: 
Capital 0 0 0 0 0 2.03 2.05 1.87 
Land 42.47 42.47 42.47 55.19 55.19 4.70 5.32 7.11 
Tenant 4* 
Land 
Landlord Ui 
Land 
Tenant 3t 
Mar, labor 
May labor" 
Capital 
Landlord 5; 
Mar, labor 
May labor 
Nov. labor 
Land 
28.78 28.17 
42.4.7 42.47 
85.99 73.78 
18.48 18.48 
0 0 
8.41 20.59 
U.74 U.77 
0 0 
20.00 20.00 
28.17 21.41 20.24. 35.32 28.26 35.32 
42.47 55.19 55.19 35.32 42.39 35.32 
60.04 52.77 0 76.46 61.14 81.65 
18.48 15.62 2.24 23.17 18.54 23.17 
0 0 .57 0 0 0 
34.35 23.41 37.14 17.97 33.29 12.68 
14.74 17.56 17.56 10.05 14.69 10.05 
0 5.10 5.10 0 0 0 
20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 
®These values correspond closely with the marginal productivities com­
puted from the difference in net income between tenant situations 4 and 4a.. 
^These values correspond closely with the marginal productivities com­
puted from the difference in net income between situations 3a and 3 (see 
Tables 14 and 17). 
80 
brings an $11,72 increase in net income as against a $1,16 net return per 
$0. capital added. 
In all cases in which capital is a limiting resource, the marginal 
products of capital are well above bank loan rates of 6 to 8 per cent. In 
fact the lowest such return is 1,23, while most returns are between tl and 
$2, Self-imposed capital rationing would be very foolish on the part of 
a farm operator faced with these opportunities. 
The returns to March and May labor are unusually large tinder tenant 
situation 3 and landlord situation 5. If the tenant with lease 1 and situ­
ation 3 finds one extra hoiir that he can spend in the field in March, he 
can increase his income by ^^5.99, The rational tenant will find this 
extra hour. 
The landlord's marginal value products for tenant labor are lower in 
situation 5 than the tenant's were in situation 3 because the landlord has 
the extra opportunity of cash renting the unused land. If the landlord 
offers the tenant an extra hour of March labor, his marginal value product 
is only $8,41 tinder lease 1 compared with the tenant's marginal product of 
$85,99, When March labor is added, extra land must be used; this land has 
no value to the tenant, but it is worth $20 per acre to the landlord. 
When land is the only limiting resource, as it is in tenant situation 
4- and landlord situation 4- as shown in Table 18, the marginal value 
products are much higher for the landlord than the tenant except under 
leases 6 and 8, All of the net income is imputed to land, and the leasing 
merely splits the income and the marginal value products between the land­
lord and tenant. The marginal value product of land to an owner-operator 
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with unlimited capital is ^0,64, and this is the same as his average income 
per acre. 
Under lease 1, the income per acre is divided into $28.78 for the 
tenant and 3^42.4-7 for the landlord. In the crop-share lease the landlord 
bears his share of the price and yield uncertainty of farming and enjoys a 
higher average return because of this. Under a cash lease of $15 per acre, 
the tenant would bear all this risk but, at the same time, his average 
income would jun^ to about $55 per acre. 
Marginal value productivities are a free by-product of the simplex 
method, and they are useful in several ways, (l) They provide insight into 
the structure of the restrictive resources and an idea as to which it would 
be most profitable to increase. (2) They provide a simple check of linear 
programming computations, i,e., the sum of the marginal value products 
times the originsiL amount of the scarce resources always equals the total 
net income, 
B, Appraisal of Leases 
Tenant and landlord programs compared with owner's 
A lease is considered efficient here if the optimum pix>gram for each 
party is the same as the optijnum for the owner-operated firm. This is 
called a "sufficient" condition for an efficient lease. There are three 
subordinate conditions to this that are considered "necessary" conditions. 
Fulfillment of any two or them means the sufficient condition is fulfilled. 
These necessary conditions are: (l) the tenant's optimum program is the 
same as the owner-operator's, (2) the landlord's optimum program is the 
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same as the owner-operator's and (3) the tenant's program is the same as 
the landlord's and there is rental harmony. 
It is reasonable to test for the sufficient condition only in those 
resource situations where both, the tenant and landlord can adopt the 
optimiim program of the owner-operator. In the situations where capital is 
unlimited, it is generally possible for one party to adopt the program of 
the other and the program of the owner-operator. Table 19 summarizes the 
optimum programs of the owner, landlord and tenant with unlimited capital 
and labor and unlimited capital with limiting labor, 
a. Unlimited cat)ital and labor Land is the only limiting resource 
in the fourth resource situation of the landlord and tenant and the tenth 
situation of the owner-operator (see the left side of Table 19). Each 
party simply chooses the rotation with the highest net income per acre for 
him. This is Pg, corn-soybeans with heavy fertilization, for the owner, 
and there is complete agreement with this program on the part of both 
tenant and landlord under leases 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8, Therefore the sufficient 
condition is met for all of the leases except 1, 4- and 5. The landlord's 
program in lease 1 agrees with the owner-operator's, and the tenant's 
program in lease 5 is also Pg, 
In lease 1 the tenant chooses to put all of his land into P^g, com-
com-oats-meadow, rather than Pg. This indicates that the |8 per acre 
cash rent for meadow makes a meadow rotation profitable for the tenant 
which is not particularly profitable for the landlord. Note that their 
differences are resolved, and both have the same program as the owner-
operator under leases 2 and 3* 
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Table 19. Summary of the acres of each rotation chosen by owner, landlord 
and tenant vinder rmlimited labor and capital, and limited labor 
with non-limiting capital situations 
Unlimited labor and catJital Limited labor- non-limitinf? cartital 
Lease Tenant sit. A Landlord sit. 4 Tenant sit. 3 Landlord sit. S®' 
Rot. Acres Rot. 1 Acres Rot. 1 Acres Rot- Acres 
1 
^19 154 P8 154 p8 
^19 
27.4 
118.0 P® 
^19 
27.5 
118.0 
2 P8 154 % 154 
^19 
27.5 
117.8 
P8 
^19 
27.5 
117.9 
3 P8 154 ^8 154 
^19 
27.4 
118.0 P?9 
27.5 
117.8 
U 
^23 154 ^4 154 Pl9 
^23 
2.7 
143.8 FS 
^20 
22.0 
4.5 
117.9 
5 ^8 154 ^4 154 
^23 
.1 
U5.9 
^20 
22.0 
4.5 
117.8 
6 
^8 154 ^8 154 P« 
^19 
27.5 
117.9 P® 
^19 
27.5 
117.9 
7 
^8 154 PS 154 ^8 
^19 
27.5 
117.8 P^ 
^19 
27.6 
117.5 
8 
^•8 154 154 
^19 
27.7 
117.7 P^ 
^19 
27.4 
118.0 
Owner situation 10 P8 154 Owner situ­
ation 5^ 
^8 
^19 
27.6 
117.6 
®The acres cash rented, Poe* ty the landlord and owner are omitted 
from this table for purposes of comparison with the tenant's programs. 
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In leases 4 and 5 the tenant pays all of the fertilizer and seed costs 
and the landlord has no capital expenses. This explains the landlord's 
choice of which maximizes gross income per acre, rather than Pg, which 
maximizes the net income per acre for an owner-operator (see Table 7). In 
lease 4 the tenant chooses P23, which uses slightly less fertilizer.than Pg, 
because fertilizer is now relatively expensive for him as compared with 
lease 2. 
It would appear that the landlord and tenant can resolve their dif­
ferences quite easily. Usually, when a change is made from one program to 
another, one party gains and the other looses. If the combined income goes 
up when a change is made, the gainer from such a change should be able to 
"bribe" the loser into favoring it. In this way the rise in total net 
income which results from the change is shared between the loser and the 
gainer and both parties can gain. 
Table 20 summarizes the net income that each party receives under 
lease 1 from Pg and P^^^, The combined income for Pg, $10,878, is higher 
than the combined income from P]^g, $9528,33, If the tenant desires P^g, 
Table 20, Incomes for landlord and tenant and combined incomes for two 
rotations imder lease 1 and situation 4 
Item 
R9tfit^9qfi} Incomes from 15A acres of each 
^8 •^19 
Tenant income, situation 4 
Landlord income, situation 4 
U338.18 
6540,81 
M2.47 
5095.86 
Combined income ^0,878,99 $9528,33 
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the landlord Is in a position to use simple oash payments ("bribes") to 
persuade him to produce Pg, 
The differences between the landlord and the tenant can be resolved 
in this same manner in the case of lease 5. However, in the case of lease 
Uf a situation exists (shown in Table 21) in which the landlord chooses 
and the tenant Pg^, but the maximum combined Income comes from Pg, It is 
clear that neither the landlord nor the tenant, assuming one of them is 
dominant, will willingly agree to shift to Pg, even though this maximizes 
the combined income. However, if they are looking for a compromise between 
their individual choices, they might well hit upon the corn-soybeans rota­
tion, Pg. 
If enough assumptions are made about the nature of the process by 
which leasing parties resolve their differences, any lease would provide 
the same program as the ovmer-operator chooses. No such assumptions are 
made here, and leases 1, 4 and 5 fail to satisfy, while leases 2, 3» 6, 7 
and 8 do satisfy, the sufficient condition for an efficient lease when labor 
and capital are unlimited. 
Table 21, Incomes of landlord and tenant for 3 rotations under lease U and 
situation U 
Rotations* Incomes from 15A acres oJ r each rotation 
Item 
^8 ^23 
Tenant income !|1757.U $3117.18 $3296.98 
Landlord income 8498.90 7761.60 6220.06 
Combined income $10,256,04 $10,878.78 $9517.04 
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b« Limited labor and vmllmlted capital The right side of Table 19 
compares the tenant and landlord choices when capital is unlimited but 
labor is limited. The optimum program for an owner assuming these same 
labor and land limitations includes 27,6 acres of Pg and 117.6 acres of 
P19. The tenant and landlord are both in con^ilete accord with this program 
except in leases K and 5. The tenant again pays all of the fertilizer 
costs and receives only ha3.f the added return from fertilizer under leases 
4. and 5. He chooses mainly which uses less fertilizer than either Pg 
or P^g. The landlord picks a mixed program in which all of the land is 
treated with heavy fertilizer applications, 
c. Limited capital and 'unlimited labor The high degree to which six 
of the eight leases pass the sufficient criterion for an efficient lease 
when capital is unlimited should not be taken as an indication that there 
is little difference between these six. The real teat comes when capital 
is a limiting factor since the capital coefficient contains the main 
source of variation from lease to lease. When capital is limiting, it is 
often Impossible for the tenant and the owner-operator to adopt the program 
of the landlord and vice versa. This is especially true in leases 4 and 5 
where the landlord has no capital expenses and hence no capital limitation. 
However, certain situations can be selected in which the capital available 
relative to capital requirements malce tenant with owner-operator and land­
lord with ovmer-operator comparisons reasonable. 
Table 22 presents the acres of each rotation chosen by the owner-
operator, tenant and landlord under three different resource situations. 
In the most limiting capital situation, the tenant has $1500 and the land­
lord #500 making a combined owner-operator's capital of $2000, In the 
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Table 22. Acres of each rotation chosen by ovmer, tenant and landlord with 
limited capital and unlimited labor 
Acres of each rotation chosen 
Situation Capittil P5 P7 ^8 % ^21 ^23 
available 
(dollars) 
Ovmer-6 2000 — — «« 115.8 mm 
Tenant-la1 1500 
Lease 1 67.6 
2 mm — 67.4 mm 
3 - - 67.4 mm mm 
U > - - - - 51.7 
5 9A.9 - - - -
Landlord-1: 500 
Lease 1 > 69.6 — 84.4 
2 - 69.6 84.4 — mm 
3 - - — 80.4 - 73.6 
Owner-? 2700 9m 85.9 mm 
Tenant-laJ 
Lease 6 - 51.1 — - 102.9 -
7 - 143.6 10.4 — — 
8 84.3 69.7 - - - — 
Landlord-2 1200 
Lease 6 - - - - 139.0 — 
7 - - • - 115.8 
8 
— 
— — 135.8 
-
Owner-9 4200 mm 139.3 
Tenant-2a: 3000 
Lease 1 - - - - 135.2 
2 - - 134.9 - - -
3 - - 134.9 - - -
U - - mm - - 103.4 
5 84.3 69.7 - - - -
Landlord 2t^ 1200 
Lease 1 — 7.8 146.2 I. - -
2 7.8 146.2 - — -
3 — - 146.7 — — 7.3 
^Capital is non-limiting here. 
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next situation the tenant has 11500 and the landlord ^^200, In the final 
comparison the owner-operator has $4200, the tenant $3000 and the landlord 
11200. 
With $2000 capital divided ^500 to the tenant and $500 to the land­
lord, the most reasonable leases to compEire with owner-operator situation 
6 are the first five of the tenant and the first three of the landlord as 
shown in the top section of Table 22. In the first five leases the tenant 
pays most operating expenses, and in the first three the landlord shares 
fertilizer and seed costs. None of these eight tenant and landlord optima 
agree with that of the owner-operator. However, both the tenant in leases 
1 and L, and owner-operator choose the corn-soybeans-com-oats-meadow rota­
tion, This indicates that with quite limited capital there would be more 
agreement upon the amount of land allocated to meadow when the cash rent 
for pasttire is less than §16 per acre than when it is more than this amount. 
In the second comparison of Table 22, the tenant has $1500 and the 
landlord $1200 making the owner-operator's capital $2700, The most reason­
able comparisons are with leases 6, 7 and 8 under which all operating 
expenses are shared. Again, there are no real areas of agreement with the 
owner-operator's optimum. However, the landlord's choice of under 
leases 6 and 7 corresponds with the owner-operator's choice when he is 
limited to $2000, Also the tenant's optima rinder leases 2 and 3 in the 
upper section of Table 21 correspond quite closely with the owner-operator's 
for more than $2700 capital. 
The higher capital levels in the final comparison of Table 21 provide 
more agreement. The owner-operator's is divided $3000 to the tenant 
and ^200 to the landlord. The mequal division of capital again makes 
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the first five leases of the tenant and the first three leases of the land­
lord the most logical comparisons. Agreement is nearly perfect under 
leases 2 and 3 for the tenant and leases 1, 2 and 3 for the landlord. 
d. Limited labor and capital It is generally assumed in this study 
that the landlord does not recognize the lahor limitation of the tenant. 
The only departxire from this rule is situation 5 in which the landlord 
assumes the same labor sittiation as the tenant. In this situation the 
landlord also assumes unlimited capital. Therefore there are no limited 
labor and capital situations of the landlord to be conpared with those of 
the tenant and owner-operator. The tenant and owner-operator comparisons 
for limited labor and capital are provided in Table 23. 
In the first comparison of Table 23 capital is much more restrictive 
than labor, and substantially the same disagreement between owner-operator 
and tenant programs that was observed in Table 22 is repeated here. Tenant 
leases 6, 7 and 8 are compared with owner situation 2 in the second com­
parison and the only close agreement is under lease 8, In the third 
comparison, capital and May labor limit production of the owier-operator 
and of the tenant under leases 2 and 3 providing close agreement among the 
optimum programs. With the final comparisons of Table 23, March and May 
labor are the only limiting factors and there is again almost perfect 
agreement between tenant and owner-operator. 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from Tables 19, 22 and 23 arei 
(l) When capital is unlimited, it is possible for each peirty to adopt the 
program of the owner-operator and in these situations the sufficient con­
dition virtueilly is met for all leases except U and 5. (2) When capital 
is limiting, there very seldom is agreement between the programs of even 
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Table 23. Acres of each rotation chosen by the owner and the tenant \d.th 
capital and labor both limiting resources 
Icres of each rotation 
Situation Capital 
^5 ^8 ^17 ^19 ^21 ^23 
available 
Ovmer-1 2000 mm mm 115.8 
Tenant-1t 1500 
Lease 1 mm - - — - 67.6 
Lease 2 mm — 67.4- — - -
Lease 3 - - 67.4 - -
Lease U - - - — - 51.7 
Lease 5 81.3 9.0 
-
— 
- -
mm 
Owner-2 2700 87.6 2.2 
Tenant-1J 1500 
Lease 6 - - — 35.8 80.0 38.2 
Lease 7 - - — 6.3 mm 140.9 
Lease 8 
— 
-
77.9 — — — 18.2 
Oimer-3 3500 22.3 109.5 
Tenant-2: 3000 
Lease 1 - - — - — 135.1 
Lease 2 - mm 28.4 - - 99.5 
Lease 3 - mm 37.4 mm - - 84.7 
Lease U - > — - 103.4 
Lease 5 
-
56.^ — — — — 53.6 
Ovmer-5 5000 27.6 117.6 
Tenant-2 3000 
Lease 6 — 27.5 — 117.9 -
Lease 7 - ~ 27.5 — 117.8 — 
Lease 8 — _ 27.5 117.7 •• 
Tenant-3:® A500 
Lease 1 — - 27.4 - 118.0 - -
Lease 2 - - 27.5 - 117.8 — 
Lease 3 - - 27.4 - 118.0 - — 
Lease U - - - 2.7 - 143.8 
Lease 5 - .1 - - - - 145.9 
^Capital is non-limiting here 
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two of the three parties. However, leases 2 and 3 do provide the tenant 
slightly more concurrence with the oxmer's choices than do the others. 
2. Landlord and tenant protzrams compared for each leaae 
Each lease is discussed below in an effort to isolate its effects upon 
the rotation choices of the tenant and landlord. 
a. Lease 1 Tenant and landlord choices of rotations under lease 1 
for different resource combinations are presented in Table 24.. Under this 
lease the tenant pays $8 per acre cash rent for meadow, and the fertilizer 
and seed costs are shared. Each of these provisions may be questioned 
with respect to whether or not they are conducive to agreement between the 
landlord and tenant. 
At hi^ levels of capital the .$8 cash rent causes the tenant to choose 
more pasture in rotation than the landlord (see comparisons C and D of 
Table 24.), and also more than the owner-operator (Table 19). However, at 
low levels of capital the cash rent brings closest agreement between the 
tenant and owner-operator (Tables 22 and 23). In comparisons A and B of 
Table 24. the tenant chooses proportionally more pasture than the landlord. 
Indicating that a slightly higher rent ndght bring closer agreement. 
Another question, which is raised with respect to lease 1 (and which 
also applies to leases 2 and 3)f is whether the practice of sharing ferti­
lizer and seed costs, while other costs are not shared, leads to an 
excessive use of fertilizer by the tenant. In comparison A of Table 24 
the tenant uses ®1500 capital to produce 68 acres of P23> vrfiich requires 
moderate applications of fertiliser. This activity maximizes his net 
income per dollar capital. However, the maximum income per dollar capital 
Table 24.. A coniparison of the acres of each rotation chosen 
con^iarable resource situations for lease 1 
by the tenant and landlord under 
Party 
and 
Capital 
available 
(dollars) 
labor 
available 
CShu 
Acres of rotation 
CS-h 
% 
CCOM-n 
1^7 
CCOM-m 
1^9 
CSC0I4-m 
^23 
Net 
income 
(dollgyg) 
Net sacrifice 
to adopt plan 
of other party 
(dQllffrg) 
A 
B 
(Tenant-1 
(Landlord~l 
(Tenant-2 
(l£indlord>l 
(Tenant-2 
^(Landlord-a 
(Tenant-r4 
^(Laiidlord-4 
g(Tenant-3 
(Landlord' 
-5 
1500 
500 
3000 
500 
3000 
1200 
IMlim. 
TInlim. 
4-500^  
Ohlim. 
"A" 
Ifalim, 
"A" 
Unlim. 
"A" 
IMlim. 
Unlim. 
Unlim. 
"A" 
»A" 
70 
70 
8 146 
154 
27 
27 
84 
84 
154 
118 
118 
68 
135 
135 
1906 
4705 
3813 
4705 
3813 
6492 
4432 
65a 
4168 
5241 
ja. 
693 
-,a 
_a 
1549 
94 
1444 
0 
0 
^Indicates it is not possible for one to adopt program of other. 
^Capital is non-limiting here. 
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for the ovmer-operator is obtained from which uses no fertilizer (see 
Table 7). The landlord's optimum use of capital is with which uses no 
fertilizer, but his choice of P^ and ?y/ in comparison A is conditioned by 
limited land as well as capital. Since the tenant shares fertilizer 
esqpenaes with the landlord but pays the other variable costs in full, 
fertilizer becomes a relatively efficient use of capital for him. This 
causes him to apply more fertilizer than an owner-operated firm would in 
a similar position. 
The net sacrifices that are involved if one party adopts the optimum 
program of the other are listed in the final column of Table 24. However, 
in many cases resource limitations prevent one party adopting the other's 
program, and dashes are inserted in this column. In comparison A, both 
capital and May labor prevent the tenant raising the landlord's optimum 
program. The landlord's sacrifice in adopting the program of the tenant 
is only ^693 because it is assumed that he is able to rent the land the 
tenant does not use to someone else at ^0 per acre. Zero entries are 
made in this column whenever the landlord and tenant have identical 
programs, 
In comparison B of Table 24-» "tbe landlord situation is the same and 
capital is still the tenant's only limiting resource. The tenant's acreage 
in iiicome are doubledj however, it is no longer possible 
for the landlord to adopt a program involving this much fertilizer. 
The landlord's capital la increased from ^^500 to $1200 in comparison 
C, and his optimum program now consists mainly of Pg, His net income 
increases $1787 with only J3700 more capital available. If the landlord 
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adopts the optimum program of the tenant and cash rents the xmused land, 
he saorifioes $1549 from his ovm optiraum income. 
In comparison D of Table 24 both parties have xinllmited capital and 
labor. The tenant finds it most profitable to produce and the landlord 
Pg. If the tenant adopts the landlord's program he sacrifices $94, while 
by accepting the tenant's program the landlord sacrifices |1445. The 
logical direction for compromise is in favor of the landlord's program as 
it is pointed out in connection with Table 20. 
In the final comparison of Table 24, where capital is non-limiting and 
the landlord assumes the same labor limitation as the tenant, there is 
perfect agreement between them. 
Lease 1 represents the "typical" lease in this part of Iowa. However, 
it provides very little rental harmony among the programs of the landlord 
and tenant. The main reasons for the lack of harmony are the low cash rent 
for pasture and the unequal shares in which expenses are borne. 
b. Lease 2 The second lease is the same as lease 1 except the cash 
rent is doubled to ^16, Table 25 provides a comparison of the acres of each 
rotation chosen for five pairs of tenant and landlord situations. 
In comparison A the tenant uses his scarce capital to apply the highest 
rate of fertilizer to 6? acres of corn-soybeans. The landlord retains the 
program he had under lease 1, which involves a much lower fertilizer expend-
itvire. The tenant uses none of his scarce capital to rent pasture, while 
the landlord's optimum program calls for 21 acres of meadow. 
In comparison B the increased capital available to the tenant causes 
him to choose a rotation involving 20 acres of rented past^ure, almost as 
much as the landlord chooses. Such agreement between the pasture acres of 
Table 25. A con^jarison of the acres of each rotation chosen by the tenant and landlord iinder 
comparable resource situations for lease 2 
Acres of rotation 
CShbx i CS^li 
r? 1 % 
CCOM—n i CCOi-^*© 
1^7 ) 1^9 
1 
CSCOli-m 
2^3 
Partgr 
and 
situation 
Capital labor 
available available 
(dollars) 
Ket 
income 
(dollara) 
Ket sacrifice 
to adopt plan 
of other party 
(dollars) 
.(Tenant-l 
^(Landlord. 1-1 
B 
(Tenant-2 
(Landlord-
(Tenant-2 
-1 
i-2 (landlord 
j(Tenant-4-
(Landlord-4. 
(Tenant-3 
^(landlord. 
-5 
1500 "A" — 67 - — — 1901 _a 
500 Unlim, 70 
-
84 - - 4874 280 
3000 "A" 28 100 3449 _a 
500 Unlim. 70 - 84 - - 4874 -a 
3000 "A" 28 100 3449 _a 
1200 Unlim, 3 U6 - - - 6492 1299 
•Dnlim, Dnlin, 154 4338 0 
Unlim, Unlim, 
- 154 - - - 6541 0 
4-500^ "A« mm 28 118 3930 0 
TM-iin, "A" - 28 - 118 - 5476 0 
^•Indicates it is not possible for one to adopt program of other. 
''Capital is non-limiting here. 
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each party implies, though it certainly does not prove, that the 4l6 rent 
nd^t be quite satisfactory at the $3000 capital level of the tenant and 
the $500 level of the landlord. 
The landlord's capital increases to t>1200 In con^arison C and his 
optimum program shifts to the corn-soybeans rotation. As a result his 
Income increases by fl6l8, Thou^ the landlord could produce the optimum 
program of a tenant with $3000 capital, it would involve a $1299 sacrifice. 
Both of the final two comparisons of tenant and landlord positions in 
Table 25 provide complete agreement. 
On the whole, lease 2 provides a better basis for rental harmony than 
does lease 1. The differences are less severe under very limited capital 
conditions, and there is complete agreement where capital is plentiful. 
When widely different capital limitations are compared, it is seen that 
the tenant in the most limiting capital situation and the landlord in the 
highest capital situation bo-Ua choose Pg, as does the landlord in the 
^1200 capital class and the tenant with unlimited capital. 
c. Lease 3 The third lease increases the cash rent for pasture to 
per acre. The comparisons of the acres chosen under five tenant and 
landlord positions are presented in Table 26. 
The optimum plan for the landlord with severely limited capital includes 
35 acres of meadow as compared with 21 acres in leases 1 and 2. Land is 
taken out of corn-soybeans and switched to corn-soybeans-corn-oats-meadow, 
reducing the small area of agreement that is present in con^jsrison A of 
leases 1 and 2. This 5^9 increase in cash rent makes possible a #381 
increase in the landlord's optimum income and increases by the same amount 
the not sacrifice the landlord would incur by adopting the tenant's program. 
Table 26, A con^aarison of the acres of each rotation chosen by the tenant and landlord lander 
comparahle resource situations for lease 3 
Acres of rotation Net sacrifice 
Party 
and 
situation 
Capital 
available 
(dollars) 
labor 
available 
CS-h 
^8 
CCOM-n 
?17 
CCOM-m 
^19 
OSCOM-m 
^23 
Net 
income 
(dollars) 
to adopt plan 
of other party 
(dollars) 
(Tenant-1 
*(Landlord-l 
1500 
500 
"A" 
Unlim. 
67 
80 
-
74 
1901 
5155 
_a 
561 
g(Tenant-2 
(landlord-l 
3000 
500 
"A" 
Unlim. 
37 
80 
- 85 
74 
3156 
5155 
_a 
-.a 
„(Tenant-2 
(Landlord-2 
3000 
1200 
"A" 
Unlim, 
37 
U7 — -
85 
7 
3156 
6502 
_a 
1173 
-(Tenant-4. 
(Landlord-4. 
Unlim, 
l}nlim. 
Unlim. 
Unlim. 
154 
154 — — — 
4338 
6541 
0 
0 
{Tenant-3 
^(Landlord-5 
4500^ 
Unlim, 
"A" 
"A" 
27 
27 
-
118 
118 
- 3667 
5741 
0 
0 
^Indicates it is not possible for one to adopt program of other, 
'^Capital is non-limiting here. 
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In comparison B the tenant has $3000 and again he chooses some "^23* 
although he rents less meadow than in leases 1 and 2. Agreement between 
the landlord and tenant is increased when compared with the similar situ­
ations in leases 1 and 2. 
There appears to be even closer agreement in comparison C, at least in 
the activities chosen if not in the levels of each, A logical means of 
resolving the differences in comparison C is to raise the cash rent still 
further. It is possible, however, that raising the pasture rent would 
upset the agreement in comparison B, and perhaps in D and E, 
Lease 3 provides slightly more agreement between the landlord and 
tenant than does lease 2 and much more than lease 1. The ^  cash rent for 
meadow, which is so common in Northern Iowa, may be too low, and even a 
$25 per acre rent may not be high enough in some resource situations. 
d. Leases A and 5 Agreement virtually is out of the question imder 
leases U and 5 where the tenant pays all the fertilizer and seed costs, 
and the landlord has no operating expenses. Under lease Ji. the cash rent 
for pasture is $16 per acre and it is raised to $25 TJnder lease 5. The 
optimum plans under these leases for both parties are svtmmarized in Table 
27. 
Since the landlord has no capital expenses, he maximizes net income 
and gross income at the same time. His optimum program naturally calls 
for heavy applications of fertilizer. The landlord chooses in all 
situations except 5» where he recognizes the labor limitation of the tenant. 
The effects of paying all the fertilizer costs are less noticeable in 
the tenant's programs. For the most part, he still chooses rotations with 
medium levels of fertilization, P7, and Pgj. However, individual 
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Table 27. Acres of each rotation chosen by the tenant and landlord tinder 
leases 4- and 5 
Party 
and 
Capital 
available 
Labor 
available Lease 4 Lease 5 
situation (dollars) Rotation Acres Rotation Acres 
Tenant-1 1500 "A" 
^23 52 ^5 
P7 
81 
9 
Tenant-2 3000 "A" P23 103 ^7 
P23 
56 
54 
Tenant-3 4500 "A« 0
^
 
m
 
Pi 
P^ 3 
144 
^7 
P23 
.1 
146 
Tenant-4 Unlim. Unlim. 
^*23 154 P8 154 
Landlord 1-4 500-
Unlim. 
Unlim. P4 154 ^4 154 
Landlord-5 Unlim. "A" 
^4 $ 
P20 
22 
4 
118 
^4 
^20 
22 
4 
118 
comparisons of leases 4 and 5 with leases 2 and 3, respectively, reveal 
that in every case the latter include some higher fertilizer rotations. 
There is no evidence of greater agreement between the optimum programs of 
the tenant and the owner-operator when the tenant pays each of the vari­
able costs in full, 
e. Lease 6 Under lease 6 all the operating costs and the receipts, 
incltiding the hay yields, are shared equally by the landlord and tenant. 
Lease 6 meets the recommended condition that the variable factors and the 
product be shared in the same proportion. The only difference between it 
and a complete partnership is that the tenant supplies his labor and the 
landlord supplies the fixed costs associated with land and buildings. 
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Lease 6 guarantees complete agreement between landlord and tenant if 
both have identical limiting resources because both parties have the same 
input-output coefficients and net prices. However, in practical situations 
the landlord's and tenant's resources are never identical, for the landlord 
does not recognize the tenant's labor limitations. 
Table 28 provides a comparison of the acres of each rotation chosen 
by the tenant and landlord. The tenant's $1500 capital now enables him to 
farm all 154- acres, although most of it is without use of any fertilizer. 
The incentive towards heavy fertilization is gone as compared v/ith leases 
1-3 because all costs are now shared. The landlord's §500 only allows liim 
to produce 58 acres of P21, which also maximizes his income per dollar 
capital. 
Comparison B has much more nearly equal capital limitations. The 
tenant has 118 acres in coin-soybeans-com-oats-meadow (adding and P23 
acres), as compared with the landlord's 139 acres, and the tenant also has 
36 acres in com-com-oats-meadow. Production of the landlord's program 
would cost the tenant a $677 sacrifice in income due to the differences 
in available capital. 
In the third comparison the tenant's $3000 capital is non-limiting, 
and his optimum program departs quite radio£0.1y from the program of the 
landlord with $2000 capiteQ., 
There is complete rental harmony in the final two comparisons of 
Table 28 as is expected when identical limiting resources are assumed. 
In conclusion, lease 6 provides less rental harmony than leases 2 and 
3 for the situations given. However, the fact that it guarantees harmony 
Table 28. A coB^jarison of the acres of each rotation chosen by the tenant and landlord imder congsarable 
resotirce situations for lease 6 
Party 
and 
Bituatj.9n 
Capital 
available 
(^9lj.arg) 
Labor 
avEiilable 
Acres of each rotation 
CS-4n CS-h CCOM-n 
^17 
CCOM-m 
^19 
CSCOM-n 
^21 
CSCOM-mlCSCOM-h 
^23 j ^24. 
Net 
income 
(doUais) 
Net sacrifice 
to adopt plan 
of other party 
(dollars) 
(Tenantol 
^(landlord-l 
(Tenant-1 
^{Iandlord-2 
(Tenant-2 
(Landlord-3 
(Tenant-4. 
(Landlord-4-
E 
(Tenant-3 
(Landlord-S 
1500 "A" — 36 - 80 38 - 3758 2475 
500 Unlim. - - - - 58 - - 3205 JBi 
1500 "A" • ^ 36 80 38 3758 677 
1200 TJnlim, - - - - 139 - - 3779 ^a 
3000''" "A" 28 118 _ A616 «a 
2000 Ifalim, 104. 50 
-
- - - 4.784. -a 
IMlim. Unliin, 154. _ 54^0 0 
Dnlim. Ihilim. - 15U - - - - - 5440 0 
4.500^ "A" 28 118 4618 0 
IJnlim. "A" - 28 - 118 - 4.790 0 
^Indicates it is not possible for one to adopt program of other 
^Capital is non-limiting here. 
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whenever the landlord and the tenant have the same limiting resources is 
a definite advantage. 
It is evident that this lease would be difficult to "sell" to the land­
lord, His returns are much lower than under the "typical" crop-share lease 
for Northern Iowa (lease l). For example, his return from P21 in comparison 
A is only $22.15 per acre, while his similsir average return in lease 1 is 
$30,55 per acre, 
Assviming that the "typical" lease provides something approximating an 
equilibrium distribution of income, then it follows that under lease 6 the 
landlord is making less than the marginal value product of his land, and 
the tenant more than the marginal value product of his labor. The most 
obvious suggestion is a lease which maintains the good qualities of lease 
6, yet allows the landlord greater returns. 
Lease 7 Lease 7 allows the landlord greater returns by allocating 
a 3/5 share of all receipts and expenses to the landlord and only 2/5 to 
the tenant. In effect the land resource is allocated 3/5 of the net income 
and the labor resource 2/5. Table 29 summarizes the jrotations chosen by 
the landlord and the tenant under lease 7, 
Under comparison A the landlord can raise only acres of P21 because 
he pays 3/5 of the capital expenses. His net income per acre Pgi is now 
$26,62, however, as opposed to $22.15 under lease 6, and there is a $193 
increase in his net income. The tenant, on the other hand, is able to 
shift more of his capital to P23. May labor actually becomes a more limit­
ing input for him than his $1500 capital. 
In comparison C capital is no longer a limiting input for the tenant 
and his optimum program consists of Pg and P^g. The landlord's program 
Table 29. A con^jarison of the acres of each rotation chosen by the tenant and landlord under 
conqjarable resource situations for lease 7 
Party 
and 
situation 
Capital 
(dollars) 
Labor 
available 
CS**211 CS-h CCOM-n CCOM-m CSCOl^n 
8^ h7 1^9 % 
CSCOH-m 
2^3 
Net 
income 
Het sacrifice 
to adopt plan 
of other party 
(dollars) 
(Tenant-1 1500 
^(Landlord-l 500 
B (Tenant-l (Landlord-2 
(Tenant-2 
^(Landlord-3 
_(Tenant-4 
"(Landlord-4. 
1500 
1200 
3000^ 
2000 
Unlim. 
Unlim, 
"A" 
Unlim. 
"A" 
Dnlim. 
"A" 
Unlim. 
Unlim. 
UnHm. 
(Tenant-3 4^500° "A" 
^(Landlord-5 Unlim. "A" 
28 
101 -
154 
154 
28 
28 
118 
118 
118 
48 
116 
53 
141 
141 
3598 
3398 
3598 
3843 
3694 
4924 
4352 
6528 
3694 
5714® 
2747 
«a 
1541 
-a 
„a 
^a 
0 
0 
0 
0 
^Indicates it is not possible for one to adopt program of other, 
^Capital is non-limiting here. 
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with $2000 capital allows for one rotation with moderate fertilization, P7, 
and another without any fertilizer, 
Again, under the unlimited capital comparisons D and E agreement is 
complete. The landlord's net income with unlimited labor and capital is 
very nearly as great as his income under similar circumstances for leases 
1, 2 and 3, 
Lease 7 provides slightly less agreement at the low capital levels 
than lease 6 although this lease does come closer than 6 to providing the 
landlord with the same returns that he earns from lease 1. 
g. Lease 8 Lease 8 is like lease 6 except that the tenant keeps all 
the product of the meadow and pays a cash rent of $25 per acre for it. 
Table 30 provides a comparison of the acres chosen by the landlord and 
tenant. 
The tenant with limited capital shifts sharply away from the meadow 
rotations in lease 8 as compared with lease 6, while the landlord increases 
his meadow adopting P27 instead of P21* When net incomes under lease 8 
are compared with incomes Tinder lease 6, the tenant's income is reduced by 
1433 and the landlord's is increased by |8l. 
In comparison B the capital limitations of the landlord and tenant 
are more nearly equal, but the two are still no nearer agreement upon their 
choice of rotations. It would cost the tenant I4I6 to adopt the program 
of the landlord, and he would have to farm 40 additioneJ. acres. 
There is some agreement under comparison C, v/here the tenant chooses 
28 acres of corn-soybeans with heavy fertilization and the landD.ord chooses 
102 acres. They both put some land in com-com-oats-meadow, although the 
tenant uses a moderate fertilizer level and the landlord uses none. 
Talsle 30. A coiaparison of the acres of each rotation chosen by the tenant and landlord tinder 
comparable resource situations for lease 8 
Party 
and 
situation 
Capital 
available 
(dollars) 
labor 
available 
Acres in rotatioi 1 
Net 
income 
(dollars) 
Net sacrifice 
to adopt plan 
of other party 
(dollars) 
CS-h CCOM-n 
^17 j 
CCOK-to 
^19 
CSCOMna 
^23 
(Tenant-1 1500 "AW 78 18 3325 2127 
^(Tflndlord-l 500 UnliTD, - 57 - - 3286 .a 
„(Tenant-1 1500 "A" 78 18 3325 416 
^(Landlord-2 1200 Unlim. 
-
136 - - 3575 -a 
_(Tenant-2 30001^ "A" 28 — 118 4.718 -a 
(Landlord-3 2000 Unlim. 102 52 - - 4836 -a 
jj(Tenant-4 I]hlim. Italim. 15A _ 5AA0 0 
(Landlord-4. Unlim. Unlim. 154 - - - 5440 0 
„(Tenant-3 A500^ "A" 28 118 4718 0 
®(Trfind1ord-5 IMdm, "A" 28 — 118 - 4687 0 
^Indicates it is not possible for one to adopt program of other. 
Capital is non-limiting here. 
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Comparisons D and E are typified by rental harmony. In E the tenant's 
income increases by $100 in moving from lease 6 to lease 8, while the land­
lord's income is decreased by the same amount. Hence, it appears that the 
tenant could afford a still higher cash rent for meadow. However, when 
the tenant's capital is very limited, this high cash rent causes a sizeable 
decrease in the amount of meadow he can afford Eind in his income. 
h. All resource situations compared In discussion of the leases 
above the cases where the landlord's and tenant's capital limitations are 
similar are emphasized. Agreement between dissimilar resource situations 
also is important to an over-all appraisal of these leases. Table 31 
brings all the leases and resource situations together con^jaring similar 
and dissimilar situations at the same time. 
To appraise the rented harmony provided in any one lease the individual 
choices of the tenant in the upper half of Table 31 are compared with the 
landlord's choices in the lower half, A rough measure of the degree of 
harmony provided in each lease is a simple count of the number of times 
that each rotation chosen by the tenant is also chosen by the landlord. 
Tlie last row of Table 31 provides these sums for each lease. On this basis 
lease 3 rates highest with 19 agreements followed by leases 2, 6 and 8. 
In lease 1 the only area of coE^lete agreement is between tenant 
situation 3 and landlord situation 5. The choice of rotation is Pg and 
Pig. On the side of disagreement, the tenant chooses more rotations with 
meadow than the landlord. There are only six instances under this first 
lease in which a rotation chosen by the tenant is also chosen by the 
landlord. 
1C7 
Table 31, Summary of rotations chosen for all lease and resource situations 
Item 1 1 2 3 1 L 1 5 6 7 8 
Tenant 
situations: 1 
^23 Pa P8 ^23 ^5 
^7 
pl7 
JSI 
^23 
&v 
^23 
^8 
^23 
2 
^23 
^23 ^23 
^23 p'^  
^23 
P® 
^19 p^ 1^9 
> 
1^9 
3 
1^9 1^9 
^8 
Pl9 
pl9 
^23 
p'' 
^23 
P8 
1^9 
1® 
n9 
p8 
1^9 
U 1^9 P8 % ^23 P8 "^8 ^8 ^8 
Landlord 
situations: 1 
PI? 1^7 ^7 ^23 ^4 % ^21 % 
2 
^8 ^23 
^4 % ^21 % 
3 Ps ^8 P8 ^4 p7 
^8 
P? 
^21 P^ n7 
4 I'e ^8 ^8 P8 ^8 P8 
5 
Pl9 P^ ^19 1^9 
^20 ^20 
P® 
U9 
p8 
1^9 
p^ 
1^9 
No, of instances 
in which agree­
ment upon activi­
ties BWa? 
6 17 19 1 1 13 11 13 
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The higher cash rent for meadow in lease 2 ($16 per acre) causes a 
shift towfird on the part of the tenant and generally toward closer 
agreement between the landlord and tenant. The cona-soyheans rotation 
(Piy and Pg) appears in each of the nine programs, and in only four out of 
these nine is another rotation chosen along with it. There are few really 
significant areas of disagreement here. 
The situation is much the same under lease 3, The $25 per acre rent 
for pasture leads the leasing parties a little closer to agreement, par­
ticularly in the case of the second resource situation of the landlord. 
Under leases 4 and 5 there virtually is no agreement. The landlord 
does not share fertilizer and seed costs in these leases and this affects 
his choice of rotations as well as his choice of universally high fertilizer 
levels. 
There is a fair degree of accord between the landlord and tenant vmder 
leases 6, 7 and 8, but not as much as under leases 2 and 3. Disagreement 
is most serious in landlord situations 1 and 2, where his capital rationing 
is acute, 
C, Appraisal of hypotheses 
Each of the hypotheses stated at the end of Chapter II is now analyzed 
to determine whether it is possible to accept or reject it, 
1. n^gt )]yp9th^3is 
The first hypothesis is that the cash rent of $8 per acre for meadow 
is too low to lead to maximm agreement between tenant, landlord, and 
owner-operator as to the optimum amount of land to be used as meadow. The 
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main evidence bearing upon this hypothesis appears as the cash rent for 
pasture is increased from $8 in lease 1, to ^pl6 in lease 2 and finally to 
$25 in lease 3. 
The tenant and the otmer-operator come closest to agreement with the 
rent of $8 per acre when their capital is at the lowest levels (Tables 22 
and 23)• However, as the amount of capital available to each is increased, 
the only agreement is found at the ^6 and $25 cash rent levels. 
The closest agreement between the landlord and tenant, at their lowest 
capital levels, is provided by lease 2, with a $16 per acre cash rent 
(Tables 2A, 25 and 26), ^'Ihen capital is raised to medium levels, the ®25 
rent brings closer agreement than the |!l6 level, but there are indications 
that a still higher rent would bring the acres cash-rented by each party 
closer to agreement. With xinlimited capital available, both leases 2 and 
3 provide perfect agreement between tenant and landlord as to the acres of 
cash rented pasture. 
To determine whether the ^5 rent encourages or discourages xise of 
pasture by the tenant, it is possible to compare lease 6, which provides 
for sh£u?ing all receipts and expenses equally, and lease 8, which provides 
the same except that pasture is rented for #25 per acre (Tables 28 and 30), 
When capital is limiting, the $25 cash rent causes the tenant to reduce 
meadow and the landlord to increase it. With vinlimited capital, the number 
of acres is not affected, but the $25 cash rent causes the tenant's income 
to increase and the landlord's to decrease, iujplying that the tenant would 
pay an even higher rent. 
The conclusion is that the first hypothesis is confirmed, and that the 
$8 rent is too low to provide maximum agreement. An exact level of rent to 
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replace this $6 is not determined; however, the proper level appears to 
depend upon the capital limitations of the leasing parties. When the land­
lord, tenant and ovmer-operator have very limited capital, a rent between 
§8 and ^6 is indicated. For higher levels of capital, a cash rent above 
$l6 appears to be most promising, 
2. Second hypothesis 
The second hypothesis is that agreement among the optimum programs of 
the tenant, the landlord and the owner-operator is highly unlikely when the 
tenant pays all the fertilizer costs and receives only a share of the added 
return. Leases 4 and 5, in which the landlord does not share fertilizer 
and seed costs, are designed to test this liypothesis. They are compared 
with leases 1, 2 and 3» in which only fertilizer and seed costs are shared, 
and with leases 6, 7 and 8, in which all costs are shared. 
Landlord and tenant ore much closer to agreement under leases 1, 2 and 
3 than under leases 4- and 5 (Tables 24.-27), The owner-operator and the 
tenant also are closer to agreement upon choice of rotation under the first 
three leases (Tables 22 and 23). However, the tenant chooses higher ferti­
lizer levels than the owner-operator in all five leases, and the differences 
are greater in 1, 2 and 3 then in 4 and 5. The tenant chooses excessively 
high fertilizer levels under leases 1, 2 and 3 because he shares these 
costs with the landlord, while he pays the other operating expenses in 
full. Therefore, the fertilizer inputs are quite efficient relative to 
other cost items for the tenant. 
Leases 6, 7 and 8 solve the fertilizer problem by providing complete 
sharing arrangements. Since the landlord and tenant share all costs in the 
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same proportions that they share the output the lease itself should not 
cause distortions from the pattern of inputs chosen by the owner-operator. 
The landlord-tenant comparisons do not show this agreement upon fertilizer 
use (Tables 28-30) because of the widely different resource limitations 
assumed. Tenant and owner-operator comparisons, however, reveal slightly 
closer agreement upon fertilizer use than under the first five leases 
(Table 23). 
The hypothesis is confirmed by the poor showing of leases 4. and 5. 
Leases like 1, 2 and 3 are better than 4 and 5» although they are not a 
solution to the problem. They lead to an overuse of fertilizer by the 
tenant and an underuse by the landlord. The logical solution is a complete 
sharing arrangement which does not distort the input choices. However, 
such leases might have disadvantages which offset this advantage, 
3. Third hvT)otheslB 
The third hypothesis is that leases which share all crops and operat­
ing expenses in the same proportion are more likely to provide agreement 
among the optimum programs of the tenant, the landlord, and the owner-
operator than leases which have unequal proportions. Leases 6, 7 and 8 
are designed to help test this hypothesis. 
However, leases 2 and 3 provide more agreement among the landlord, 
the tenant and the owner-operator than leases 6, 7 and 8 for the resource 
situations that are tried in this study (Tables 2it-27 and 28-31), Whenever 
resource limitations of the leasing parties are exactly proportional to 
the shares in lease 6 there must be conqjlete agreement between the programs 
of the landlord, tenant and owner-operator. 
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It is not realistic to assvun© that the landlord always recognizes the 
labor limitations of the tenant, and the fact that he does not in most of 
the assiuned resource situations of this study is a major cause of disagree­
ment, Complete share leases increase the Incentives for the tenant to 
substitute capital for his ovm labor and hence to select activities with 
lower labor requirements and higher capital requirements.* Differences in 
resource limitations of the landlord and the tenant cotild thus explain why 
leases 6, 7 and 8 provide less agreement than leases 2 and 3. 
The third hypothesis cannot be accepted or rejected upon the basis of 
the computations of this study. Leases 6, 7 and 8 provide perfect agree­
ment where resource limitations are identical, but this advantage is offset 
by less agreement when widely different rosovirce limitations are assumed. 
However, the third hypothesis reinforces one conclusion from the 
discussion of the first hypothesis, that the best lease in terms of the 
amount of agreement between tenant, landlord and owner-operator depends 
upon the resource limitations of the landlord and the tenant. It is gen­
erally accepted that personality differences, land differences and other 
special considerations should be taken into accoimt in planning a satis-
factoiT^ lease for a particular farm. This study suggests that capital and 
other resource limitations should also be considered. 
*A close-working relationship between the landlord and tenant often 
is needed in such leases. The landlord wants to help decide upon labor use 
and operating expenses, because the tenant has a strong tendency to reduce 
his labor and increase operating expenses. 
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VI. SUMMARI 
Principles of production economics are used to eaqalain some fundamental 
theories about the economics of crop-rotations and crop-share leasing. 
Three hypotheses concerning the optimum choice of crop rotation and ferti­
lizer level under crop-share leases are developed from observations about 
crop-share leasing. These hypotheses deal with the level of cash-rent for 
pasture, with the sharing of fertilizer costs, and with the efficiency of 
leases which share all crops and operating expenses in the same proportion. 
Experimental data for six crop rotations with four fertility treatments 
are used, together with assumptions about techniques and prices, to estab­
lish budgets for 24- activities. Linear programming is applied to choose 
the maximum profit programs of crop-share tenants and landlords under eight 
hypothetical leases. The leases provide tests of the three hypotheses. 
The labor and capital limitations of the tenant and landlord are 
varied in order to show whether the hypotheses hold under different 
resource situations. Resource situations are also established for an 
owner-operator who has the combined capital of the landlord and the tenant. 
A lease is considered efficient if the optimum productive programs of 
landlord, tenant and owner-operator are identical. No single lease meets 
this standard for all resotirce situations} however, all except two in which 
fertilizer and seed costs are not shared meet it when capital is unlimited. 
The results show that the $8 cash rent for ciropland in pasture, which 
is the modal amount paid In crop-shnre-cash leases of Northern Iowa for the 
period 1949-1953, is too low to provide maximum agreement among landlord, 
tenant and owner-operator. With very limited capital, an $8 - $16 cash 
lU 
rent is indicated} however, as capitEO. is increased, the tenant desires 
more pastxire than the landlord at even a $25 per acre rent. The indica­
tions are that cash rent should he considered a variable factor when leases 
are designed and renewed. 
Agreement is highly vinlikely among the tenant, landlord and owner-
operator when the tenant pays all the fertilizer costs and receives only 
a share of the added returns from fertilizer. Leases in which only ferti­
lizer costs are shared are not a satisfactory answer because they lead to 
an overuse of fertilizer by the tenant. Complete sharing of all variable 
expenses in the same proportion guarantees an optimum allocation of ferti­
lizer but gives rise to some other leasing problems. 
Leases which share all crops and all expenses in equal proportions 
provide perfect agreement among the landlord, the tenant and the owner-
operator when the landlord and tenant assume identical resource limitations. 
However, agreement is far from perfect when the landlord does not assume 
the labor limitations of the tenant and when their capital limitations are 
different. Such complete share leases resemble the typical father-and-son 
partnership, and like this, depend upon a close bookkeeping and decision­
making relationship between the two parties. While con^Jlete share leases 
solve the problem of the allocation of inputs like fertilizer, they 
intensify the problems of providing incentives for tenant labor. Therefore, 
these leases may not be completely satisfactory in some oases. 
The results of this study suggest minor adjustments of the crop-share 
lease now common in Northern Iowa rather than a major overhauling of 
leasing practices. The sharing of fertilizer and seed costs appears to be 
very necessary to their efficient allocation, and it is anticipated that 
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the sharing of other variable costs such as com-borer control and picking 
and gleaning costs is necessary to their optimum use. Higher cash rents 
for meadow are indicated, and ^25 per acre is not too high in some cases. 
Itost important, the best lease in terms of agreement among the tenant, the 
landlord, and the owner-operator depends upon the resource limitations of 
the landlord and the tenant. 
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VII. RECOMffiNDATIONS FOR FURTIffiR STUDX 
These recommendations for further study are based on the experiences 
of this study and pertain more to recommended methods than to areas of 
inquiry. 
A. Recommended Methods 
Both resource situations and lease situations should be flexible 
rather than fixed,* AssuBiing a landlord and tenant with one set of resource 
limitations, it is desirable to "tailor-fit" a lease that is satisfactory 
for them. Similarly, once a particular lease is assumed, it then is worth­
while to discover for each party the resource limitations within vrhich it 
is satisfactory. Resovirce maps could be used, and the "best" lease v/ould 
be one with the largest areas of agreement between the landlord, the 
tenant, and the owner-operator,** 
A study of this type also would be more realistic if tenant livestock 
programs are included (14), 
Each linear programming activity assumes constant proportions between 
inputs regardless of the level of inputs used or available. In reality, 
however, a farmer who is short of labor will use labor-saving techniques 
*A fixed group of resource situations and leases were used in this 
study. These were chosen at the outset as an integral part of the model, 
as it was thought that any other procedtire would introduce a researcher's, 
bias into the results. However, many of the shortcomings of this study 
arise from the lack of flexibility that ensued, 
**Various methods are available for getting resource maps which show 
the changes in the optimum program when one input changes, A modification 
of the simplex computations for treating capital as a variable input was 
explained recently by Candler (5). 
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that vd.ll not be used by a farmer who has plenty of spare time. One solu­
tion is to introduce extra activities for each crop or rotation. For 
example, "labor-saving" techniques which use large amounts of custom work 
could be introduoed with the resource situations in which labor is most 
limited. "Capital-saving" techniques which use more operator labor and 
less tractor time and hired labor could also be included when capital is 
very limited. Introduction of such additional techniques would enlarge 
the possible areas of agreement between the landlord and the tenant. 
Where resources have alternative uses outside farming, or off the 
particular farm considered, it is Important to include opportunity costs 
as separate activities. In this study an opportunity coat of land is 
included for the landlord and the owner-operator, but it is not provided 
for any of the other resources. Introduction of these possibilities along 
with opportunities to buy inputs where this is possible add to the realism 
of a linear programming application. 
B. Recommended Areas of Study 
Study of the rationale of crop-share leasing is needed, aiming at an 
explanation of why present practices exist. An attempt should be made to 
understand the advantages and disadvantages of each part of the leases. 
For example, Johnson's suggestion that there may be a definite advantage 
connected with the short term of crop-share leases should bo evaluated. 
Study of the decision-making processes also is needed. The amount of 
supervision different landlords want to exercise should be defined and 
related to the type of lease he chooses. If it can be assumed in some 
situations that one peirty is the decision maker, then the problem of find-
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Ing a lease that will lead to an optimum allocation of resoiiroes is 
greatly reduced. Also the separation of leasing problems into thoir two 
logical parts: allocation of resources and distribution of income, would 
be sin^jler \riien one party makes all the production decisions. 
Application of linear programming to specific farm leasing problems 
is also important. Leases could be fitted to the resource situations 
and managerial abilities of particular tenants and landlords. Again it 
is worthwhile to consider the terms of the lease as almost infinitely 
variable, 
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APPENDIX A. GROSS INCOME, CAPITAL COSTS, AND LABOR REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL 
SITUATIONS 
Spaoe does not permit presentation of the basic matrices of coeffi­
cients used in this study. Instead, the data from which the coefficients 
can be computed are given in the Tables 32, 33 and 34. For any rotation 
and lease situation, an input coefficient is simply the input for that 
activity and lease divided by the corresponding gross income. 
Labor coefficients need not be con^tod for all months because it may 
be Impossible for some of them to be limiting. A month, say June, cannot 
be limiting if the June labor available per acre (based upon the assumed 
quantities of land and June labor available) is greater than the June labor 
requirement per acre for every activity. Land is selected as the common 
denominator here because 154 acres of cropland are assumed throughout. 
Assuming 149,4 hours available in J\ine, there are .97 hours per acre avail­
able, By inspection of the labor requirements in Table 34 (it is necessary 
to divide the labor requirement given by the acres at the head of each 
column), it can be seen that no activity reqiiires this much labor and that 
June labor could not be limiting while the land is fixed at 154 acres. 
Table 32. Gross income for leases anci activities 
ActivjJ-ic s 1-12 
Leases 1 c-n 
1 acre 
2 c-1 
1 acre 
3 c-m 1 
1 acre 1 
4 c-h 
1 acre 1 
5 cs-n 
2 acrer. 
6 CS-1 
P, acroc 
7 CS-m 
2 acres 
(ronai 
Tenant 1, 2, 3, U, 5 2A.15 34.50 44.85 55.20 54.27 69.78 81.93 
Tenant and landlord 6, ? 2A.15 34.50 4^f.85 55.20 54.27 69.78 81.93 
Tenant 7 19.32 27.60 35.88 44.16 43.42 55.82 65.54 
Landlord 1,2,3,4-, 5 2^.15 34.50 4A.85 55.20 54.27 69.78 83 .93 
Landlord 7 28.98 a.40 53.82 66. 2^ 65.12 83.74 98.3" 
Activitio 13-24 
Leases 13 COM-n 
3 acres 
]4 COK-1 
3 acres 
15 , COH-m 
3 acres 
16 COM-h 
3 acres 
17 CCOK-n 
4 acres 
18 CC0K-] 
4 acres 
19 GCOM-m 
4 acres 
(dolla ra) 
Tenant 1,2,3,4^,5 109.81 U2.92 151.31 148.82 U8.93 190.11 213.41 
Tenant and landlord 6 85.90 111.63 118.2A 116.51 125.40 3 59.58 li'r.34 
Tenant 7 68.72 89.30 94.59 93.21 100.32 127.66 144.27 
Tenant 8 106.39 138.36 146.75 145.02 145.89 186.31 208.85 
Landlord 1 69.98 88.34 93.17 - 92.20 109.36 • 137.C5 151.27 
Landlord 2, U 77.98 96.3/i 101.17 100.20 117.86 145.05 163.27 
Landlord 3, 5 86.98 105.34 110.17 109.20 126.36 154.05 372.27 
landlord 7 103.07 133.96 U1.89 139.81 150.47 191.50 216.41 
Landlord 8 90.40 109.90 114.. 73 113.00 129.90 157.85 176.83. 

ActivlT if s l-]2 
1 A- c-h 1 5 Gs-n 6 CS-1 7 CS-ir, 8 GS-h 9 CCO-n 10 CCO-1 11 CCO-m 12 CCO-h 
1 1 acre 1 2 acroit 2_.asrR£i, . .2. acres... 2 acres 3 acres 3 acres 3 acres 3 acres 
(c'o] larrj) 
55.20 , 54..27 69.7F 81.93 IOC.80 78.06 103.32 120.57 138.99 
55.20 54.27 69.78 81.93 10( .80 75.AO 99.90 117.15 135.95 
AA.16 U7>.K2 55.82 65.5A_ BO.U 6r.32 79.92 93.72 108.76 
55.20 5/^.27 69.7B 8D .93 100,80 72.7 A 96.48 113.73 132.91 
65.12 83.7A %.32 12C.96 90.4.8 119. 8P; UO.58 l''-3.U 
Actilviti or.''13-22i. 
16 COM-h 17 CCOM-n 18 ccoi:-:: n9 CCOM-m ?( CGCM-h 21 CL'G0i;-n 2? CSCOM-1 23 CSCOK-re 2A CSCOM-h 
acres 4. acres 4 acres 1 A acres 4. ; crcs 5 acres 5 acres 5 acres 5 acres 
U8.82 U8.93 190,11 213.41 214.37 177.A9 224.43 252.11 25°.52 
116.51 125.40 3 59.58 180.34 IP.2.06 153.96 193.90 219.04 227.21 
93.21 100.32 127.66 l/Jv.27 I-.5.65 123.16 155.12 175.23 181.77 
U5.02 U5.89 186,31 208.85 210.57 174.A5 220.^^.3 247.55 255.72 
92.20 109.86 137.05 15:.27 157.75 138,42 173.37 193.97 202.99 
100.20 117.86 145.05 163.27 1^5.75 U''-.42 179.37 201.97 210.99 
109.20 126.86 15A.C5 3 72.P7 374.75 155.A2 188.37 210.07 21^^99 
139.81 150.47 191.50 216,41 218.47 184.75 232.68 262.84 272.''-^5 
113.00 129.90 357.85 176.83. ,178.55 158.46 192.17 215.53 223.70 
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Table 33. Capital costs foi- leasee; and activities 
h 'iiviliotj 1-] 
Leases 1 C-n 
1 acre 
2 C-1 
1 acre 
3 C-ra 
1 acre 
U C-h 
1 acre 
5 CS-n 
2 ucroo 
6 c;.-i 
2 arret 
I 7 Cr-rr; 
i I ? acres 
(dol 'ars) 
Tenant 1, 2, 3 U.56 20.55 23.61 30.12 28.48 34.61 37.58 
Tenant U, 5 15. 26.53 31.71 43.79 31.60 47.87 
Tenant & landlord 6, 8 7.74. 13.26 15.86 21.90 15.80 • '>1 10 23.93 
Tenant 7 6.20 10.61 12.68 17.52 12.64 17.11 1' .14 
landlord 1, 2, 3 • .93 5.98 8.10 13.67 3.12 8.17 10.2^' 
I->andlord 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 ( 
landlord 7 9.29 15.92 19.03 2,6.27 18.96 25.67 2i: .T-
f-.nt.i V i(,'s 13-
I-eases 13 COM-n 
3 acres 
14 COM-1 
3 acres 
15 COM-m! 
3 acres 
16 COM-h 
3 acres 
17 CCOM-n 
4 acres 
18 CCOM-l 
4 acrct', 
19 -GOM-m 
4 acres 
Tenant 
\ 
1 56.23 69.35 73.12 79.17 72.19 
u 
91.12 
" >1". -irs) 
9P. 3C 
Tenant 2 64.23 77.35 81.12 87.17 8C.I9 99.1? 106.3c 
Tenant 3 73.23 86.35 90.12 96.17 89.19 108.12 315.30 
Tenant 4 69.79 90.01 95.90 108.14 86.68 117.76 129.18 
Tenant 5 78.7.9 99.01 104.90 117.14 05.68 126.7''^ 138.18 
Tenant & landlord 6 26.89 37.01 39.95 - 46.06 35.34 50.89 5' .59 
Tenant 7 21.51 29.60 31.96 36.85 28.26 40.70 45.27 
Tenant 8 51.89 62.01 64.95 71.06 60.34 75.89 81.59 
Landlord 1, 3 5.58 12.67 14.79 21.00 6.51 18.65 22. S9 
Landlord A,  5  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Landlord 7 32.27 44.40 47.93 55.28 42.41 61.05 67.90 
Landlord 8 26.89 37.01 39.95 46.06 35.34 50.89 56.59 

Act.ivilicis 1-12 
-h 5 C.S-n f: j 7 c;:-m 8 C^'-h 1 9 CrX'-n 10 CCO-1 11 CCO-m 12 CCC-h 
;re 2 acroD 2 acreo I 2 acrea 2 acrea 1 3 ncrea ...l..»Qre5 3..,.5i?xe!i.. 3 acres 
(col]ar.<3) 
L2 28.48 34.61 37,58 44. .46 42,57 56.94 62.76 7<' .25 
79 31.60 42.7?^ 47.87 60,32 47.34 73.86 83.92 10^1.17 
90 15.80 21.39 23,93 30.16 23.68 36.94 41. "6 54.58 
52 12,64 17.11 1".U 24.13 18.03 29.54 33.56 43.'"7 
37 3.12 8.17 10.2^^ 15.86 4.77 16.91 21.15 32,93 
0 0 ( 0 0 0 0 0 
27 18.96 23.67 2!:' .7" 36.19 28.41 44.32 5 ^ . 3 5  ^-5.50 
Ac^i'vifitin 13-2/. 
OM-lil 
ores 1 
17 GCOM-n 
4 acres 
18 CGOH-1 
4 acre;-
19 'CO!;-ml 
4 ac,TeE 
20 CGOM-h 
4 acres 
21 CSGOM-n 
5 acres 
22 CSGOM-1 
5 acres 
23 CEGOM-rr. 
5 acres 
24 CSGOM-h 
5 acres 
17 72.19 
(c 
91.12 
'ol' .'irs) 
9r. 30 110.24 •
 
CO 
104.84 111.01 124.12 
17 Be. 19 99.1? 106.30 118.24 93.67 112.84 119.01 132.12 
17 89.19 108.1? n5.30 127,2A 102,67 121.8A 128.01, u:.i2 
14 86.68 117.76 129.18 152.88 102,35 133.67 U5.08 168.95 
M 95.68 126.76 138.18 161.88 111,35 142.67 154.08 177.°5 
06 35.34 50.89 5' ,59 68.43 43.18 58.84 64.54 76,47 
85 28.26 40.70 45.27 54.75 34.53 47.07 51.63 61.18 
06 60.34 75.89 81.59 93.43 68,18 83,84 89.54 101.47 
00 6.51 18.65 22.89 34.67 8,70 20.84 25.08 36.86 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 42.41 61,05 67.90 82,12 51.81 70.59 77.44 °1.76 
06 35.34 50,89 56.59 68.43 43.18 58.84 64.54 76.47 

127 
Table 3A. Labor requirements for 24 activities 
Activitie.3 1-14 
1 C-n 2 C-1 5 CS-n 6 C3-1 9 CGO-n 10 GGO-1 13 GOM-n 14 GOK-l 
Months 3 C-m 7 GS-m 11 CGO-m 
4 C-h 8 GS-h 12 GCO-h 
1 acre 1 acre 2 acrer. 2 acres 3 acres 3 acres 3 acres 3 acres 
March 0 0 0 0 .355 .655 .355 .6'^5 
April .826 .876 1.414 1.464 2.547 . 2.647 1,721 1.771 
May 1.540 1.590 2.998 3.048 3.080 3.180 1.540 1.590 
June .917 .967 • 1.7B7 1.837 1.834 1.934 2.138 2,560 
July .749 .799 1.415 1.465 3.373 3.473 3.845 4.267 
August 0 0 0 0 1.875 1.875 1.957 1.981 
September .140 .140 .3U .3U .280 .280 .330 .388 
October 1.036 1.036 3.280 3.280 2.072 2.C72- 1.036 1.036 
November ].428 1.428 1.428 1.428 2.856 2.856 1.428 1.428 
December .364 .364 .364 .364 .728 .72P .364 .364 
Total 7.000 7.200 13.000 13.200 19.000 19.700 14.714 16.040 
Activities 1^--24 
15 COM-m 17 CCOM-n 18 CGOM-l 19 GGOM-m' 21 CSGOM-n 22 CSCOH-1 23 CSGOM-m 
Months 16 GOM-h 20 GGOM-h 24 GSGOM-h 
3 acres 4 acres 4 acres 4 acres 5 acres 5 acres 5 acres 
March .655 .355 .655 .655 .355 .655 .655 
April 1.771 2.547 2.647 2.647 3.135 3.235 3.235 
May 1.590 3.080 3.180 3.180 4.538 4.638 4.638 
June 2.666 3.055 3.527 3.633 3.925 4.397 4.503 
July 4.373 4.594 5.066 5.172 5.260 5.732 5.838 
Aufnast 1.988 1.957 1.981 1,988 1.957 1.981 1.988 
September .405 .470 .528 .545 .644 .702 .719 
October 1.036 2.072 2,072 2.072 4.316 4.316 4.316 
November 1.428 2.856 2.856 2.856 2.856 2.856 2. .-56 
December .364 .728 .728 .728 .728 .728 ,728 
Total 16.276 2,1.7U 23 .2A0 23.476 27.714 29.240 2' / . / . 76  
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APPENDIX B. GROSS INCOMES FOR THE OPTIMUM SOLUTIONS 
The net incomes and acres cropland for each optimum solution are 
presented in Tables 14.-17. The gross income for each solution is given 
in Table 35, These are needed in reconstructing the Pq column of any 
final tableau and stonmaries of solutions as in Table 13, Levels of 
resource use can be found by multiplying the gross income of the rotation 
in question by the appropriate labor or capital coefficient. 
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Table 35* Gross incomes of activities in optimm solutions 
Situation 
(tenant) 
Activity Gross income 
(dollars) 
Situation 
(tenant) 
Activity Gross income 
(dollars) 
1.1.1 23 3406.61 3.1.1 8 3400.82 
1.1.la 23 3406,61 3.1.1a 8 3400.82 
1.1.2 23 6813.23 3.1.2 8 
23 
1885.92 
4270.17 
1.1.2a 23 6813.23 3.1.2a 8 6801.64 
1.1.3 8 
19 
1382.60 
6294.64 
3.1.3 8 
19 
1386.54 
6286.64 
1.1.3a 8 
19 
1717.23 
6286.64 
3.1.3a 8 
19 
1717.23 
6286.64 
1.1.4 19 8271.72 3.1.4 8 7762.10 
1.1.4a 19 
23 
5971.11 
2123.13 
3.1.4a 8 7535.38 
2.1.1 8 3400.82 4.1.1 23 2606.61 
2.1.1a 8 3400.82 4.1.1a 23 2606.61 
2.1.2 8 
23 
1430.66 
5018.38 
4.1.2 23 5213.22 
2.1.2a 8 6801.64 4.1.2a 23 5213.22 
2.1.3 8 
19 
1386.54 
6286.64 
4.1.3 19 
23 
144.93 
7252.21 
2.1.3a 8 
19 
1717.23 
6286.64 
4.1.3a 8 
23 
298.13 
7423.08 
2.1.4 8 7762.10 4.1.4 23 7766.01 
2.1.4a 8 7535.38 4.1.4a 23 7592.24 
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Table 35. (Continued) 
Situation Activity 1 Gross income Situation 
I 1 (t^^an^) 
Activity Gross income 
(dollara) 
5.1.1 
5.1.1a 
5.1.2 
5.1e2a 
5.1.3 
5.1.3a 
5.1.4-
5.1.Aa 
6.1,1 
6.1.1b 
6.1.2 
6.1,2a 
6.1.3 
6.1.3a 
6.1.4 
6.1,^  
5 
7 
7 
23 
5 
7 
7 
23 
7 
23 
8 
7 
8 
17 
21 
23 
7 
21 
8 
19 
8 
8 
19 
8 
19 
8 
8 
2206.72 
368.13 
2576.12 
2309.12 
2701.12 
2288.85 
2853.58 
6.12 
7357.20 
516.06 
6869.68 
7762.10 
657.80 
6952.72 
1122.58 
2464.. 07 
1671.82 
2092.99 
3168.41 
1385.76 
53U.53 
7762.10 
1385.76 
53U.53 
1715.12 
5316.80 
7762.10 
7427.88 
7.1.1 
7.1.1a 
7.1.2 
7.1.2a 
7.1.3 
7.1.3a 
7.1.4 
7.1.4a 
8,1,1 
8,1,1a 
8,1,2 
8.1.2a 
8.1.3 
8.1.3a 
8.1.4 
8.1.4a 
17 
23 
7 
8 
8 
19 
8 
8 
19 
8 
19 
8 
7 
8 
8 
23 
5 
7 
8 
19 
8 
8 
19 
8 
19 
8 
7 
8 
156.91 
4940.77 
4705,81 
as. 55 
1108.44 
4251.38 
6209.68 
1108,44 
4251.38 
1373.17 
4251.10 
6209.68 
1313.52 
4592.99 
3926.27 
899.14 
2288,89 
2853.49 
1388,52 
6146.50 
7762.10 
1388,52 
6146.50 
1719.21 
6146,50 
7762,10 
1315.63 
6U3.34 
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Table 35. (Continued) 
Situation 
(landlord) 
Activity Gross income 
(dollars) 
Situation 
(landlord) 
Activity Gross income 
(dollars) 
1.2.1 7 2887.63 4.2.1 4 8498.90 
17 2317.60 
1.2,2 7 324..71 4.2.2 4 8498.90 
8 7367.57 
1.2.3 8 7762.10 4.2.3 4 8498.90 
1.2.4- 8 7762.10 4.2.4 4 8498.90 
1.2.5 8 1386.76 4.2.5 4 1212.92 
19 4573.46 8 228.27 
25 173.49 20 4886.08 
25 191.84 
2.2.1 7 2887.52 5.2.1 4 8498.90 
17 2486.55 
2.2.2 7 324.71 5.2.2 4 8498.90 
8 7367.57 
2.2.3 8 7762.10 5.2.3 4 8498.90 
2.2.4 8 7762.10 5.2.4 4 8498.90 
2.2.5 8 1383.71 . 5.2.5 4 1216.71 
19 4812.97 8 227.77 
25 172.59 20 5146.67 
25 193.10 
3.2.1 17 2550.25 6.2.1 21 1782.91 
23 3105.08 25 1921.82 
3.2.2 8 7393.94 6.2.2 21 4278.99 
23 308.20 25 300.37 
3.2.3 8 7762.10 6.2.3 7 4242.91 
8 2541.66 
3.2.4 8 7762.10 6.2.4 8 7762.10 
3.2.5 8 1387.69 
19 5072.41 6.2.5 8 1385.76 
25 173.43 19 5314.53 
25 172.25 
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Table 35. (Continued) 
Situation 
(landlord) 
Activity Gross income 
(dollars) 
Situation 
(owner) 
Activity Gross incom 
(doUare) 
7.2.1 21 1782.91 1 21 7131.65 
25 2115.08 25 763.64 
7.2.2 a 4278.99 2 8 8831.54 
25 764.21 23 195.13 
25 1283.80 
7.2.3 7 4966.85 3 8 2252.03 
21 1957.66 23 9598.13 
25 442.91 
7.2.4 8 9316.39 4 8 2782.39 
19 10,604.40 
25 176.63 
7.2.5 8 1667.86 5 8 2782.39 
19 6369.64 19 10,604.40 
25 174.05 25 176.63 
8.2.1 17 1837.83 6 21 7131.65 
25 194^.26 25 763.64 
8.2.2 17 4410.79 7 8 9023.76 
25 363.83 25 1289.68 
8.2.3 8 5159.47 8 8 11,697.47 
17 1677.07 25 759.22 
8.2.4 8 7762.10 9 8 14,036.96 
25 295.07 
8.2.5 8 1382.69 10 8 15,524.19 
19 5216.22 
25 171.53 
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APPENDIX C. TENANT LABOR AVAIIABLE 
For the limited labor situation it is assvimed that the tenant is 
willing to work 26 days a month for 10 hotirs a day, or 260 hours per month 
on the average. It is also assvimed that the tenant has the modal quanti­
ties of livestock which are found on crop-share farms in Northern Iowa as 
determined by the Shaw sample of 1950 (17), The quantities of livestock 
arej spring pigs, 30 fall pigs, 2 milk cows, 125 chickens, and no beef 
cattle, feeder cattle, or calves. Figures for labor requirements per 
animal are from a study 1:^ Clay Gilson (9). These are: 4..27 hours per 
spring pig, 6.00 hours per fall pig, 154 hours per milk cow, and 2.10 hours 
per hen. Multiplying the modal qviantities of each type of livestock by 
these labor requirements yields an approximate figure for the amount of 
time such a tenant devotes to his livestock a year, 
A month-V^-month percentage breakdown of the labor devoted to each 
type of livestock is then used to derive the monthly labor requirements 
(9), These percentage distributions are reproduced In Table 36 along with 
the final aggregated livestock labor requirements for each month. In 
Table 37 the livestock labor requirements are finally subtracted fi^m 26o 
hours per month, December, January, and February are dropped since very 
little field work is necessary in these months. 
The percentage of the time available for field work in the remaining 
months is derived from Iowa State College Agronomy Farm data iU) and Is 
recorded in column 4- of Table 37. This percentage times the residual 
labor after livestock yields the final figure for the amount of time 
available each month for field work (column 5 of Table 37). 
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Table 36. Jtonthly percentage distributions of labor for livestock and 
total monthly livestock labor reqvdrements of tenant 
Percentage distributi< pns Total livestock 
Month Sprixig Fall mik Chickens labor requirement 
pies Dies cows (hens) (hours) 
Jan* 7.9 9.7 11.0 7.6 84.8 
Feb. 7.9 7.6 10.5 7.6 79.4 
March 9.5 7.0 11.0 8.2 84.2 
April 10.0 5.4 9.5 9.8 81.7 
9.1 4.7 7.5 15.1 86.6 
June 8.3 5.2 6.0 10.5 69.5 
July 8.3 5.0 6.0 8.2 63.2 
Aug. 8.3 8.2 6.5 7.6 68.9 
Sept. 7.9 13.0 6.0 7.3 74.6 
Oct. 7.9 12.4 7.5 5.8 74.6 
Nov, 7.8 10.9 8.5 6.5 76.2 
Dec. 7.1 10.9 10.0 5.8 77.7 
TotaJ. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 37. Computation of time available for field work 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Assumed Hours Hours Hours 
Month hours required available Percentage of available 
tenant after time suitable for field 
willing tenant's livestock for field work work 
to work livestock (1) - (2) ( 3 )  X  (4) 
March 260 84.2 175.8 10,96 19.3 
April 260 81.7 178.3 71,98 128,3 
May 260 86.6 173.4 78.18 135.6 
Jvme 260 69.5 190.5 78.43 149,4 
July 260 63.2 196.8 92.79 182,6 
Aug. 260 68.9 191.1 87.35 166,9 
Sept, 260 74.6 185,4 90.23 167,3 
Oct. 260 7A,(> 185.4 90,73 168,2 
Nov, 260 76.2 183.8 64,62 118,8 
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APPENDIX D. TENANT UBOR INPUTS 
Yearly labor requirements for each crop are estimated and then distrib­
uted by monthly percentages throughout the year. It ig assumed that the 
tenant hires the following things done by custom operator: hay baling, 
com shelling, and transportation of com, oats and soybeans to market. 
The changes of the custom operators, and the cost of additional labor 
hired to help haul the hay and to help with the shelling, are considered 
capital inputs of the tenant rather than labor inputs. 
The remaining annual labor inputs of the tenant are assumed to be 7 
hours per acre for com, 5 hours per acre for oats and 6 hours per acre for 
soybeans (2). The extra labor for fertilizing com (starter fertilizer 
and side dressings) is assumed to be ,2 hours per acre evenly divided among 
the four months April through July. The extra labor needed to fertilize 
the oats is assumed to be .3 hOTirs per acre, all used at planting time in 
l-Iarch. 
The monthly percentage distributions of labor for com, oats and soy­
beans are presented in the first three coltmms of Table 38. The actual 
labor reqxairements in hours are found by multiplying the annual labor 
inputs by these percentages. 
The labor for hay is conq^uted on the basis of yield per acre and 
labor requirements per ton. Larger estimates (1) of haying time are 
adjusted to allow for custom baling and for hiring two thirds of the labor 
for loading, hauling, unloading and stacking. The operator's mowing time 
is .39 hours per ton and the raking time is ,2A hours per ton. Loading, 
hauling, unloading and stacking are assumed to require 1.66 hours per ton 
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Table 38. Computation of tenant labor inputs for com, oats, and soybeans 
Month 
Per cent of vearlv innuts- Labor inmts. hours/month 
Com 1 Oats 1 Soybeans Com Oats Soybeans 
March 7,1 MB ,355 
April 11.8 17,9 9.8 ,826 .895 ,588 
Jfay 22.0 - 24.3 1.540 - 1.458 
June 13.1 •. U.5 ,917 - ,870 
July 10,7 37.5 11.1 ,749 1,875 ,666 
Aug. - 37.5 - mt 1,875 -
Sept, 2,0 - 2.9 ,140 - .174 
Oct. 14»8 - 37.4 1,036 - 2.244 
Nov. 20, A - - 1,428 - -
Deo, 5.2 - - .364 - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100,0 7,000 5.000 6.000 
^Percentages obtained from private communication \d.th Dr. Ross Bauman 
( 2 ) .  
of v/hich 1.11 hours are hired and ,55 hours are furnished by the tenant. 
The tenant's total labor input per ton comes to 1,18 hours. Ilis capital 
inputs are $iA..OO per ton for custom baling and |;,87 per ton for hired 
labor. 
Since only three different hay yields are indicated for the different 
activities, there are only three different annual labor inputs for hay. 
These labor inputs are assumed to be distributed among the summer months 
as follows: June, 45 per cent; July, AS per cent; August, 3 per cent; 
September, 7 per cent (2), Table 39 summarizes these hay labor computa­
tions. 
In order to obtain the total labor requirements for various rotations 
as shown in Table 3A, the Individual labor requirements of each component 
of that rotation are added together. Tables 38 and 39 provide the data 
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needed for estimating the lalaor reqtdrements of the 24 rotations* 
Table 39. Operator labor for hay with various yields 
Yields, 
tons/ac. 
Annual 
hrs./ac. 
1.18 hrs. 
X yield 
June 
hrs./ac. 
of 
. annual 
July 
hrs./ao. 
of 
annual 
August 
hrs./ao. 
3^ of 
annual 
September 
hrs./ac. 
n% of 
annuEd 
2.3 2,7M 1.221 1.221 .082 .190 
3.0 3.540 1.593 1.593 .106 .248 
3.2 3.776 1.699 1.699 .113 .265 
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APPENDIX E. PRICES 
It is assumed here that the landlord and tenant both use the average 
prices for the years 1949-53 inclusive in making their plans. The prices 
of the products are those of the Iowa Crop and livestock Reporting Service 
(20), The averages for the five years 1949-1953 are: $1,38 per bushel 
for com, $,76 per bushel for oats, $2.58 per bushel for soybeans, and 
$17.82 per ton for hay. 
Seed prices used are those paid by Iowa farmers in the spring of the 
years 1949-1953 (29 and 30) except in the case of oats. It is assumed that 
the tenant has oats treated at a cost of $.05 per bushel, and these are 
used as seed oats. The average prices of the seeds for these five years 
are J $11,16 per bushel for hybrid corn, $3.65 per bushel for soybeans, 
$,505 per pound for red clover, $,65 per pound for alfalfa, $.217 per pound 
for timothy, $.22 per po\ind for sweet clover, and ^,81 per bushel for oats. 
Winter 1953-1954 fertilizer prices in Iowa were 196,38 per ton for 
33-0-0, i!^,41 per ton for 0-20-0, and I65.55 per ton for O-O-6o (4). 
These are easily converted into the prices per available pound of fertilizer, 
i«e,, 11,14603 per povmd N, $.111025 per pound P, and $,05463 per pound K. 
The ratio of the average B. A. E. fertilizer price indices for 1949-
1953 to the 1953 index was 148.8/153 (31). This ratio times the above 
individual prices yields approximations to the individual average prices 
for 1949-1953J $.1411 per pound H, $.10731 per pound P and $,0528 per 
pound K, 
The wage rate used here, $.786 per hour, is the average of the B, A. E. 
composite wage rates for Iowa, 1949-1953j as of October 1 each year (32). 
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The composite rate is a weighted average of monthly, daily, and hovirly 
wage rates combined with adjusted wage rates which include board and room. 
The custom baling rate of ^^,00 per ton is based on Iowa State 
College's farm service costs and suggested custom rates of $3,90 to ^,60 
per ton (3^)* The figure $4-»00 is chosen because it appears to have been 
the most common charge in Central Iowa in 1953-1954.. 
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APPENDIX F. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 
Capital expenditures are divided into constant costs and variable 
costs. "Constant costs" are the per-acre costs associated with the plant­
ing, cultivating, etc. of a particular crop. The "variable costs" are 
associated x^ith the different yields per acre and include such things as 
fertilizer and harvesting expenses. 
The constant costs considered arej overhead tractor costs, operating 
tractor costs, fixed machine costs, and seed costs. The first three are 
based upon cost estimates of lilderkin and Jensen for Iowa in 1949 (A). 
These are adjusted with separate farm indices to obtain the costs pre­
sented in Table 4-0. The seed costs in column 5 of this table are con^juted 
with the prices explained in Appendix E and the following assujned seeding 
rates; 1/6 bushels per acre for corn, 2 bushels per acre for oats, 15 
ixjunds per acre of sweet clover seed when this is used as a "catch" crop 
with oats, 1.6 bushels per acre of soybeans, and a hay mixture of 4- pounds 
per acre red clover, 6 pounds per acre alfalfa and 4- pounds per acre 
timothy. Another constant cost per acre paid by the tenant in some leases 
is his cash rent for hay or pasture land. 
Variable costs include harvest costs and fertilizer costs. The costs 
associated vrith harvest are listed in Table <il. The fertilizer treatments 
and the pounds of fertilizer for each are listed in Table 42. The prices 
from Appendix E are multiplied by the respective quantities of N, P and K 
and added to obtain the total costs of the treatments. 
la 
When these variable costs and the constant costs are added together 
for each crop in a rotation, the capital expenses in Table 33 are obtained. 
Table 40. Constant costs per acre for various crops 
Overhead Operating Fixed Total 
Crop tractor tractor machine machine Seed 
costs® costs^ costs® costs costs 
Corn 2.51 2.85 6.07 11.43 1.86 
Oats 2.59 1.46 4.02 8,07 2.49^ 
Soybeans 2.50 2.38^ 5.19 10,07 4.38 
Hay .67® 1.25® 1.28 3.20 6.79 
^•Elderlcin-Jensen estimate for 194-9 adjusted iidth Iowa Motor Vehicle 
Index for 1950-1952, and 1952 cost projected for 1953. 
^ELderkin-Jensen estimate for 1949 adjusted with the Iowa Auto Supply 
Index for 1950-1952, and 1952 cost projected for 1953. 
°Elderkin-Jensen estimate for 1949 adjusted with the Iowa Farm 
Machinery Other Than Motor Vehicle Index for 1950-1952, and 1952 cost 
projected for 1953. 
^I'/hen sweet clover seed at the rate of 15 Ibs./ac. and $,22/lb. is 
added, the oats-sweet clover seed cost becomes |i5.82/ac, 
®Here tractor costs are only for mowing and raking since loading, 
hauling, oinloading and stacking costs are considered variable. 
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Table 41. Variable costs per bushel or per ton for each crop 
Crop 1 Cost item Cost 
Com 
Com 
Com 
Com 
Oats and soybeans 
Oats and soybeans 
Oats and soybeans 
Hay 
Hay 
Hay 
Shelling-custom operator 
Electricity for elevating into crib 
Hauling to market~custom operator 
Labor for shelling and hauling to crib 
Total 
Electricity for elevating 
Hauling to market—-custom operator 
Labor for hauling from field to bin 
Total 
Custom baling 
Tractor costs for loading, hauling, etc. 
Hired labor for loading, hauling, etc. 
Total 
.02/bu.^ 
.0001/bu.^ 
.025/bu.\ 
.0177/bu.° 
,0628/bu, 
.OOOl/bu.® 
.025AtJ.® 
.0098/bu.o 
.03U9M* 
4.00/ton^ 
1.21/ton^ 
.87/ton® 
6,08/ton 
^Adapted from Elderkin-Jensen data (4)» 
^Extra worker hired for shoveling away from sheller, ,01 hrs./bu. 
Labor hired for hauling from field to crib, .0125 hrs./bu. (4). Total 
additional labor for com, ,0225 hrs./bu, at ^,786/hr. equals $.177/bu. 
0.0125 hrs./bu, at $,786/hr, equals $.0098/bu, (4.). 
^See Appendix E. 
®l.ll hrs./ton (see Appendix D) at !|.786/hr. equals $.87/ton. 
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Table 42. Computation of fertilizer costs for separate treatments 
Founds available Cost of fei ctiliser 
Treatment fertilizer cer acre N at P at K at Total 
N 1 P K ^.lAll S.1073 $.0628 cost 
Corn-l 30 AO 30 4.23 4.29 1.58 10.10 
Corn-m 60 AO 30 8.4.7 4.29 1.58 14.34 
Corn-h 120 60 AO 16.93 6.44 2.11 25.48 
Oats and hay-m®' 10 20 10 1.41 2.15 .53 4.09 
Oats and hay-h® 
-
-^ 0 20 mm 4.29 1.06 5.35 
®The author asstuned that this single fertilizer application at the 
time the oats was planted applied to both the oats (sweet clover) and the 
oats-meEidow in rotations. This may be an errorj however, it is not felt 
that it would affect the results enough to warrant complete recomputation 
(see Table /J.), 
